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“[T]here is plenty of evidence that the Negro is a very political animal. And that his 
political urges will find expression in other channels whenever he is deprived of 
participation in the usual political processes.”1 
 
“[sic]Most of the Negroes who did vote, voted in the cities. It was in the cities that Negro 
suffrage was most discussed, whether privately, or publicly through the medium of 
newspapers, interracial bodies, and Negro welfare organizations. It was in the cities [sic] 
that elections occurred in which Negro votes were more or less openly solicited; it was in 
the cities that stories arose, sometimes verifiable, sometimes not, of an occasional Negro 
balance of power.”2  
 
1. Introduction 
 Mounting scholarship on the development of black political activism before the 
period generally known as the mainstream Civil Rights Movement—a time marked by 
rampant activism, federal intervention, and new legislative mandates—has opened the 
door for new questions and inquiries. Recent scholarly contributions have provided 
evidence for what has recently been coined the “long civil rights movement,” pushing a 
collective inquiry into cases and narratives of black activism and political life since 
emancipation.3 
                                                 
1 Ralph Bunche, The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1973). 
2 Paul Lewinson, Race, Class & Party: A History of Negro Suffrage and White Politics in the South 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 150. 
3 Steven Hahn, The Political Worlds of Slavery and Freedom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2009); Risa Goluboff,  The Lost Promise of Civil Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2007); Thomas. J. Sugrue, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Forgotten Struggle for Civil Rights in the 
North (New York: Random House, 2009); Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement and 
the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of American History, 91:4, 2005. 
2 
There have been important contributions illuminating community-level black activism by 
political and social historians.4 These studies have provided evidence of black activism 
long before the days of the Montgomery bus boycott or sit-ins and have intricately 
solidified our understandings of black activism in the decades before the national 
spotlight focused on the historic black freedom movement. Among social scientists, a 
budding debate on the structural conditions and institutional changes necessary for 
sparking substantive policy change has also brought to focus the need for deeper 
analyses.  
 This dissertation recognizes the importance of bridging these literatures—those 
that have provided us with fine-grain accounts of black life in the early twentieth century 
with the big picture, top-down institutional analyses concerned with bureaucratic and 
legislative responses. By investigating what black activists inherited from earlier 
activities, we stand to learn that when federal interventions emerged, black activists were 
not starting with a blank slate and instead had passed on a toolkit that could be activated. 
Additionally, a deeper analysis of local activism prior to the mainstream Civil Rights 
Movement demonstrates the limits of local black activism and why structural and 
institutional changes were necessary in order for black activists to secure larger successes 
in later years. Situating the analysis on local activism—in this project, the focus is on 
                                                 
4 Earl Lewis, In Their Own Interests: Race, Class, and Power in Twentieth-Century Norfolk, Virginia 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Leslie Brown, Upbuilding Black Durham: Gender, Class, 
and Black Community Development in the Jim Crow South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2008); Glenda Gilmore, Gender & Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North 
Carolina, 1896–1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Karen Ferguson, Black 
Politics in New Deal Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Steven Hahn, A 
Nation Under Our Feet: Black Political Struggles in the Rural South, From Slavery to the Great Migration 






black Baltimore, and particularly middle-class black activists—allows us to observe the 
conditions in which race-based activism could take place before massive changes to the 
national racial landscape. 
 This project is motivated by some important unanswered questions in political 
science literature. First, several studies investigating black political attitudes and behavior 
begin with an analysis of black political behavior during or after the mainstream Civil 
Rights Movement. This literature has afforded us several useful and important analyses, 
but tells us less about the nature of black political engagement prior to the big changes 
occurring during and after the mainstream Civil Rights Movement and even less about 
the potential for local activism to set the stage for organizing work in later periods. 
Second, by embarking on serious inquiry into how institutions form and change over 
time, scholars in American Political Development (APD) have made great strides in 
explaining the institutional underpinnings of the growth of the social welfare state, 
political parties, institutional barriers, bureaucracies, and industrialization.5 What the 
APD literature does not reveal is why black activists could not make larger gains without 
changes to structural conditions. 6  
                                                 
5 Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004); Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political 
Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Richard Bensel, 
Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990); Daniel P. Carpenter, The Forgoing of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, 
Networks, and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862–1928 ( Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2001); Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National 
Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Richard F. Bensel, 
The Political Economy of American Industrialization, 1877–1900, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000); C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1955). 
 
6 Paul Frymer, Uneasy Alliances: Race and Party Competition in America (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1999);  V.O. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Vintage Books, 1949); Richard 
Valelly, The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004); Robert C. Liberman, Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State 
4 
 APD scholars studying the development of the long Civil Rights Movement have 
argued that external conditions such as World War II and the Cold War, and the death of 
King Cotton were necessary components to the crystallization of huge shifts in the 
political landscape. According to these scholars, WWII paved the way for black activism, 
as increasing attention on American segregation and racism placed race and democracy 
on the worldwide stage. Criticism and skepticism from other countries not only instigated 
activism by black soldiers but also put the U.S. on the defensive in justifying its own race 
relations.7 Although the APD literature reveals the fact that insufficient structural 
conditions were in place during much of the twentieth century and stymied any progress 
for substantial advances by black Americans, without prior experience in organizing 
grassroots movements, blacks would not have been able to capitalize on the structural 
changes in the manner in which they did. Therefore, there is a need to excavate the cases 
of local black activism before structural conditions changed to show the tools, methods, 
and strategies that were in practice when opportunities opened up.  
 In bringing to focus a community-level analysis, we learn that local activism was 
indeed present in black communities before the massive gains of the mainstream Civil 
Rights Movement. Some cases of local activism can be especially instructive and have 
not been fully exploited to build a more comprehensive narrative of the limits and 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1998); Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, Issue 
Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989); Suzanne Mettler, Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Policy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1998). 
 
7 Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and Decline of Racial Equality in 
America (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1999); Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and 
the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Robin D.G. Kelley, 




promise of local activism and the conditions that needed to be met to bring forward larger 
gains. This project seeks to contribute an additional piece to this growing area of 
scholarly inquiry and aims to fill in the gap of what we know from community-level 
studies and APD analyses. Building a bridge between community-level studies and 
institutional analyses also reveals what later activists inherited by way of experiences, 
successes and failures, methods of mobilization, strategies and tactics, and institutional 
partnerships that bolstered their efforts when structural changes took hold. 
 The main research question of this dissertation is: When did local black activists 
develop a proper fit between their existing resources, their mode of engagement on an 
issue, and the political environment in which they found themselves? In the same thread 
as Skocpol’s finding that white clubwomen found innovative ways to penetrate 
bureaucracies by finding a complementary fit between their method of organizing and the 
institutional windows available to them, this dissertation is focused on understanding 
when and how local black activists found a proper fit to launch successful campaigns, 
and the limits that held them from launching bigger agendas. In addition to understanding 
how black activists developed proper fits to launch their campaigns, this project also asks 
how disadvantaged groups make use of existing resources to build new resources to 
bolster their chances for successful campaigns; how they build expertise; and how the 
structure of organizing hinders or expands outcomes for political success.  
2. What the Literature Tells Us 
 Several students of political participation and mobilization investigate the 
relationship between political inequalities and political behavior.8 Scholars of black 
politics have devoted particular attention to the relationship between racial disparities and 
                                                 
8 Throughout this dissertation, the terms “black” and “African American” are used interchangeably.   
6 
participation rates, racial consciousness, and racial attitudes.9 The starting point for most 
studies in political science on black political participation begins with the 1965 Voting 
Rights Act.10 Research using data from the later part of the twentieth century has also 
shown that African Americans become more involved in local politics when they are able 
to develop interracial coalitions and bargain for improvements in local goods and 
services.11 Consistent throughout the literature on contemporary urban politics is the 
finding that African Americans have succeeded in making inroads in local-level 
politics.12 While helpful in explaining contemporary politics, these frameworks also 
invite investigation of whether these models hold up over time and if African Americans 
have historically behaved differently at the local level.  
 Early studies of African American political behavior in the pre–Civil Rights 
North offer preliminary indications that African Americans were active in politics in 
                                                 
9 Further discussions are found in: Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, “Beyond SES: 
A Resource Model of Political Participation,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 2 
(June1995), pp. 271–294; Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, Henry Brady, Norman H. Nie, “Race, 
Ethnicity and Political Resources: Participation in the United States,” British Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct., 1993), pp. 453–497.  Kinder, Donald R. and Lynn M. Sanders, Divided by Color: 
Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Katherine Tate, From 
Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1993); Michael Dawson, Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994); Melissa Harris-Lacewell, Barbershops, Bibles, and BET: Everyday Talk 
and Black Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
10 Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1993); Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, 
and Democracy in America (New York: Macmillan, 1993); Patricia Gurin., S. Hatchett & J. S. Jackson, 
Hope and Independence: Blacks’ Response to Electoral and Party Politics (NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 
1989). 
11 Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, “Protest Is Not Enough: A Theory of 
Political Incorporation,” PS, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Summer, 1986), pp. 576–581. 
12 Clarence N. Stone, Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946–1988 (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1989); Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, Protest Is Not Enough: The 
Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984); Keith Reeves, Voting Hopes or Fears? White Voters, Black Candidates and Racial Politics in 
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New 
Black Voters in American Elections (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Katherine Tate, Black 
Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S. Congress (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003). 
 
7 
cities. DuBois, Gosnell, and Drake and Cayton offered keen insight into the strength of 
political machines in accumulating the black vote in Northern cities. 13 Through this 
literature, we learn detailed accounts of the strong organizing roots of the black middle 
class. In cities such as Chicago and Philadelphia, newly enfranchised African Americans 
were joining the NAACP and Urban League, becoming members of fraternal societies at 
records speeds, and planning efforts to gain influence at the local level. While this 
literature has painted a fuller picture of how blacks behaved politically once they moved 
on to new opportunities in the urbanized North, less explored among social scientists is 
how newly migrated blacks behaved politically when they moved to cities outside the 
solid North.  
Political Participation and Mobilization: Classic Theories  
 
The participation literature generally falls into four categories: explaining who 
participates, determining factors that lead to participatory behavior, explaining why 
disparities occur, and investigating how people participate. According to Rosenstone and 
Hansen: “Participation is action directed explicitly toward influencing the distribution of 
social goods and social values.”14 Other classic accounts of voting participation posit a 
rational choice model to explain voting participation—in these models, the cost of voting 
does not outweigh the benefits and a single vote makes a small mark on the actual 
                                                 
13 W.E.B. Dubois,  Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1996), Harold Gosnell, Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago  (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1935); St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a 
Northern City (New York: Harper Row, 1962). 
14 Steven J. Rosenstone  and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America 
(New York: Macmillan, 1993). 
8 
outcome. From this perspective, people vote because it makes them feel good and 
provides a sense of duty.15  
Of course, political participation extends beyond the voting booth. Different 
modes of participation include: participating in campaign activities, contacting a 
government official individually or with a group, signing a petition, participating in a 
rally or boycott, and donating money.16 Scholars of voter mobilization have shown that 
people participate because they become mobilized and usually have an incentive to 
participate; they want to be part of the group or perhaps have a stake on the outcome.17 
So who is mobilized and who participates? Many have illustrated that people participate 
because they have resources. The most important of these are institutional resources and 
socioeconomic resources. Socioeconomic resources include education and income; 
income generally increases with education, and those with the most education tend to 
participate the most on average.18 Because education influences an individual’s 
propensity to participate, women and minorities tend to participate less than white males. 
Drawing on the work of classical frameworks of political participation, recent studies 
have found that resources acquired in nonpolitical institutions such as the workplace, 
church, and voluntary organizations are also key determinants of levels of participation. 
People learn how to give presentations, talk to strangers on the phone, work among a 
group, and write memos at work. If people choose to get involved with church activities 
                                                 
15 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper Publishers, 1957), Rosenstone 
and Hansen, 1993. 
16 Sidney Verba  and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and 
Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
17 Steven J. Rosenstone  and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America 
(New York: Macmillan, 1993). 
18 Sidney Verba  and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady, Voice and 
Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995).  
9 
or voluntary organizations, they may mobilize others to join their cause, organize and 
attend meetings, make phone calls, or write letters.  
Those who have few socioeconomic resources do not always get a chance to 
acquire certain institutional resources, such as workplace skills.19 Having the necessary 
skills and resources is not an automatic ticket to participating, though. People have to be 
engaged and interested if they are going to devote their time. For example, Burns, 
Schlozman, and Verba found that women are not always engaged in politics because 
some perceive politics as a man’s world. However, they have shown that when women 
are represented in politics, female citizens become more engaged.20  
 
Black Political Participation  
 
Contemporary discussions of race and participation have mostly analyzed why 
African Americans participate differently and at different rates than whites do.21 
Although wide-scale studies of political participation have shown convincingly that 
education and income are key predictors of participation, studies also revealed that when 
socioeconomic status is controlled, blacks participate equally to whites.22 Much of the 
work in political behavior found that race consciousness was also a key factor motivating 
blacks to vote beyond their socioeconomic status.23 More recent studies have examined 
                                                 
19 Nancy Burns and Kay Lehman Schlozman, The Private Roots of Public Action: Gender, Equality, and 
Political Participation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
20 Ibid. 
21Hanes Walton, Invisible Politics: Black Political Behavior (Albany: University of Albany Press, 1985); 
Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The New Black Voters in American Elections (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1993); Michael Dawson, Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American 
Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation 
in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). 
22 Lawrence Bobo and Franklin D. Gilliam, “Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment,” 
1990. The American Political Science Review, 84: 377–393; Katherine Tate, From Protest to Politics: The 
New Black Voters in American Elections (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
23 Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972). 
10 
the role of political context in black political behavior—namely how the emergence of 
black political candidates relates to political trust, engagement, and participation. This 
literature illustrates that a viable black candidate can spur mobilization efforts, and that 
given the context, black voters have been strategic in using nonvoting as a tool to express 
discontent.24 Drawing on the work of black political incorporation at the local level, Bobo 
and Gilliam argue that blacks who live in “high empowerment” areas, as measured by 
black political representation at the local level, participate more than their white 
counterparts do in the same localities25. Their work looks specifically to local politics and 
opens up questions about how black politics may operate differently at the local level and 
about change over time in the political development of black politics. 
Early studies of black political behavior can be traced to the works of Bunche, 
Key, Gosnell, and Drake and Cayton. Several analyses of black political participation 
before the Civil Rights Movement offer accounts of an anemic black polity and nearly 
nonexistent participation. Bunche and Key’s seminal studies highlighted that 
opportunities for black political participation were weak and virtually impossible because 
of one-party rule and rampant political intimidation across the Black Belt.26 In most of 
these accounts, places where black Republicans were active in local politics are given 
consideration when analyzing Southern blacks because black Republicans did some work 
at mobilizing and brokering patronage. According to Hanes Walton, in cities where one-
party rule was less oppressive, Black and Tan Republicans worked primarily at the state 
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and national level, although he cautions that they should not be considered influential to 
the local politics of African Americans: 
 In some localities, indeed, the Black and Tan organizations became merely self-
 seeking groups with no concern for the welfare of the Black community. Because 
 the Black and Tan leaders had no constituencies, like the lily-whites, they became 
 primarily presidential rather than local groups …. Politicians are generally more 
 concerned with getting elected and re-elected than with the promotion of social, 
 economical, and racial justice, and the Black and Tans were politicians first and 
 Blacks second.27  
 
Literature on African American political participation outside the North painted a bleak 
picture for good reason—lynch mobs were rampant, the white primary ruled, and racial 
history of the region is clearly sordid. However, the landscape of black political behavior 
may be a bit more nuanced than previously analyzed. For example, we know that in large 
cities like Chicago, black politics was exceptionally alive, and in places like Mississippi, 
acts of politics were physically threatening and few and far between.  
Social Movements Theories 
 
Some inside and others outside of political science have devoted a great deal of 
research to social movements. Social movement scholars contemplate how disadvantaged 
groups act on their grievances. The important questions center on how movements come 
to be, how they are sustained, and what leads to their success.28 This literature teaches us 
that disadvantaged groups often have few resources and little institutional power to bring 
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to bear on the political system. However, political activism can occur when socially and 
politically disadvantaged groups have a “package” of resources and can connect 
themselves to a political opportunity. Tilly argues that insurgent groups rely on a 
repertoire or a collection of strategies and tactics that are unique to their situation.29 
Resources are bundled in various combinations depending on the context, and 
marginalized groups evaluate their environment and opportunities, applying resources 
and strategies to position themselves strategically to advance their goals.30  
  Scholars interested in social movements generally agree that three actors are 
present: the aggrieved group, bargaining elites, and officials that make sure that change is 
enforced. For instance, Meyer and Tarrow argue that social movements “are best defined 
as collective challenges to existing arrangements of power and distribution by people 
with common purposes and solidarity, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and 
authorities.”31 Classical social movement theorists argue that groups that endure strain or 
discontent eventually reach a threshold and their psychological response results in the 
sparking of a social movement. To many classical theorists, social movements erupt and 
do not evolve.  
 Other classical theorists believe that resources are directly connected to a group’s 
ability to coordinate and execute a mass movement. Dahl succinctly argues that 
“whenever a group of people believe that they are adversely affected by national policies 
or are about to be, they generally have extensive opportunities for presenting their case 
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and for negotiations that may produce a more acceptable alternative.”32 In Dahl’s 
perspective, everyone has an opportunity to tap into some method of change and can 
effectively negotiate with a third party. Building on classical theories, resource 
mobilization theorists take the idea of discontent further in explaining that opportunities 
can only crystallize if individuals put their resources into action—in order for movements 
to develop and operate, resources such as time, money, and organizational capacities 
must be present. According to resource mobilization theorists, social movements do not 
form because strained groups are subject to a cathartic psychological experience, but that 
strain and discontent are always present and relatively stable over time. Discontent is 
cumulative and can wax or wane; movements arise because resources become available 
to otherwise unorganized groups.33  
 Proponents of resource mobilization theory contend that resources aggregate and 
disaggregate over time—money, time, and physical space change as time goes by and 
movement formation occurs when the strained group can physically act on their 
condition. As McCarthy and Zald note, “because resources are necessary for engagement 
in social conflict, they must be aggregated for collective purposes…resource aggregation 
requires some minimal form of organization.”34 Political scientists studying political 
participation look directly to resources to determine how an individual will behave. 
Resources play a prominent role in the way we come to understand how an average 
person becomes politically engaged. In the political behavior literature, we look to 
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education and income to explain political engagement, whether or not people will vote, 
participate in a rally, sign a petition, and contribute money to a campaign.  
A key element and possibly a weakness of resource mobilization theory is that 
disadvantaged groups accumulate resources via a third party. According to Jenkins and 
Perrow, “Collective action is rarely a viable option because of lack of resources and the 
threat of repression….When deprived groups do mobilize, it is due to the interjection of 
external resources.”35 Gamson echoes this account and claims that the interests of 
disadvantaged groups are “organized out” of institutional processes because they lack 
bargaining power. When studying political activity among disadvantaged groups, we 
must consider the repertoire of resources that disadvantaged groups may hold before we 
conclude that advancement is solely the result of bargaining with an external elite.36 
Although disadvantaged groups may appear to be the political underdogs, resources of all 
kinds often play a key role in mobilization and movement strategies.  
Charles Payne’s detailed analysis of the Mississippi Freedom summer found that 
the absence of external meddling enabled voter education schools to thrive. We learn that 
individuals removed from the economic power structure were able to create safe havens 
and organizational space for insurgents and were key to the movement’s success. Payne 
reveals a more complex arrangement of resource mobilization by showing that resources 
fostered within the disadvantaged group can be advantageous, because external actors 
may weaken movement progress.37 Charles Tilly also brings to light the importance of 
resources in crafting tactics and strategies that are specific to the aggrieved group. 
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According to Tilly, “Particular times, places, and populations have their own repertoires 
of collective action….”38 Repertoires are distinct because they are fashioned separately 
by groups and molded and reshaped depending on context. For example, Southern blacks 
had a repertoire that consisted of black church resources and communication networks 
among domestic workers; Southern whites, on the other hand, did not create the same 
toolbox of cultural tactics and strategies. Also important to Tilly’s understanding of 
repertoires is that they vary in how effective they are. According to him, groups with a 
limited repertoire (i.e., a sparse toolbox) are in turn limited in how effective their group 
can be—they are limited in the nature of their activities and the effectiveness of their 
tactics. Last, Tilly believes that every group is faced with the decision of whether to use 
indigenous tactics that they are most familiar with or to create new tactics.  
In Payne’s analysis, Southern blacks employed a specific repertoire of familiar 
tactics—beauticians, funeral directors, and everyday street hustlers were key actors in 
keeping communication networks thriving and providing organizations with space 
separate and apart from white spaces.39 In Skocpol’s work, leaders employed tactics 
learned in the settlement house movement and with their women’s clubs to project a 
politics of motherhood that convinced male policymakers and was unique to the 
experiences learned in a gender segregated space. In Skocpol’s work, women recognized 
that white male policymakers had a certain reverence for motherhood and women’s work, 
and strategically positioned themselves as mothers and not as social agitators. Likewise, 
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the hairdressers and local street hustlers in Payne’s account maneuvered under the radar 
and integrated their political activity into their everyday life of African Americans in 
Mississippi.  
 We can better understand the relationship between institutional political 
opportunities and social movements by looking at the work of Theda Skocpol. Theda 
Skocpol introduces an institutional approach to explain that individual resources alone do 
not fully explain how citizens participate. In what she calls a structured polity approach, 
Skocpol argues that institutional change occurs when a group has the political 
opportunity to operate within an institutional niche.40 In her case, white clubwomen had 
the opportunity to become bureaucrats in the emerging gendered social policy arena. 
Prior to women’s suffrage, politicians were uncertain about the looming political power 
of a women’s voting block and were more amenable to their political requests. White 
clubwomen also had the necessary resources to take advantage of their opportunity: They 
were educated, were trained social workers currently engaged in public interest work, and 
were members of federated women’s clubs that stretched from small Midwestern towns 
to national headquarters. Skocpol’s research not only established that federated civic 
associations have the potential to strongly influence policymaking via lobbying and 
networking but also highlighted how everyday people with the necessary tools can take 
advantage of opportunities within government institutions.41  
 An important lesson learned from the social movement literature is that the 
movement is dependent on the structure of politics as well as the ability to bargain with 
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elite actors. According to Doug McAdam, black insurgency during the Civil Rights 
Movement was a result of slowly simmering political opportunities and not of a sudden 
catalyst. He counts the Great Migration, the death of King Cotton, and the strengthening 
of black organizations as political opportunities that allowed social movement activity to 
develop. In this framework, several factors are crucial to the development of social 
insurgency, including: organizational readiness, insurgent consciousness, and a 
restructuring of political opportunities.42  
Although much of the social movement literature deals with national movements, 
the key components of resources, bargaining power, and political opportunities can easily 
be applied to local politics. Jack Walker’s work on Atlanta in the early sixties sheds light 
on how a local story of social movement activity differs from a national one. Walker and 
McAdam study the same movement, but Walker’s local focus opens intricate discoveries. 
Walker finds that blacks Atlantans agreed on the goal of dismantling Jim Crow but 
differed on tactics.43 Conservative blacks pushed for bargaining with white officials, 
whereas liberal blacks favored boycotts and protest.44 Walker’s work reveals the 
necessity to analyze local-level differences in how groups form strategies along with the 
heterogeneity imbedded in interest-group politics. McAdam also discusses dissention 
within black leadership, but his national analysis does not fully reveal the intricate stories 
of dissention at the local or regional level.  
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Black Institutions and Resources  
 
 Gunnar Myrdal proclaimed that African Americans were hyper-involved in 
organizations.45 Unlike whites, African Americans belonged to a collection of 
organizations that all had some motivation for improving racial conditions and/or 
opportunities for the disadvantaged. Historically, students of black politics have 
explained that black political participation must be studied alongside black organizations 
and institutions. A constant theme of almost any work on black politics is the argument 
that black institutions have been and remain the spine of any phenomena in black 
political behavior. Hanes Walton, W.E.B. DuBois, Harold Gosnell, and Drake and 
Cayton all hail the importance of the church, the independent black press, racial uplift 
organizations, and fraternal organizations in black politics. However, the most complete 
studies of black institutions center on either Northern cases or the inner workings of the 
Civil Rights era. For example, we learn that black institutions were key components that 
enabled black political influence in Chicago in the early twentieth century and that 
Southern blacks in Mississippi utilized informal and formal institutions to covertly 
mobilize during the heat of the Civil Rights Movement.46 The obvious gap in the 
literature is the scarcity of studies on the role of black institutions in political life in 
multiple cities in the early twentieth century. 
 The precise reasons why black institutions such as the church, secret societies, 
black-owned businesses, and race uplift organizations were the basis of black politics are 
because every one of these institutions provided a safe space where ideas could be 
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generated and mobilization could occur without the presence of the white power 
structure. Black institutions were segregated in their own right and were places free of 
meddling from outsiders who were not committed to their cause. Further, black 
institutions allowed a space to challenge white supremacy because they were segregated. 
Whites did not attend black churches, were not widespread readers of black newspapers, 
and were not members of local black organizations—the imposed segregation of black 
institutions protected their politics and opened a space for mobilization to occur. African 
American institutions served an enormous role in teaching democratic principles and 
providing participatory tools that were later executed through formal politics. Black 
institutions were the places where African Americans were kept abreast of the political 
and social happenings of the day. It was the institutions that encouraged the vote, the 
rallies, and the petitions, be it through the pulpit, in a grassroots organization, or on the 
pages of the black press. Concepts of democracy and equality were foremost in black 
institutions, and an ideology of racial uplift was echoed in many organizations.  
 Recent historical monographs provide examples of political activism and 
participation occurring in unexpected places in the Jim Crow South. For example, in 
Ortiz’s account, local black institutions in Florida crafted strategies and were extremely 
tactical in organizing voter registration drives at the local level and encouraging the vote 
on certain municipal matters.47 The resulting mobilization drives often confused white 
elected officials, and the source of mobilization was generally never pinned down. As a 
result, black institutions had opportunities to do political work even if the institution was 
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not explicitly political in nature or in purpose. The real strength of black institutions came 
from the tradition of crosscutting memberships.  
 As Myrdal so accurately noticed, African Americans belonged to a plethora of 
organizations working toward similar goals. This means that in cities across the country, 
African Americans were members of multiple organizations in small localities. For 
example, a single individual might have been a general member in one organization, a 
secretary for their church auxiliary, and the treasurer of their fraternal organization. The 
concentration of leadership roles culminated in the building of a diverse political toolkit 
for many African Americans. The skills accumulated in each organizational role taught 
varying and useful political skills such as voting, rallying, letter writing, public speaking, 
and fundraising.  
 As Skocpol highlights, “The existence of more lodges in relation to any given size 
of population meant that black men and women not only had more opportunities for 
social intercourse; they also enjoyed extra opportunities to learn and exercise 
organizational skills by serving on working committees and holding officerships in 
fraternal organizations.”48 In cities outside the North, fraternal organizations introduced 
organizational and political skills to all classes and offered resources previously afforded 
only to the middle class. Fraternal organizations broke class barriers by including poor 
blacks and also pushed on gender constraints with the presence of female fraternal 
orders.49 
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 The web of black institutions stretching from fraternal orders to the black church, 
and organizations such as the NAACP allowed racial uplift work to operate in multiple 
arenas with varying levels of influence and exposure to white power structures. Secret 
societies and the black church had limited exposure to the white power structure, and that 
anonymity was valuable in pulling together agendas and actors without the threat of co-
optation or violence. Institutions with more exposure, such as the NAACP, utilized their 
status to build coalitions and navigate access to political institutions. 
 The NAACP is generally regarded as the epitome of black organization and 
institutional strength.50 The 1930s were a tremendous period of growth for the 
organization, and local branches proliferated in places beyond the North. Nationwide, 
NAACP membership increased from approximately 18,000 to 156,000 from the late 
thirties to the end of WWII.51 I argue that in places like Baltimore, the NAACP worked in 
innovative ways at the local level that had lasting impacts on the future legal and 
legislative battles forged in the 1950s and 1960s. For example, data from the papers of 
the NAACP reveal that in Baltimore, the local branch of the NAACP spent much of its 
time trying to (1) create coalitions and multilayered networks among various black 
organizations to build resources to fight for local causes and (2) worked consistently on 
local issues and not as much on the legal or national issues that were encouraged by the 
national office.52  
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 Black fraternal organizations were another realm of institutional strength in the 
black community. In cities across the United States, secret societies enabled covert 
political mobilization. Organizations such as the Knights of Pythias, Prince Hall Masons, 
and the Easter Star had abundant membership rolls. Leaders of secret societies and 
fraternal organizations could effectively order their members to register to vote, pay their 
poll taxes, and cast their vote for a particular candidate.53 Fraternal orders are further 
evidence of the bundling and interconnectedness of black organizations and institutions. 
Lodges run by black women and men had expansive membership rolls. Executive 
leadership from the NAACP were members of lodges, as were reverends and pastors, 
sorority leaders, and everyday people. As such, there is evidence that fraternal orders 
worked alongside and in tandem with other organizations. Donations moved between 
fraternal orders and larger racial uplift organizations such as the NAACP, resulting in the 
formation of an extensive web of black institutional resources that became a presence 
both inside and outside the public eye.54 
3. The Argument 
 Again, this dissertation helps to explain how and when black activists developed a 
proper fit to launch campaigns for local racial change. By “fit,” this project is concerned 
with how black activists made use of their organizational and institutional resources, their 
political environment, and their method of engaging and mobilizing on an issue to find 
ways to make political gains. Black Baltimoreans made real gains, but these gains were 
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limited and did not wholeheartedly transform black Baltimore. Transformational changes 
would be ushered in years later as structural conditions opened up and political 
representation at the federal, state, and local level brought a new face to black politics, 
bringing a new era with new challenges and agendas. 
 This project takes on Baltimore, Maryland, from roughly 1920–1944, and situates 
the analysis in what scholars have often described as the nadir of black political 
activity—a time sandwiched between the rapid rise and fall of Reconstruction-era black 
political advances and the modern racial gains culminating from the 1950s and 1960s. I 
chose the 1920–1944 time period for this project because (1) the interwar period 
preceded historic political and social changes in American politics and (2) because since 
this project is interested in the nature of black activism, it was important to analyze a 
period in which black organizations were fully functioning. This project ends at roughly 
1944 because by then black Baltimoreans had participated in the Annapolis march and 
had set in motion the Governor’s Commission to Study the Problems Affecting Colored 
People, which addressed the grievances expressed over several decades and launched the 
agenda that would shape the local contemporary Civil Rights agenda.  
 I argue that black activism flourished during this period and that activists were 
able to pass along a set of strategies and a method of building interwoven networks and 
overlapping networks in meaningful ways. Black activists in Baltimore developed 
detailed interwoven networks, and at times, doing so enabled them to lessen the 
collective action problem and communicate clear messages to a varied audience with 
consistent strategies. Further, this project makes an argument for the limits of black 
activism and the impediments to substantive change. Institutional barriers such as weak 
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political influence and minimal or absent political representation limited black campaigns 
to single issues rather than substantive system change. Although black activists did make 
attempts at widespread system change, I will discuss cases where they were most 
successful when crafting their expertise and placing their resources into a single issue that 
did not call for reverberating change to Baltimore politics. Last, it is important to note 
that the actors in this project are mostly middle-class activists. The main voices in each of 
the cases discussed in this project were middle-class, positioning this analysis within a 
class construct that had bearing on ideological frameworks, tactics utilized, and the 
agendas advanced. The cases discussed in future chapters pay close attention to how 
cross-class versus middle-class coalitions played out and how activists compiled their 
resources and tactics to find a successful fit to push for their gains.  
4. Case Selection and Research Design 
Case Research  
 In determining cases to be included for this project, I first conducted a complete 
scan of articles in the Baltimore Afro-American that made mention of strictly local issues. 
I scanned all available editorial pages and headlines from 1920–1945 in the newspaper, 
searched available historical databases, and followed leads from potential articles and 
secondary literature. The Baltimore Afro-American was one of the most prominent black 
newspapers in the country, ranking third in circulation behind the Pittsburgh Courier and 
Chicago Defender in 1935, and it grew to a circulation of 154,511 by 1942.55 Much like 
other prominent black newspapers of its time, the Afro-American was the central and 
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most influential mouthpiece on all social and political concerns in Baltimore and reported 
broadly on race relations across the country and internationally.56 
 Table 1.1: Baltimore Afro-American Circulation Nationwide and Internationally, 
193857 
City/Region Circulation 
New England 3,626 
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania 10,019 
Philadelphia 12,372 
Baltimore 21,497 
Washington, DC 16,557 
Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina 11,350 
Other states, Canada, International 5,929 
Total Circulation: 81,485 
 
 In addition, I conducted research at the Schomburg Center for Research in Black 
Culture, the University of Pennsylvania, and the Library of Congress to collect material 
on the Baltimore NAACP and its relationship with the national office of the NAACP. 
Specifically, the research focused on local branch papers, administrative staff 
correspondence, annual reports, financial reports, special correspondence files, field 
secretary files, and campaign files. This data provided substantive clues to the larger 
story of the building of Baltimore’s black organizing tradition, the actors involved, the 
agenda setting, and the conflicts and tensions between the national office and the local 
branch.  
 This project also made extensive use of the Urban League archives held at the 
Library of Congress. In particular, archival material for annual reports, research 
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department files, Baltimore Urban League records, and community department files were 
crucial to rounding out the story of activism that included partnerships with working-
class labor groups. This project has also made full use of the private family archives of 
the Mitchell family—members of the Mitchell family represent key actors in this project. 
The Library of Congress holds a limited selection of records from the Mitchell family; 
however, this project includes records that are not publicly available. Research at the 
Mitchell family archives included a complete scan of records from Florence Snowden, 
Clarence Mitchell, Juanita Jackson Mitchell, Lillie Jackson, and Virginia Kiah. These 
archival records  were crucial to data collected on the City-Wide Young People’s Forum 
and neighborhood associations. Further, personal letters were invaluable to building a 
stronger narrative of the personal and familial networks embedded in Baltimore’s 
organizing tradition. 
 Research for this project also included a complete scan of archival records of 
Sharp Street Memorial Church papers and the papers of Edward Lewis, both housed at 
the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture. Additional research on state and 
local governmental records was conducted at the Enoch Pratt Library, the New York 
Public Library, and the Baltimore City Archives. Unfortunately, several municipal 
records have not been properly preserved and that limited the availability of municipal 
materials. Last, this project made use of the records of the First Colored Directory of 
Baltimore City from 1919–1945, made available by the Maryland State Archives and 
Morgan State University. 
 This projects draws on archival and newspaper records for several reasons. Black 
newspapers and archival sources provide detailed accounts of how agendas came to the 
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surface, who was involved, what mobilization tactics were unleashed, and how activities 
unfolded. Articles and editorials from the Afro-American are particularly useful in tracing 
the evolution of discussion and discontent around a particular issue on a weekly basis, 
and provide a front-row seat to organizational activity because meeting announcements 
are posted along with detailed accounts of leadership and issues discussed. There are 
limitations and biases to drawing from the Afro-American for news coverage. For one, 
this project does not place accounts from the mainstream white newspapers into the 
analysis. There were distinct reasons for not relying on white newspaper accounts—white 
newspapers did not report on black organizational activity and did not have access to the 
inner workings of black activists because of segregation and the absence of black 
reporters. White newspapers could be useful if this project included an analysis of the 
reactions and organizational activities of whites in Baltimore, but this project is focused 
on detailed accounts of black activism, making the Afro-American a suitable choice for 
analysis. 
 Several factors motivated my decision to utilize archival records from the 
NAACP and Urban League. While admittedly the archival sources utilized have their 
own limits and biases , they also have tremendous value. First, archival records from the 
Baltimore NAACP offered the most abundant and accurate accounts of the organization. 
These records displayed personal correspondence and conflict, important information on 
memberships, and annual reports on branch activity. The NAACP papers revealed a rare 
glimpse into the day-to-day activities of black organizing in Baltimore and its nuances. 
The limitations inherent in the NAACP papers are the voices that are not represented. 
The NAACP papers provided information on high-level leadership and not general 
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members or those not involved in branch activities. Therefore, what is missing from this 
analysis from the data standpoint is information on those on the periphery or outside 
leadership circles, and we know little about their levels of political engagement. Although 
this is a clear limitation of utilizing NAACP records for this analysis, there are no strong 
alternative records that would provide information on those standing on the margins of 
organizational activities.  
 Records from the Urban League were chosen for this analysis because they 
provided information on social scientific studies of black Baltimore along with detailed 
summaries of yearly activities. Urban League records were also chosen because they 
included information on black labor activities, which stood in contrast to the NAACP 
records. However, there are also limitations to the Urban League records. Unlike the 
NAACP records and newspaper accounts, Urban League records do not show 
deliberations and correspondence among individuals about strategies and tactics or 
agendas. Lastly, this project also includes records from the private archives of the 
Mitchell family. These records were useful in researching the actual inner workings of 
black activists in Baltimore—and in particular, their personal correspondence and 
mobilization tactics. However, it is important to note that this data source has its own 
biases because it reflects the work of one particular family rather than multiple actors. 
Although the private archival material has its own biases, it does offer firsthand 
information from black actors centrally involved in black activism during this time and is 
an important source of information. 
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Focus on Local Politics and Case Selection 
 Because this dissertation argues that black activists made incremental political 
gains prior to the textbook Civil Rights Movement, it is appropriate that the research 
focuses on local-level activism. We would be analyzing black activism in the wrong 
places if the focus was at the federal or even state level, where blacks had little practice 
and no political representation and influence. For example, if this project focused on how 
black activists maneuvered within Congress or worked with their respective state 
legislators, our data would be greatly limited, because very few blacks were in positions 
of power at these levels. Alternatively, blacks were organizing in large numbers at the 
local level and putting pressure on local officials. The windows of opportunity and action 
were situated at the local level, and local polities served as a training ground for later 
activism in different times.  
  Cases were chosen for this project based on the following criteria: (1) they were 
strictly local battles and were sparked and carried out by local groups, (2) they involved 
activism and were not primarily legal in strategy or desired outcome, and (3) the cases 
occurred in different time periods but were finite in their duration.   
 I chose cases that were local battles because the purpose of this project is to 
demonstrate how local people battled over local issues. Cases in surrounding areas or 
those that extended beyond Baltimore were omitted.58 Secondly, I honed in on cases that 
                                                 
58 For example, in the 1930s, Thurgood Marshall led the NAACP legal team in extending the teacher 
salary equalization fight to the counties surrounding Baltimore City.  These cases were omitted from this 
analysis because a legal strategy was the primary mode of activism and secondly because the activity 
stretched beyond Baltimore.  For a complete history of these efforts, see  Mark Tushnet, NAACP’s Legal 
Strategy against Segregated Education, 1925–1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987) 
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sparked mass or group activism and involved some level of group organization.59 
Although much of the activity was situated in the legal realm, the objective of this project 
is to describe how groups mobilized locally, and not the path to legal redress.60 Lastly, I 
chose cases that did not persist for decades.61 For one, this was a logistical consideration 
to ensure that this project included a robust sample of several cases rather than to focus in 
on one protracted battle. This case strategy is not meant to diminish the importance of 
tracing the development of legal battles in the development of racial policy. In fact, 
several recent studies have illuminated the importance of early legal strategies in the 
development of black activism.62  
  
                                                 
59 I defined group organization as efforts mounted by a group of individuals with a leadership and 
membership structure.  Group size or tenure of activity was not a determinate. 
60 To glean a deeper understanding of longer protracted battles that were hinged in the legal realm, see the 
Enoch Pratt library case and efforts to break down the color barrier in hiring practices.  “Library Case 
Victory Seen as Avenue for Opportunity,”  Afro-American,  October 20, 1945; “Council Head Didn’t 
Know of Library Discrimination,”  Afro-American, April 29, 1933; “Afro Reporter First Applicant for City 
Library School,” Afro-American, August 30, 1930; “Race Bias Banned in Baltimore Library,” Afro-
American, April 28, 1945 
 
61 For example, see the prolonged fight for black representation on the local school board.  My 
investigation of cases for this project revealed that black Baltimoreans fought for black school board 
representation from roughly 1920 to 1944 when a black school board member was appointed.  To trace the 
decades long push for black representation on the school board see:  “Will Not Commit: Mayor Tells 
Delegation That his Appointment to School Board Will Satisfy Colored Voters,” Afro-American, January 
16, 1920; “A Superintendent of Colored Schools,” Afro-American, February 25, 1921; “The School 
Board,”  Afro-American, March 22, 1930; “School Board Voted Down Strayer Recommendation for Real 
Head of Colored Schools,”  Afro-American, May 12, 1922; “The School Board’s Jim Crow Reception to 
Teachers,”  Afro-American, May 11, 1935; “School Shake-Up 10 Years Late,” Afro-American, June 30, 
1934; “On School Board,”  Afro-American,  May 25, 1944; “Broening Balks at Negro Appointment,”  
Afro-American, April 26, 1930; “Mrs. Bauernschmidt Urges Uniformed Colored Police, Member on School 
Board,” Afro-American, May 9, 1942; “Mayor Repeats City Not Ready for Board Member,” Afro-
American, March 28, 1942; “Mayor Names White Man to School Board,” Afro-American, May 17, 1941.  
Also, the lobby for black representation on city school boards was not isolated to Baltimore city with 
evidence that similar efforts were waged in other cities.  For example, see: “On Chi School Board,” Afro-
American, August 15, 1942; “D.C. School Board Member,” Afro-American, January 30, 1943. 
 
62 For a fuller analysis of the law in relation to the development of race policy in the United States see:  
Vesla M. Weaver, “Frontlash: Race and the Development of Punitive Crime Policy,” Studies in American 
Political Development, 21 (Fall 2007), 230-265; Megan Ming Frances, Crime and Citizenship: The 
NAACP’s Campaign to End Racial Violence, 1909-1923 (dissertation Princeton University, 2008). 
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A total nine cases were chosen for analysis in this project:  
• The Urban League’s campaign to eradicate disease and clean up the “Lung Block;” 
• Activism by neighborhood associations to remove taverns from black 
neighborhoods; 
• The joint Afro-American and Urban League campaign to expand the city’s 
playground system for black children; 
• The Citizens Committee for Justice’s mass march on Annapolis and their efforts to 
fight police brutality against blacks; 
• The Monumental Golf Club’s activism to desegregate city golf courses; 
• Activism on behalf of black city council members for black political appointments; 
• “Don’t Buy Where You Can’t Work” activism launched by the City-Wide Young 
People’s Forum; 
• Urban League efforts to desegregate employment sectors; 
• Organizational activism around the fight to equalize the salaries of black teachers 
 
The cases chosen for this project vary by the type of organization carrying out the work, 
class dimension, and nature of effort. It was important to compare cases by the type of 
organization, because different groups had unique habits of organizing and constraints on 
their resources and mobilization abilities. These cases also vary in whether they were 
marked by middle-class or cross-class activism to show how different ideologies and 
actors involved approached and attempted different tactics and agendas. Last, in 
researching the cases for this project, it became clear that they fell into three specific 
issue domains. During the period analyzed, black activists in Baltimore primarily 
organized around social welfare, antidiscrimination, and employment. 
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Table 1.2: Case Selection 
 
Type of Organization Middle-Class Activism Cross-Class Activism Issue Domain 
 
Federated Lung Block 
 
 Social welfare 
Grassroots  
 
 Anti-tavern fights Social welfare 
Federated 
 
Playground expansion  
 
 Social welfare 
Grassroots  
 
 Police brutality  Anti-discrimination 








Grassroots   “Don’t Buy Where You 
Can’t Work” campaign 
 
Employment 
Federated  Urban League 
employment campaigns 
Employment 






Choice of Baltimore  
 This dissertation project presents an in-depth case study of the local black politics 
of Baltimore, Maryland, from roughly 1920–1945. Baltimore presents an interesting case 
because it was highly organized and was home to key black institutions, and it had a 
substantial black population compared to other border cities. Since this project is 
concerned with understanding the limits and successes of black activism before political 
opportunities opened up, Baltimore presents an interesting city because it embodied both 
Southern and Northern characteristics. Like other African Americans in some Southern 
and border cities, African Americans in Baltimore could vote at the local level and 
participated in voting drives. However, Baltimore had a separate institutionalized 
“colored” school system, but did not have segregated public transportation; Baltimore 
had no formal institutionalized Jim Crow legislation at the local level, but blacks were 
banned from department store floors, and white-only signs were intermittently located 
throughout the city. By 1910, a residential segregation ordinance was passed in 
Baltimore. This effort was initiated to exclude middle-class blacks from moving to 
certain blocks in the northwest section of the city, and what ensued was a heated legal 
battle lead by the local NAACP. In the end, the ordinance was rife with implementation 
challenges, but white homeowners continued to harass potential black residents.63  
                                                 
63 Stephen Grant Meyer, As Long as They Don't Move Next Door: Segregation And Racial Conflict in 
American Neighborhoods. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). 
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Figure 1.1: Map of Baltimore and Concentration of Black Population, 193064 
 
 Recent attention on the contemporary politics of Baltimore has generated 
increased curiosity about the city. However, scholars have noted that studies are scant, 
and important lessons can be learned from Baltimore. 
 Yet as a city in-between North and South, it has rarely received the historical 
 attention it deserves. Other cities in the Northeast and Midwest have been used for 
 case studies of industrial growth—New York, Boston, Pittsburg, Milwaukee, and 
 Detroit to name a few. Southern history has focused more upon the plantation 
 economy: Urban studies have been less prevalent. Baltimore, therefore, has 
 become something of a historiographical orphan.”65  
 
                                                 
64 “Concentration of Negro Population: Percent Distribution of Total Negro Population in Baltimore by 
Census Tracts 1930.” Prepared by the Department of Economics and Sociology of Goucher College. Urban 
League Papers, Series 6, I: F Box 84, Research Department. 
65 Robert S. Wolff, “Racial Imaginings: Schooling and Society in Industrial Baltimore, 1860–1920” (PhD 
dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1998), p. 44. 
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Scholars have investigated the local politics of African Americans in other border cities, 
and several important studies have focused on the development of black politics in 
Northern cities prior to the mainstream Civil Rights era.66 There are indeed limitations to 
studying Baltimore—this project does not analyze the development of activism in the 
solid South, where a hostile political environment might have shaped different forms of 
activism and institutional constraints. In a similar respect, studying Baltimore looks 
different from what one may find in a bustling Northern city—Northern cities tended to 
blaze the trail for black political office–holding and incorporation during the interwar 
period. What makes Baltimore unique is what most scholars have coined its “in-
betweenness” as a city with pieces of Southern mores and a Northern political economy. 
 Barbara Fields argued that as early as the nineteenth century, Baltimore and the 
state of Maryland in general was an important place occupying the “middle ground.” 
According to Fields, Maryland was different than other border states because of its 
bifurcated political economy.67 The coastal areas of the state—mainly the Eastern 
Shore—were based on the slave economy, and Baltimore served as a major economic and 
                                                 
 
 
66 Harold Gosnell, Negro Politicians: The Rise of Negro Politics in Chicago (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1935); St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a 
Northern City (New York: Harper Row, 1962); Earl Lewis, In Their Own Interests: Race, Class, and 
Power in Twentieth-Century Norfolk, Virginia. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Joe 
William Trotter,  Black Milwaukee: the Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915–45 (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1985); Kimberley L. Phillips, Alabama North: African-American Migrants, Community, 
and Working-Class Activism in Cleveland, 1915-45. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999; Peter 
Gottlieb, Making Their Own Way: Southern Blacks’ Migration to Pittsburgh, 1916–30, (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1987); Matthew Countryman,  Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006); Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: 
Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Arnold R. Hirsch, 
Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940 to 1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983). 
67 Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground:  Maryland During the Nineteenth 
Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). 
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shipping portal between the South and Europe. Maryland was also home to the country’s 
largest percentage of free blacks.68 Maryland had the largest percentage of free blacks in 
1850. Including states in the Upper South and other border states, Maryland’s free black 
population was 74,723 in 1850, with the second-largest free black population trailing in 
Virginia with 54,333.69 Simply stated, Maryland and Baltimore were the mecca for free 
blacks prior to the Civil War. By the Civil War, Baltimore was home to the largest free 
black community in the country and to the fourth-largest urban black community in the 
United States by 1910. By 1910, Baltimore had an estimated black population of 
84,000.70 
By 1930, the midway point of analysis for this project, Baltimore was considered 
a booming metropolis with a total population of 804,874. Baltimore was (and remains) a 
working-class city with a major shipping industry and steel plants that employed the 
newly arrived European immigrants and African Americans that migrated from the South 
and rural Maryland. A black middle class did thrive—including a black professional class 
and black-owned businesses; however, Baltimore did not approximate the black urban 
metropolis of a city like Chicago. Instead, Baltimore mirrored Cleveland and 
Washington, DC, more so than other cities with sizable black populations.  
                                                 
68 Robert S. Wolff, “Racial Imaginings: Schooling and Society in Industrial Baltimore, 1860–1920”  (PhD 
dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1998),  p. 45. 
69 Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground:  Maryland During the Nineteenth 
Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), p 2. 
70 William George Paul, “The Shadow of Equality: The Negro in Baltimore 1864–1911,”  (PhD 
dissertation, History, University of Wisconsin, 1972), pp. 1–2. 
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Table 1.3: Black Population, 1920: Border Cities71 




St. Louis 9.0 
Washington, DC 25.1 
Wilmington 9.8 
 
Table 1.4: Black Population, 1930: Border Cities72 




St. Louis 11.4 
Washington, DC 27.1 
Wilmington 11.3 
 
                                                 
71 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Negroes in the United States 1920–32. 
72 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Negroes in the United States 1920–32. 
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Baltimore presents an important city to study black activism during the interwar 
years because a substantial and varied set of black organizations were in existence and 
abounded. Baltimore was home to key institutions—the local NAACP branch was 
established by 1920 and the Urban League shortly thereafter. Baltimore was also home to 
several fraternal, grassroots, and neighborhood organizations, along with the expected set 
of black sororities and fraternities. In his detailed report of black Baltimore in the mid-
forties, Edward Lewis, the former secretary of the Baltimore Urban League, made note of 
black Baltimore’s organizational strength. 
Organizationally speaking, Baltimore’s Negro community has been making real 
 strides  ahead…groups are in every play when there are critical issues or knotty 
 discrimination problems to be solved. There has been real unity of action present 
 in the projects that have been cited, and there is a growing tendency to recognize 
 the importance of a “grand strategy” in planning pressure or educational 
 campaigns.73  
                                                 
73 Edward Lewis, Profiles: Baltimore, Journal of Educational Sociology (Jan. 1944), p. 294 
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Table 1.5: Black Organizations, Greek Letters, and Fraternal Orders 1919–1945 
 
 1919–1929 1930–1939 1940–1945 
American Legion  X X 
Adelphian Club  X X 
African Methodist Episcopal Clergymen X X X 
Afro-American Club  X X 
Altruistic Club of 20   X 
American Woodmen X X X 
Arch Social Club X X X 
Association for the Handicapped X X X 
Association for the Promotion of Negro Business  X  
Baptist Clergymen X X X 
Baptist Laymen Association  X  
Baptist Orphan Home X   
Baltimore Colored Symphony Orchestra  X X 
Baltimore Committee on Unemployment  X  
Baltimore Dramatic Club X   
Baltimore Educational Association X   
Baltimore Urban League X X X 
Baptist Young People’s Convention   X 
Beauticians Association  X X 
Century Club X   
Child’s Study Association  X X 
Cheltenham Committee  X  
Citizens’ Alliance for Social Security  X  
Citizens Civic Committee   X 
Citizens Committee for Justice   X 
City-Wide Association of Teachers in Colored 
Schools 
 X X 
City-Wide Young People’s Forum  X X 
Civic League   X 
Clef Club   X 
Fourth Congressional District Republican League  X X 
Colored Business Men’s Exchange X X  
Colored Day Nursery  X  
Colored Motion Picture Operators Union   X 
Commission on the Higher Education of Negroes  X  
Community Club  X  
Cooperative Cornell of Christian Education   X 
Cosmopolitan Choral Society X   
Court of Calanthe X X X 
Day Nursery Association for Colored Children X   
Defense Council X   
Defense League  X  
Dental Association  X  
Douglass High School Alumni X X X 
DuBois Circle X   
East Baltimore Citizens Association   X 
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 1919–1929 1930–1939 1940–1945 
Elks Lodge, Monumental No. 3 X X X 
Elks Lodge, Pride of Baltimore X X X 
Elks Lodge, Sampson W. Brooks X X X 
Emergency Helping Hand Association   X 
Equal Rights League X X  
Ex-Grand Jurors Association  X  
Federal St. Neighborhood Club   X 
Frances E. Harper Temple of Elks   X 
The Great Southern Temple of Elks   X 
Eight Ounce Boys   X 
Empty Stocking Club X X X 
Eva Jenifer Neighborhood Club X X X 
Ex-Grand Jurors Association   X 
Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs X X X 
Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs X X X 
Fishermen of Galilee  X  
Galilean Fishermen X X X 
Glass Blowers Association   X 
G.M.O.E.S. of Masons  X X 
Good Hope Lodge X X X 
Graduate Nurses Association   X 
Grand Order of St. Luke X X  
G.U.O. Jobs  X X 
G.U.O. Nazarites  X X 
G.U.O. Odd Fellows   X 
Henry Watson Children’s Aid Society  X X 
Hod Carriers Union X X  
Housewives’ League  X X 
Howard Alumni Association X X X 
Insurance Underwriters’ Association of Baltimore  X  
Interdenominational Ministers Alliance of 
Baltimore 
  X 
International Labor Defense  X  
International Longshoremen’s Association  X X 
Interracial Conference X   
Knights of Columbus  X  
Knights of Peter Claver  X X 
Knights of Pythias X X X 
Knights of St. John   X 
Knights of St. John- Women’s Division  X X 
Ladies Guild of Morgan State College  X X 
Ladies Guild of Provident Hospital  X X 
Lincoln Alumni Association X X X 
Local No. 194 L.H.C.H & C.L.U. of A.   X 
Longshoremen’s Union X X  
Maryland Association for Colored Blind X   
Maryland Association for Promotion of Business  X X 
Maryland Association for Social Service X   
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 1919–1929 1930–1939 1940–1945 
Maryland Interracial Commission  X X 
Maryland Federation of Colored Organizations   X 
Maryland Medical, Dental and Pharmaceutical 
Association 
X X X 
Maryland Negro Democratic League  X X 
Maryland State Teachers Association X   
Masonic Lodges X X X 
Medical Association X X X 
M.E. Ministers Meeting   X 
M.E. Minters’ Wives Association  X X 
Methodist Episcopal Clergymen X X  
Ministerial Alliance  X  
Mission Helpers’ Day Nursery   X 
Mission Helpers’ Guild  X X 
Monumental Bar Association  X X 
Morgan State College Alumni Association X X X 
Morning Glory Benevolent Association   X 
Moses Lodges X X  
Most Worshipful Hiram Grand Lodge X X X 
Mt. Olive Beneficial Association  X X 
A.U.O.S.D of Moses   X 
NAACP X X X 
National Mutual Improvement Association X   
Nazarites X X  
Negro Advancement League   X 
Neighborhood Improvement League X   
Northwest Maternal Health Center   X 
National Federation of Post Office Clerks   X 
National Association of Postal Employees X X X 
O.E.S.G.M.  X  
Odd Fellows X X  
Old Folks’ Home, A.M.E. Church X   
Opportunity Makers Club  X  
Pharmaceutical Association X X X 
Post Office Glee Club  X X 
Pricilla Art Club X   
Professional Chauffeurs Aid Association of 
Maryland 
 X X 
Progressive Engineers Association of Maryland   X 
Prominent Club Women and Civic Workers  X  
Red Cross Branch X   
Regular Fellows Club  X  
Republican City Committee  X X 
Schoolmaster’s Club X X X 
Seven Wise Men X X X 
Seventeenth Ward Community Club  X X 
Sharp Street Community House X X X 
Smart Set Club  X X 
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 1919–1929 1930–1939 1940–1945 
Social Worker’s Round Table of Baltimore  X X 
South Baltimore Y Club X X  
St. Catherine’s Home for Boys & Girls X   
Temple of Elks  X  
The Gay Sisters Club   X 
The Great Southern Temple  X  
The Time Girls   X 
Total War Employment Committee   X 
Townsmen Progression Association   X 
UNIA X   
Underwriters Association of Maryland   X 
United Usher Board Association X X X 
Union Political Club  X  
W.C.T.U  X X 
Women’s Auxiliary of Medical Associations   X 
Women’s Cooperative Civic League X X X 
YMCA X X X 
Young Negro Progressive League X   
YWCA X X X 
Walter Green Post No.14  X  
Woman’s Suffrage Organization X   
Women’s Interdenominational Missionary Union 
(Interracial) 
  X 
Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity X X X 
Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity  X X 
Omega Psi Phi Fraternity X X X 
Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity   X 
Pi Lamda Psi Fraternity   X 
Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority X X X 
Delta Sigma Theta Sorority X X X 
Phi Delta Kappa Sorority X X X 
Zeta Phi Beta Sorority X X X 
Sigma Pi Phi Fraternity  X  
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 Paying attention to the class diversity in black Baltimore is important. Quite simply, 
black Baltimore was no monolith. Baltimore was home to a thriving black middle class that held 
key leadership positions in the city’s most prominent black organizations. Census data also 
demonstrate that Baltimore had a sizable number of black-owned business that spanned from 
insurance businesses to barbershops.74 Data on the black poor and working class in Baltimore is 
limited : Records on this population are scant and those outlining black labor activities are biased 
toward leadership rather than individual or mass-level political engagement.  
 In addition to researching the level of black-owned businesses in Baltimore compared to 
that of other cities, it is also useful to look into homeownership records. I looked to 
homeownership statistics in Baltimore compared to those of other border cities to better gauge 
class differences. The working-class nature of Baltimore provided a different landscape of black 
life compared to a city such as Washington, DC, or Atlanta at this time. What Baltimore allows 
us to investigate is a working-class city with a thriving black middle-class community and a 
strengthening organizational base that was situated at the North–South border. 
 
                                                 
74 To gather a fuller picture of the growth of Baltimore’s black professional class and businesses over time, see the 
First Colored Directory of Baltimore City.   
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Table 1.6: Black-Owned Businesses in Baltimore, 192975 
 
Type of Business Percentage of Black Businesses 
Food (candy stores, groceries, meat markets, 
produce markets, bakeries, caterers, etc.) 
37.9 
Automotive (gas stations, repair shops) 1.2 
Apparel (clothing and furnishing) .50 
Restaurants and food service 20.4 
Cigar stores and stands 1.5 
Coal and wood yards 6.3 
Ice dealers .83 
Drugstores 8.2 
Miscellaneous retail stores 9.5 
Secondhand stores 2.8 
Total number of stores N= 282 
 
 
Table 1.7: Black-Owned Businesses in Baltimore compared to other cities, 1929 76 
 








Memphis  379 
New Orleans 771 




St. Louis 310 
Washington, DC 244 
 
                                                 
75 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Negroes in the United States 1920–32. 
76 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Negroes in the United States 1920–32. 
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Table 1.8: Black Unions in Baltimore, 1920–192977 
 
Independent Black Unions 
Construction 
Consolidated Hod Carriers, No. 1 
International Building Laborers Protective Association, No. 3 
National Hod Carriers and Common Laborers, No. 124 
Railroads 
Railway Men’s Benevolent and Protective Association 
Brotherhood of Dining Car Employees on the B and O 
National Alliance of Postal Employees 
Other 
The Colored Projectionists Association of Baltimore 
Beauticians 
Waiters’ Exchange No. 836 
Locals of Predominantly White Unions 
Construction 
International Hod Carriers and Common Laborers 
Railroad 
Station Employees Association 
Freight Handlers and Station Employees 
Industrial and Transport 
Ship Caulkers 
International Longshoremen Association 









                                                 
77 Table adapted from Andor Skotnes, The Black Freedom Movement and the Workers’Movement in Baltimore, 
1930–1939 (Ph D thesis, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, 1991), p. 125. 
46 
Table 1.9: Black homeownership, 1930: Border Cities78 




St. Louis 9.3 
Washington, DC 24.4 
Wilmington 13.2 
 
Black Electoral Politics 
 This dissertation places the focus on black activism rather than electoral politics because 
for the most part, securing policy gains through electoral influence was shaky through the 1920s 
and fully extinguished by 1931. Between 1919 and 1920, Baltimore’s black electorate grew 
substantially with the introduction of women’s suffrage. In April 1919, black Baltimore had an 
estimated 16,296 registered black voters, with the bulk of registrants residing in the 14th and 17th 
wards. By the 1920 presidential election and the increase of the female vote, registered black 
voters had swelled to 36,686, with an increasing black majority emerging in the 5th ward. 
                                                 
78U.S. Bureau of the Census, Negroes in the United States 1920–32. 
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Table 1.10: Black Registered Voters: 191979 
 






















Total Black Registrants: 16,296* 
 
                                                 
79 “16,296 Colored Voters Eligible in Baltimore City,” Afro-American, April 18, 1919.  Note that the numbers in the 
table do not total 16,296 and are not reflective of all city wards.  Areas with few African American residents are not 
included, explaining the slight discrepancy in totals. 
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Table 1.11: Registered Voters by Race: 192080 
 
Ward Black Registrants White Registrants 
1 48 8,870 
2 101 4,664 
3 406 2,713 
4 1,514 2,638 
5 2,105 2,196 
6 1,014 8,756 
7 1,981 9,798 
8 450 13,654 
9 421 12,184 
10 809 5,825 
11 2,593 5,757 
12 1,530 13,888 
13 200 12,637 
14 5,232 5,150 
15 2,774 15,863 
16 2,160 12,116 
17 5,519 1,458 
18 1,818 5,301 
19 1,653 7,459 
20 209 13,170 
21 975 5,636 
22 1,428 2,535 
23 650 4,798 
24 0 6,502 
25 562 3,721 
26 60 11,027 
27 458 14,345 
28 16 3,032 
 Total Black Registrants: 
36,686 
Total White Registrants:  
215,693 
 
The increase in the black electorate in 1920 catapulted discussions in City Hall on the looming 
growth of black electoral influence. As evidenced in the registration figures from 1920, blacks in 
the 5th ward were close to reaching a majority and were building enough influence to elect a 
third black councilman in the 5th ward. By 1920, the 5th ward included a total of 2,105 
                                                 
80 “To Gerrymander Colored Voters?”  Afro American,  November 12, 1920 
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registered black voters and 2,196 registered white voters. The Afro-American reported that the 
increase in the 5th ward black voting blocked caused concern in City Hall: 
 Dissatisfaction has been expressed downtown for some time with the rapid rate at which 
 the Fifth Ward was moving towards another colored City Councilman and one of the best 
 ways to avoid this was to have the Governor redistrict the city. By gerrymandering the 
 colored voters in the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Seventeenth Wards it would not be possible 
 after that for them to form a majority in any single city ward and both representatives in 
 the City Council would be lost.”81 
 
The suspicion that City Hall would push for the suppression of the expanding black voting bloc 
came to fruition two years later, in 1922. In November 1922, Baltimoreans voted to change the 
structure of the city council from a two-branch council divided by wards to a one-branch city 
council organized around six council districts. Under the new city council, the structure of 
representation changed from each of the 28 wards electing a council member to each of the six 
districts electing three council members for a total 19 city council representatives.82 Under the 
old system, the City Council was organized by branches—the First Branch was divided into 28 
wards and the Second Branch was divided by district, with a total of ten members. The new 
organization of City Hall called for the removal of the First Branch ward-based system and 
preserved the structure of the Second Branch by adding eight new seats to be filled.83  
 Leadership within the black community did not endorse the new city council structure. 
Under the new system, no district would encompass a significant black voting presence. The new 
structure was orchestrated and advocated by Democratic white council members who effectively 
mobilized the necessary 10,000 voters to sign a petition supporting the call for a new system. 
The mainstream newspaper, the Baltimore Sun, urged readers to support the amendment in an 
attempt to curb machine politics in the City Council. The Afro-American, on the other hand, 
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launched a call for increased voter registration and urged all black voters to vote against the 
amendment. Just days before the final registration deadline, the Afro-American clearly outlined 
the consequences of the amendment and warned that “Since colored people have the majority in 
no legislative district, they will be unable to elect a single colored man or woman to the 
Council.”84 The warnings were prudent—the majority of voters in Baltimore voted for a change 
in the structure of the city council, and the newly formed districts greatly diluted black electoral 
influence for decades. In the first vote after the enactment of the new city council structure, no 
black city council members were elected and black Baltimore had virtually no black elected 
officials from 1931 to 1954. 
Table 1.12: African Americans Elected to the Baltimore City Council, 1890–1967 
 
Period in Office Councilmember 
1890–1891 Harry S. Cummings  
1891–1892   Harry S. Cummings  
1895–1896 Dr. John Marcus Cargill  
1896–1897 Dr. John Marcus Cargill  
1897–1898 Harry S. Cummings  
1898–1899 Harry S. Cummings  
1899–1901 Hiram Watty  
1901–1903 Hiram Watty  
1903–1905 Hiram Watty  
1907–1911   Harry S. Cummings  
1911–1915 Harry S. Cummings  
1915–1919 Harry S. Cummings  
1919–1923 Warner T. McGuinn & William T. Fitzgerald  
1923–1927 No representation 
1927–1931 Walter S. Emerson & Warner T. McGuinn  
1931–1954 No representation 
1955–1959 Walter T. Dixon  
1959–1963 Walter T. Dixon  
1963–1967 Walter T. Dixon & Henry G. Parks 
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 This project compares the development of African American activism and political 
participation in Baltimore over time and through different issue domains, and pays particular 
attention to when activists developed a complementary fit between their existing resources, their 
political environment, and their mode of mobilization. The chapters in this project are organized 
around three issue domains that vary in middle-class versus cross-class coalitions: (1) social 
welfare activism, (2) employment activism, and (3) anti-discrimination activism. Each chapter 
elaborates on cases that demonstrate the successes and constraints of political engagement in 
black Baltimore.  
 Chapter 2 looks to cases of social welfare activism and discusses the Lung Block 
campaign, anti-tavern activism, and efforts to expand the city park system in black 
neighborhoods. This chapter demonstrates how black activists made strategic attempts to 
position their expertise and skill set to exploit available openings in local politics. In Chapter 3, I 
examine cases of employment activism and look specifically to patronage appointments, teacher 
salary equalization, and employment discrimination. Chapter 3 helps to show how black activists 
utilized different sets of organizing structures and that different modes of organizing were 
consequential to the tactics unleashed and the issues they fought for. Chapter 4 continues the 
analysis of how black Baltimoreans organized and became politically active. In Chapter 4, I look 
to cases of anti-discrimination activism and analyze golf course desegregation and the mass 
effort against police brutality that ushered in the city’s first campaign for multifaceted system 
change. This chapter works to show that black activists amassed resources in intricate and 
innovative ways to bolster their political influence and strengthen their leverage with local 
policymakers. Chapter 5 is the final chapter, and offers unanswered questions, an epilogue, and 





 SOCIAL WELFARE ACTIVISM 
 
 
“Taverns in such areas are tearing down our youth faster than the church and school can 
build them up. We are appealing to you legislators to help us help you make Baltimore a 





 This chapter demonstrates the ways that organizations cultivated their expertise 
internally. In doing so, this chapter specifically looks to instances of social welfare 
activism. The chapter demonstrates that disadvantaged groups have attempted to take 
advantage of political openings that complement their expertise, and in some ways have 
found a good fit to launch activist activities by matching their expertise with institutional 
opportunities. Lack of access to broader political incorporation sometimes helped groups 
to target their expertise toward issues where they figured they had the most leverage. The 
analysis in this chapter uncovers that disadvantaged groups found holes in local politics 
where they could actively participate and utilize their expertise. In some cases, they 
succeeded in measuring where they had more leverage and access.  
 This chapter begins with the example of the 1925 Urban League campaign to 
eradicate the “Lung Block” comprising a few blocks in one of the black community’s 
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most poverty-stricken sections. I argue that the Lung Block campaign is an example of 
middle-class activism and that the Urban League knowingly molding its expertise in 
social scientific investigations to take on the project. Second, this chapter moves on to a 
discussion of the vast network of neighborhood associations that lobbied against the 
granting of liquor licenses in black neighborhoods. Through the tavern battles we observe 
cross-class activism. The tavern battles show how a group of mainly women, and not all 
middle-class, organized their various neighborhoods and took advantage of access to 
public hearings to fight against the passage of liquor licenses. I argue that because of the 
resources and expertise many members already held via their ties to other established 
organizations, they recognized that the expanded access to lobbying against liquor license 
could be advantageous to them. Lastly, this chapter analyzes the failed attempt to lobby 
for the building of playgrounds in black neighborhoods in the 1920s. This example 
demonstrates how individual expertise is not enough —the failure to cultivate expertise 
within a larger organizational apparatus proved limiting as middle-class black activists 
did not have the political influence for system-wide change and failed to build a cross-
class coalition that included all community members. 
 
2. Existing Literature 
 Mounting scholarship has made note of the usefulness of expertise in helping 
disadvantaged groups foster influence. Most recently, Laura Evans’ comprehensive 
analysis of how American Indian tribes have been able to broker influence by cultivating 
expertise is especially helpful.  
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Evans argued that: 
 Tribes, and other political actors situated at the margins of economic, social, and 
 electoral power, are not well positioned to wholly reformulate federal programs or 
 to win large federal allocations towards their needs. Tribes have, however, gained 
 nuanced forms of assistance from their sustained relationships with sympathetic 
 actors within the federal government, a kind of relationship that I refer to as an 
 institutional niche. By carefully managing institutional niches, tribes have 
 provoked marginal changes in federal policy; changes that then deliver, 
 unobtrusively, useful support.86 
 
This study is informed by her findings. However, Evans takes issue with how tribe 
members bulked up their expertise with the assistance of outsiders. The assumption posits 
that marginalized groups do not have access to a full set of resources and can sometimes 
learn from outside actors that serve to bolster skills rather than co-opt. This chapter is 
concerned with how expertise is fostered internally. Although it is important to 
understand how groups can find innovative ways to build alliances with outsiders to 
shore up their resources, there is also reason to pay attention to details on how groups use 
their circumstances to build expertise. 
 We have reason to believe that African Americans in particular cultivated 
expertise internally—and we stand to learn new details on how this worked in the years 
prior to the Civil Rights era. Several political scientists have emphasized the particular 
role that racial identity and group consciousness has played in black communities in 
strengthening political engagement. Many argued that race consciousness and identity 
has been utilized in strategic ways in the black community and that racial identity often 
serves as the catalyst for political engagement.87 Scholars have also found that race 
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consciousness plays a significant role in measures of political participation when black 
and whites are compared.88 Other race politics scholars have identified how African 
Americans have historically developed expertise and resources in ways that are confined 
to the segregated spaces embedded in black communities.  
 Segregated spaces have worked to build indigenous expertise in black 
communities. In Charles Payne’s detailed analysis of the Mississippi Freedom Summer, 
he notes that indigenous resources added to the strength and the success of the voter 
education schools. According to Payne, it was the absence of external meddling that 
enabled voter education schools to thrive. We learn that individuals removed from the 
economic power structure were able to create safe havens and organizational space for 
insurgents and were key to the movement’s success.89 Uncommon actors cultivate 
expertise in Payne’s analysis as well. He finds that hairdressers and local street hustlers 
maneuvered under the radar and found areas to utilize their expertise in managing 
communication networks. As we learned in Payne, segregation was not entirely limiting, 
because it allowed those economically independent from white power structures to use 
their resources and segregated spaces in advantageous ways. 
 Recent work on black politics reveals a similar pattern. Melissa Harris-Lacewell 
demonstrates that private spaces such as barbershops and beauty salons can operate as 
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centers where group consciousness is developed. She argues that these segregated spaces 
afford privacy where networks develop and political engagement can thrive.90 This 
analysis looks to race organizations as places where political engagement and 
participation thrived internally.  
 Several scholars have rightly pointed to the black church as the most longstanding 
incubator of expertise within the black community. Undoubtedly, the black church has 
been crucial to cultivating mass participation in black communities and has historically 
been considered the institution in the black community where organizing skills are 
honed.91 Existing literature has emphasized the fact that African Americans have crafted 
expertise and resources internally. This chapter offers an analysis to learn how black 
Baltimoreans sometimes strategically utilized their internal expertise to launch political 
battles. 
 
3. Prescribing Change: Lessons from the “Lung Block District” 
 The first functioning federated organization in Baltimore was the Urban League. 
The Urban League launched a successful attempt to negotiate with local government 
officials in 1925 to clean up blighted areas in black areas. The presence of the Urban 
League did not represent the city’s first foray into federated racial uplift organizations, 
but it does mark the first successful large-scale one.92 What differentiated the Urban 
League from other organizations in the city during this time was the nature of its 
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membership and methods of building capacity, partnerships, and networks. The Urban 
League channeled its expertise in ways that proved advantageous to the issues at hand. 
Additionally, members crafted tactics that complemented their expertise as middle-class 
activists.  
 By 1923, the Urban League was a fully functioning organization and possessed 
expertise in finding ways to engage with city agencies and leaders in local government. 
Much of the Urban League’s skills were fostered by its beginnings as a merger between 
the Baltimore Interracial Commission and the national Urban League office. After 
teaming up with the national Urban League office to design and carry out a survey of 
black workers, the Baltimore Interracial Commission began the process of transforming 
into the first local branch of the Urban League in the city.93 The Interracial Commission 
was officially folded into the Urban League in late 1924 and marked the city’s first 
attempt at an interracial race uplift organization. From the outset, the newly formed 
Urban League was an example in partnership-building and capitalizing on networks that 
interlocked.  
 The executive board consisted of eight African Americans with representation 
from prominent middle-class activists such as Carl Murphy of the Afro-American, former 
councilman William Fitzgerald, and clubwoman Sarah Fernandis of the Women’s 
Cooperative Civic League; the board also included eleven white members, many of 
whom had ties to Johns Hopkins University.94 The head leadership provides an 
example—Johns Hopkins University professor Broadus Mitchell, white, served as the 
organization’s first president. The very nature of the Urban League’s leadership provides 
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reason to suspect that different resources could be leveraged and their tactics and 
mobilization schemes were influenced by middle-class ideologies.  
 The white members brought their own set of expertise. Dr. Broadus Mitchell 
possessed social science skills and institutional influence by virtue of his role at Johns 
Hopkins and his educational accomplishments. Similarly, Lillian Lottier was on the pulse 
of the two largest race uplift organizations in Baltimore and was credited with helping to 
revive the local NAACP branch. Records from the NAACP indicate that Lottier played a 
pivotal role in bringing the dormant NAACP to life. 
 
Some time ago, Mrs. Lillian Lottier and Miss Margaret Williams began a 
movement to revive the work of the local branch which had been somewhat 
inactive for the last five years. The work of these women resulted in a financial 
drive which enabled the organization to meet its full quota of the national budget 
for the first time in five years. But in addition it also brought about a complete 
revival of the work of the branch.95 
 
Although Lottier would eventually step down from her role as NAACP president as she 
continued to focus on Urban League activities, she remained a member of the executive 
board of the NAACP and maintained her dual connections to both organizations.  
 The expertise and embedded networks that Urban League leaders brought to the 
table helped to shape different strategies for actions that resulted in more favorable 
outcomes—they matched their expertise as middle-class activists with their strategy and 
methods. The campaign to eradicate unhealthy conditions in the “Lung Block District” 
offers a useful example of how disadvantaged groups can apply their expertise 
strategically and advance demands when there is evidence of organizational strength.  
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 The “Lung Block District” was situated near the major black commercial district 
and was a small poverty-stricken, heavily concentrated area with skyrocketing cases of 
tuberculosis. Table 2.1 provides a closer look into the boundaries of the Lung Block, 
determined by the Urban League to be the section bounded by Biddle, Druid Hill, 
Pennsylvania, and Hoffman streets. The Lung Block District was situated in West 
Baltimore below Druid Hill Park and north of downtown. Table 2.2 illustrates the 
concentration of blacks living in Baltimore in 1930. As with the majority of cities then 
(and presently), blacks were populated in concentrated clusters in the city and spatial 
segregation was highly visible. In comparing both tables, it is evident that the location of 
the Lung Block District coincides with one of the areas of largest population 
concentrations of blacks.  
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Figure 2.1: Map of Lung Block District96 
 
 
 The Urban League took special interest in the Lung Block District when the city 
announced plans to build an elementary school in the area. Early on, the Urban League 
partnered with Morgan State College (the all-black local college) to initiate a house-to-
house canvas of homes in the Lung Block District to compile a report on the crime, 
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poverty, and health statistics of the area.97 The strategy behind the canvas was to become 
equipped with enough statistics and figures to present a convincing case to the various 
heads of city agencies to make improvement to the area. The canvassing effort required 
partnering and coordination across different groups along with mobilization and analysis 
of the findings.  
 These tasks were congruent with the expertise of the executive leadership—they 
possessed the research expertise and were well networked. The Lung Block campaign 
also represents a well-thought-out and structured strategy—the Urban League first 
conducted research and solidified partnerships and then lobbied with influential city 
officials to demand improvements. This strategy was enabled by a strong base of 
organizational allies with shared interests and ideologies—as a result, the Urban League 
appeared stronger and better equipped in the eyes of city officials.  
 The Urban League put forward a multipronged approach to lobbying for 
improved conditions. It first enlisted the help of Dr. Brown, a sociology professor at 
Morgan State College , who recruited his students to conduct the house-to house canvas. 
By partnering with Dr. Brown—a move that was most likely made possible because of 
Broadus Mitchell’s networks as a professor at Johns Hopkins—the Urban League 
managed to build a new partner and also to engage the participation of young black 
students in the city.98 The influence of Broadus Mitchell’s expertise in research is 
evidenced in the additional steps that the Urban League took in building a convincing 
argument.  
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 The Urban League created a questionnaire to schoolchildren residing in the area 
and reported that more than 900 had been collected and analyzed; it requested statistics 
and records from the Criminal Justice Commission; and it partnered with the Family 
Welfare Association to analyze any records of charitable giving to the area.99 Research 
findings were sent directly to city officials with influence to make improvements to each 
specific problem addressed—for example, health data on the Lung Block District were 
sent directly to the head of the city Health Department.100 The multipronged approach 
was detailed but not unrealistic given the knowledge base and expertise of Urban League 
leaders. Work was put into conducting research and also presenting findings to city 
officials.  
 The expertise and influence of Carl Murphy, who served as editor of the 
Baltimore Afro-American and advisory council member for the Urban League, was 
utilized. He used his journalistic freedom to highlight the Lung Block District as a salient 
and pressing issue. The Baltimore Afro-American published a series of updates over the 
course of several weeks on the progress to clean up the Lung Block District. Each report 
included a detailed example with images of the problems in the area and the status of 
improvements. The first report noted that the “… alley is still unpaved and unvisited by 
the street cleaning department. Garbage and rubbish accumulate, making the odors on a 
hot night unbearable.”101 Within a week of publishing the report, the Urban League 
provided further updates to the Baltimore Afro-American, informing readers that there 
had been correspondence between the Urban League and city officials and that swift 
action was underway.  
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The wooden joists across the alley keep the nearby houses from falling in. A 
ramshackle house plastered with billboard signs has been an eyesore for years. 
Stewart Pucell, engineer of highways in the Department of Public Works told 
Secretary Moss of the Urban League this week, that streets in the Lung district 
would be paved as rapidly as possible. William D. Larkins, engineer of street 
cleaning department called conference of foremen of district street cleaners and 
police officials…Means were devised to clean away refuse and keep it clean.102 
 
Urban League photo shows abandoned dwelling on Walnut Street. The streets are 
unpaved. Efforts to clean up this district, which has the highest crime and death 
rate in  the city, began last week…the superintendent of garbage collection has 
agreed to put an additional day a week on cleaning rubbish from streets and 
alleys.103 
 
 The Urban League also worked to build allies during this campaign—records 
indicate that it sought out partnerships with the Sharp Street Community House (an 
affiliate of Sharp Street Baptist Church), the Maryland Tuberculosis Association, and the 
YMCA.104 It is also important to note that some of these partnerships may not have been 
accessible if the Baltimore Urban League had not been interracial in design and 
leadership. The partnership with the Maryland Tuberculosis Association (an all-white 
organization) raises questions on whether such a partnership would have been as 
seamless to broker if the branch were entirely composed of and led by black 
Baltimoreans.  
 The research-driven approach buttressed by strong partnership-building proved 
successful. In this case, I argue that the expertise of the Urban League leadership was 
complementary to the task at hand. Different tactics and strategies could have been 
unleashed—meaning that taking a research and partnership approach was not merely 
coincidental. For example, the strategy could have simply included lobbying directly to 
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City Hall and city officials, or the Urban League could have launched a cross-class 
coalition and involved the residents living in the Lung Block to lobby for change. Instead 
it took advantage of its research expertise and the multiple affiliations of its leadership to 
build a larger base of support. In essence, the members utilized their expertise as middle-
class professionals to build a mobilization scheme that allowed them to best practice their 
talents and find leverage with city officials.  
 We cannot attribute the entire success of the Urban League Lung Block District 
campaign solely to a change in strategy that took full advantage of the expertise of the 
League’s leadership or the partnership-building that may have strengthened lobbying 
with city officials. It is important to also discuss the political opportunities during this 
time—the emerging opportunities and the absent ones. Foremost, the Urban League 
maneuvered this campaign during a period of absent local political representation of 
black elected officials. The Lung Block District existed before the departure of black 
representation in the city, and emphasis on cleaning up the area was precipitated by plans 
to build the new school. Although no causal relationship can be derived from the lack of 
black representation and the outcome of the Lung Block campaign, it is important to note 
that descriptive and/or substantive representation did not play a factor in how the Urban 
League leadership launched its strategy.  
 Also, the Lung Block campaign occurred during a period of municipal growth in 
Public Works departments across the country during this time. The timing of the Lung 
Block campaign should not be understated. It was during this period that garbage 
collection systems, sewage systems, police forces, and street cleaning started to solidify 
in cities across the country after the tremendous growth during the Progressive Era a few 
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years earlier. This means that the Urban League managed to lobby city agencies that were 
relatively new and carried less institutional baggage—the task did not involve working 
within a political machine and working directly with city council members. The very 
nature of the lobbying efforts—within the bureaucratic realm of local politics—was a 
political opportunity in itself.  
 The Urban League’s response to the Lung Block District was prescriptive in 
nature and action was spurred by new plans by local government. In crafting a response 
to the blight in the Lung Block District, the Urban League was able to harness its 
expertise to a single issue with a clear solution. This eased coordination for a 
straightforward and prescriptive strategy to remove trash from sidewalks and alleys, 
which ultimately, in their eyes, improved conditions in preparation for the building of the 
new elementary school. It is important to note that after achieving success in getting the 
city to step up garbage removal from the area, the Urban League did not devote any 
additional time to improving the Lung Block District and focused its efforts on 
conducting citywide surveys studying the overall social, health, and economic status of 
black Baltimore. This does not necessarily mean that the Urban League was uninterested 
in the problems of the Lung Block District, but is indicative of how it organized its time 
and invested its expertise toward finding well-researched solutions to issues.   
4. Finding Leverage: Anti-Tavern Activism and the Emergence of Neighborhood 
Associations 
 
 Between 1937 and 1942, five black neighborhood organizations were formed with 
the purpose of fighting commercial zoning in their neighborhoods.105 They were the 
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Northwest Residential Protective Association, West End Improvement Association, 
Lafayette Square Improvement Association, East Baltimore Residential Protective 
Association, and the Northeast Protective and Improvement Association.106 Each of these 
organizations took on zoning issues in its neighborhood with the primary issue usually 
involving the restriction or prevention of taverns in the area. These neighborhood 
associations took on the fight to block liquor license appointments and exploited their 
access to public hearings and involved blacks of multiple class levels. They applied their 
expertise and mobilization skills and found an opening in local government that allowed 
them more influence to improve outcomes. 
 The Northwest Residential Protective Association (NRPA) was the first 
neighborhood organization formed. The founder and president, Florence Snowden, 
spearheaded the development of the four additional neighborhood associations to serve as 
auxiliaries. The NRPA was also the largest of the neighborhood associations. By 1945, it 
had a membership totaling 1,000 property owners.107 Incidentally, Florence Snowden was 
also the sister of Lillie Jackson, president of the local NAACP, and aunt to Juanita 
Jackson Mitchell, president of the City-Wide Young People’s Forum and the Citizens 
Committee for Justice. In addition to her role as president of the NRPA, Florence 
Snowden served on the executive board of the NAACP and was a member of two 
fraternal organizations.  
 Snowden was the main actor behind the tavern and zoning battles during this 
period. The tavern zoning fights demonstrate the ability of indigenous neighborhood 
groups to lobby local government when there is an opening for greater access. Resources 
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and expertise were abundant. Many of the tavern battles were victories for the black 
activists, and their path to success was evidenced by a strong core of resources that were 
shared with the NAACP and local churches. These neighborhood groups shared legal 
counsel with the local NAACP, and the vast network of neighborhood associations 
spread across different locations in the city helped to build a larger network of churches 
and other organizations. Members of the neighborhood associations had multiple 
memberships and a broad reach—and neighborhood associations were situated in areas 
known for housing Baltimore’s black middle class along with working-class blacks. A 
closer look at their activity reveals how they cultivated their expertise internally and took 
advantage of public hearings to gain influence with local officials.  
 An in-depth look into the opposition surrounding the opening of taverns and other 
commercial businesses better explains the expertise and methods of grassroots organizing 
in the 1930s and 1940s. The NRPA and its affiliates were tremendously successful in 
these efforts—they recruited large memberships and sustained their efforts for several 
years. They also became very well acquainted with City Hall and the Liquor License 
Commission, and built influence and relationships with city officials. The neighborhood 
associations focused on micro issues concerned with their immediate surroundings. The 
cases of zoning battles demonstrate that those with little political influence and absent 
representation in local government can function effectively by harnessing their resources 
and making use of existing connections with larger established organizations to buttress 
their manpower and expertise.  
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Examples of Tavern and Zoning Fights 
 
 Consistencies are evident in the cases of neighborhood groups blocking the 
opening of taverns and other commercial interests deemed harmful to their 
neighborhoods. In most instances, protests were mounted by large groups of 
neighborhood residents and led by their respective neighborhood association. In each 
case, protests were targeted to the local governmental entity responsible for making 
decisions, and members took advantage of public hearings. Neighborhood association 
leaders brought their dissatisfaction to the City Council, the city and state Liquor License 
Commissions, and the Board of Estimates. And women were often at the helm of 
leadership—men were members of the executive leadership of neighborhood 
associations, but evidence points to the trend that more often than not, male 
representation was mostly limited to black clergymen and women were overwhelmingly 
members of neighborhood associations.  
 I argue that the nature of zoning battles was advantageous to neighborhood groups 
because zoning hearings were open to the public. Neighborhood associations did not have 
to curry favor to gain access to zoning meetings, although most of their efforts also 
involved speaking directly with local officials to gain influence in advance of the 
hearings. It took influence to persuade local officials, but there were fewer barriers to 
camping out in the office of the Mayor or visiting the zoning board director for a chance 
to express dissatisfaction and demands. Neighborhood-based political participation 
required buy-in and mobilization of a solid group of residents. Additionally, zoning 
hearings offered fertile ground for neighborhood groups because local input was valued 
and had the potential to be persuasive. At its most elemental level, neighborhood groups 
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mobilized a defined geographic area and specialized in bringing heightened awareness to 
issues pertaining to their neighborhood.  
 Unlike the voting booth, participating in zoning hearings did not require 
registration or experience in the voting process. As long as neighborhood groups 
recruited enough people and got them fired up about the issue, there was the potential to 
have influence on outcomes. Moreover, in a sense zoning issues were tailor-made for 
autonomous indigenous organizations with access to these resources on the ground, 
because in order to find success at zoning meetings, a strong showing of neighborhood 
support was necessary.  
 The agenda-setting specific to larger federated organizations constrained 
opportunities to explore local issues that were not in line with specified goals and issues. 
For example, the NAACP national office often required local branches to devote their 
work to specified activities in order to orchestrate wholesale efforts on a national scale 
and to coordinate letter-writing campaigns, petitions, telegrams, for example. Zoning 
issues did not fall under the greater rubric of the NAACP that focused on expelling 
racism, discrimination, and segregation. Because zoning issues were strictly local and did 
not have any legal ramifications, it would not have been endorsed as a worthy case by the 
national office or would have been considered a distraction. For example, during this 
time, the NAACP spent a good deal of time participating in the letter-writing campaigns 
that the national office requested. Correspondence between the local NAACP leadership 
and the national office included correspondence such as: “My dear Mr. Walter White—
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we have just written our six congressmen in Washington, as you requested. Sincerely 
yours, Lillie M. Jackson.”108  
 At the organizational level, autonomous indigenous organizations did not have to 
muster through as many bureaucratic steps or clear their mobilization plans through any 
external governing body—decisions were agreed upon by the groups’ executive board 
and did not have to be approved by multiple levels of leadership. They could, however, 
borrow and share resources from larger federated organizations if they had a strong 
enough relationship. In Baltimore and with Florence Snowden serving as the pioneer of 
these neighborhood associations, information- and resource-sharing did not pose an 
obstacle because she was the sister of the NAACP president and served as campaign 
chairwoman for the NAACP as well.  
 A discussion of the growth and work of neighborhood associations in Baltimore 
would be incomplete without mention of the general national trend in woman-led 
organizing around issues pertaining to the home and family. The zoning fights 
demonstrate that in Baltimore, much like as in other cities, neighborhood organizing 
offered women opportunities to mobilize around issues connected to the family and 
home. In several places around the country, women were better able to tackle issues that 
touched on the family and children, and leveraged gender bias to gain legitimacy over 
these policy areas and garner influence as the expert and activist around family and 
children. The Baltimore case is no exception to this.109 However, Baltimore was unique 
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in that a woman was the president of the NAACP branch for several decades and led a 
branch that ranked within the top five of the largest and most active branches in the 
country. In other cities, women were highly active and often orchestrated much of the 
work, but gender bias limited them from holding the highest positions of leadership in 
their local branch.  
 Cases of the zoning fights reveal several patterns. Similar tactics and strategies 
were employed for multiple issues and different types of zoning battles. Each case 
revealed cross-class coalitions marked by some level of mass petition-signing or protests 
and communication with local government officials. The zoning battles spanned from 
efforts to restrict grocery store owners from displaying chicken coops to a five-year legal 
battle to restrict the building of a tavern in close proximity to a school and church. The 
efforts were preventative and reactive. For example, in 1940, the Northwest Residential 
Protective Association lobbied the city council to block the opening of a grocery store in 
their neighborhood. According to accounts: 
Representatives of the Northwest Residential Protective Association and the 
homeowners of the 1200 block of McCulloh Street are scheduled to stage a mass 
protest  before the city council, Monday, against the proposed opening of a 
grocery store at 1203  McCulloh Street. It was learned that a white grocer…plans 
to move his business to 1203  [McCulloh Street]. On Monday at 3 p.m., the city 
council will hold a public hearing to  determine whether or not the grocer should 
be granted this permission, thereby changing the block from a residential to a first 
class commercial. If the transfer is granted, it was  pointed out, the block will be 
opened to almost any type of business, at least it will be possible for a merchant to 
open a tavern in the block.110 
 
The McCulloh grocery case was preventative—the goal of the Northwest Residential 
Protective Association was to stop the possibility of heightened commercial growth that 
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might include taverns. Further reports indicate that members of the Northwest Residential 
Protective Association and homeowners did in fact follow through on their plans and 
protested at the city council public hearing.  
 This case highlights the motives behind many of these protests. For one, leaders 
of the neighborhood associations were acting preventatively and aiming to steer white 
business owners from expanding commercial opportunities. Latent in the language of the 
reporting is a subtle racial politics that suggests that black leaders of the neighborhood 
associations were distrustful of the aspirations of white business owners and were making 
attempts to maintain their neighborhoods as enclaves where black businesses could 
thrive. Regardless of the underpinning race and class politics of the zoning fights, it is 
clear that mechanisms were at play in these battles and that leaders of neighborhood 
associations worked to build multiple partnerships and support both within and outside of 
City Hall.  
  In the 1203 McCulloh Street grocer fight, the Northwest Residential Protective 
Association was not automatically successful. In some instances, protest was not enough. 
Amidst protesting at the city council hearing, the City Planning Commission, Zoning 
Board, and the City Council voted to approve grocer’s plans. However, upon losing the 
initial fight, the Northwest Residential Protective Association lobbied to the mayor for a 
veto of the measure and were successful in persuading Mayor Jackson to overturn the 
ruling and block the white grocer from opening his store.111 This move demonstrates that 
leadership from the Northwest Residential Protective Association had an established 
rapport with the mayor and could leverage enough influence to persuade him. Florence 
Snowden’s family associations—with her sister leading a strong a powerful NAACP by 
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that time—and her extended family networks with other influential black institutions in 
the city helped to bridge a relationship and familiarity with the mayor that was invaluable 
in lobbying.  
 It should also be mentioned that besides building a relationship with the mayor, 
the Northwest Residential Protective Association had previous experience fighting 
against commercial interests in the same section of McCulloh Street. Therefore, it 
possessed the expertise and the experience. Three years prior, it was successful in 
blocking the approval of a liquor license to a nearby white fraternal lodge. Reports from a 
battle against a liquor license shows that: 
Members of the Northwest Improvement Association leaving Baltimore 
courthouse after successfully protesting the granting of a class “C” license to the 
Walter Green Post, American Legion at 1308 McCulloh Street. The Liquor 
License Commission decided that the location was too near two churches and a 
school.”112  
 
It is clear that the NRPA had experience in putting forth an organized effort around 
zoning issues. In the article describing the 1937 victory, an image is also provided that 
shows a large group of people that participated in the hearing to block the liquor license. 
In both McCulloh Street cases, mass-level protest was evident. We can surmise that 
residents in that immediate area had experience with mobilization around similar issues 
and were confident that their efforts could be put to good use. 
 Some zoning fights were much more clean-cut than the McCulloh grocer case. 
And each of the cases have similar ingredients of protest, large group participation, and at 
times, legal counsel from W.A.C. Hughes—a veteran of the City-Wide Young People’s 
Forum and legal advisor to the local NAACP. Two cases stand out, both  revolving 
around different types of zoning issues, but both demonstrating swift organizing and 
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similar patterns. The patterns in tactics hint that neighborhood associations shared 
information and orchestrated their efforts. One case demonstrates the work of an 
auxiliary of the Northwest Residential Protective Association and shows how expertise 
was copied under auxiliaries.  
 In 1940, the West End Improvement Association protested against a cluster of 
store owners’ displaying chicken coops in front of the stores. There is no existing 
evidence that describes the development of the West End Improvement Association. 
Potential explanations for its creation include that the neighborhood association grew 
with the help of Florence Snowden in response to a zoning issue on the west side of the 
city (although a search for this evidence yielded no clues), or perhaps the West End 
Improvement Association grew naturally out of the Northwest Residential Protective 
Association with the hopes of pollinating neighborhood groups throughout black 
neighborhoods.  
 Much like with the NRPA, a black woman was the president of the West End 
Improvement Association. The West End Improvement Association employed similar 
tactics as well. To fight against the store owners, the West End Improvement Association 
voiced its protest and filed a formal complaint with the Board of Estimates. In the end, 
the Board of Estimates ruled that chicken coops could not be displayed on sidewalks in 
front of stores.113 The West End Improvement Association targeted its protest to the 
Board of Estimates because the grievance against the grocery store owners did not 
involve a specific zoning issue or an application for a liquor license. In short, the chicken 
coop battle did not involve fighting against something new on the horizon, but was a fight 
against what it considered a neighborhood blight.  
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 This strategy reveals that leaders from the West End Improvement Association 
had expertise and knew whom to talk to and who had influence over certain decisions. 
There is no evidence that the WEIA stumbled or had to make multiple attempts to 
discover who to put pressure on. Again, this experience connects to the work and 
networks of Florence Snowden. The West End Improvement Association fell under the 
umbrella of the Northwest Improvement Association, so resources and information were 
easily shared because its leadership had deep linkages with other local organizations such 
as the NAACP. However, working autonomously from the NAACP in organizational 
structure was advantageous and allowed for quick and seamless information- and 
resource-sharing. 
 Another case of the patterns in tactics can be seen in the Northwest Residential 
Protective Association’s fight against liquor advertising on local buildings. Again, a 
protest was formed and neighborhood residents were brought into the fight. The issue at 
question with the liquor advertising was whether the Convery Sign Company had 
permission to post signs advertising wines. Much like other efforts, the Northwest 
Residential Protective Association launched its protest at the public zoning hearing 
scheduled to discuss the presence of the advertisement. Records indicate that the NRPA 
organized testimony from several long-standing residents of the block to speak out 
against the advertisements.  
 The Convery Sign Company argued that it had recently bought space in the 
building and that a sign had always been on the building for several years. The NRPA 
countered with testimony from long-standing residents that could speak to the Convery 
Sign Company’s charges. The residents argued that “although a small tin painted sign had 
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been nailed up there for a few years, there never was a large sign of any kind on the 
walls.”114 This case points out that the Northwest Residential Protective Association and 
its affiliates honed their expertise in organizing protest and displaying evidence from 
neighborhood residents to persuade city boards. In fact, in the Convery Sign Company 
case, the chairman of the zoning board expressed to the Convery Sign Company that “I 
would like to help you, but the overwhelming evidence is too strong.”115 
  The five-year legal battle mounted by the Northeast Protective and Improvement 
Association to block the opening of the Federico Tavern is important to analyze. Starting 
in 1940, the NPIA fought against plans to open the Federico Tavern across from Dunbar 
High School (an all-black school) and First Baptist Church. The NPIA initially filed an 
appeal with the State Liquor License Board to protest the renewal of the tavern’s liquor 
license.116 This demonstrates that the neighborhood association escalated their efforts 
past the local liquor board—a move that was made possible because of the resource in 
W.A.C. Hughes as legal counsel.  
 By this point in Baltimore’s black organizing, W.A.C. Hughes had fostered a 
relationship with Thurgood Marshall and Charles Hamilton Houston, both of whom were 
in close proximity in Washington, DC. His exposure to these relationships helped equip 
him with stronger skills and access to expertise to work on this case. On the legal side, 
the case of Federico Tavern shows legal stamina from both parties involved. W.A.C. 
Hughes and the Northeast Protective and Improvement Association successfully appealed 
the State Liquor License Board and blocked the renewal of the liquor license for Federico 
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Tavern in 1942. However, the owners of the tavern fought back by filing a case in Circuit 
Court arguing that they were refused a full hearing in the decision to refuse their liquor 
license.117 In what can best be described as a back and forth legal battle that required 
money and time from all parties involved, the Northeast Protective and Improvement 
Association accumulated all of its available resources and allies to protest over the course 
of five years. In the end, the Northeast Protective and Improvement Association, with the 
help of multiple legal maneuverings, neighborhood residents, black churches, school 
groups, neighborhood association auxiliaries, and the NAACP, ultimately won the effort 
and the Federico Tavern was closed.118 
 The Federico Tavern battle should not only be discussed in regards to its legal 
work. The trajectory of the Northeast Protective and Improvement Association differs in 
some important ways from the activity surrounding other neighborhood associations. 
Details of the participation and mobilization of groups against the Federico Tavern reveal 
slight differences. Mobilization efforts were aimed at galvanizing the immediate church 
and school community—evidence of a tailoring of strategies to make the most of the 
mobilization potential of those directly affected.   
 Other zoning efforts showed that neighborhood residents were the primary 
participants in the protest and also did not directly involve institutions such as the church 
and school. Institutions can serve as an important resource for recruitment and 
information-sharing; they also have their own resources of leaders who often have honed 
their own sets of skills, and those might be helpful in partnering on mobilization efforts 
that directly impact them. Reports from the Federico case contend that leadership from 
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First Baptist Church were active in the protest, along with residents of the block, 
members of the local NAACP, and members of the Dunbar High School Parent-Teacher 
Association.119  
 The Northwest Residential Protective Association also partnered with institutions 
that were not exclusively black institutions . It made attempts to convince the school 
board to partner with it on the issue, for example. Reports from the Afro-American detail 
efforts by the Northeast Protective and Improvement Association, the Dunbar High 
School PTA, church leadership, neighborhood residents, and the NAACP to speak at the 
school board meeting to present their case to close Federico Tavern. Although the effort 
was made, the school board did not partner in their cause, stating that it only got involved 
in liquor license issues when the establishment in question was within 300 feet of school 
buildings.120 The attempts by the NPIA show us that efforts to partner were not always 
easily achieved and that neighborhood groups found more allies within the black 
community than outside of it. This also speaks to the limits of their weak influence within 
local politics. With the presence of constraints to build allies within local government 
bodies, their best option was to hone resources within their community. 
 The previous cases highlight the proliferation of neighborhood groups in black 
neighborhoods and demonstrate that expertise was evident in neighborhood politics. By 
building on expertise developed in other organizational arenas, the leaders of 
neighborhood associations managed to orchestrate similar strategies and tactics across a 
range of zoning issues. The strength of neighborhood associations was the ability to fire 
up people block by block on issues pertaining to their immediate neighborhoods. Zoning 
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issues surrounding the granting of liquor and commercial licenses were by design 
municipal issues that were worked out in a neighborhood context. Public hearings were 
open, and the opposition stood to gain if they could effectively mobilize their neighbors. 
Simply stated, zoning is a neighborhood issue and black neighborhood associations were 
a complementary fit. 
5. When Expertise Fails: Constraints and Opportunities in Lobbying for 
Playgrounds 
 In the spring of 1924, Carl Murphy and the Baltimore Afro-American began 
efforts to push the city Park Board to develop a citywide system of playgrounds in black 
neighborhoods.121 The playground debate would last for two years and would later 
coincide with the Urban League Lung Block campaign efforts discussed earlier in this 
chapter. The playground debate is important to study for a few reasons. This case reveals 
the life span of a lobbying effort through different phases of organizational strength and 
shows how expertise can fail. 
 The impetus for the playground push had no connection to new initiatives put in 
place by the city Park Board. The lobby for playgrounds for black children started from a 
clean slate, requiring leaders to be innovative and selective with the scope of their 
demands and the strategies developed. Carl Murphy  first called for several parks to be 
developed across the city that black children could easily walk to. The initial diagnosis 
and proposal was for the entire city park system to be revamped and improved for the 
black community. The framing of the playground debate touched on class. Carl Murphy 
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believed that black children, regardless of class, should have access to a neighborhood 
park and that it was the city’s responsibility to ensure that parks were available.  
 At the early stages of the debate on new playgrounds, the Afro-American insisted 
that the lack of parks was fully the responsibility of the city Park Board.122 There is no 
indication that Carl Murphy considered the role that neighborhood activism could play in 
advocating for playgrounds. His expertise in communicating issues and identifying the 
actors responsible as editor of the Afro-American were mimicked in the strategy to lobby 
for playgrounds. Early on the playground debate sparked no mobilization and no petitions 
from those beyond the Afro-American staff. Neighborhood protest would emerge as the 
debate unfolded, but knowledge of how to measure the pulse of a community and 
mobilize was outside of Carl Murphy’s toolbox of expertise.  
 The playground debate was Murphy’s brainchild, and his role can best be 
described as a political entrepreneur in this matter. The push to revamp city playgrounds 
represents lobbying between a black institution and city government to innovate change 
at the local level. An analysis of how the Afro-American lobbied with city government 
helps to explain how narrow coordination across available resources can both hinder 
opportunities for everyday people to become political engaged and lead to failure. As an 
institution within the black community, the Afro-American operated differently than 
many other race uplift organizations.  
 The paper was foremost a business operation with a strong advocacy agenda, but 
was not part of a larger federated organization or a local grassroots organization. In this 
way, the movement of the Afro-American as an important institution presents an 
interesting example for studying the way that various actors made attempts to bring about 
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change at the local level. There was no executive board or various committees to take on 
specific political projects—but the paper did have a staff of 32 people by 1924 and 
bureaus in Philadelphia, Washington, DC, and New York.123 The paper aimed to increase 
circulation and membership rolls like other organizations. But it is still important to 
investigate the behavior of the Afro-American as an institution that took on neighborhood 
issues in black Baltimore, and the playground debate provides a clear example of this. 
Scholars have emphasized the importance of the black press and the Baltimore Afro-
American in particular as a highly political new source: 
...The black press was for years one of the few segments of the American news 
media that actively championed, in its articles and editorials, the struggle of 
blacks for full equality in the United States. In that sense, the black press, along 
with civil rights organizations and other black community groups, was an agent 
for protest and change.124 
  
 The initial strategy in 1924 of the Afro-American was to lobby directly to the Park 
Board for citywide parks for black children.125 Two months into the push for 
playgrounds, Carl Murphy abandoned direct bargaining efforts with the Park Board and 
directly lobbied Mayor Jackson. When he shifted the focus from the Park Board to Mayor 
Jackson, he also broadened the demands and changed the overall strategy. Most likely 
disgruntled by lack of progress with the Park Board, Murphy asked Mayor Jackson to 
create an auxiliary committee composed entirely of black Baltimoreans to serve as a 
liaison between the Mayor and the Park Board. This shift signals a distrust of the Park 
Board and shows that in an environment with no black representation in City Hall, efforts 
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were made to build in black representation within local government.126 Murphy’s push 
for a black auxiliary committee would have provided proxy representation on park and 
recreation matters.  
 It is unclear whether Carl Murphy’s attempt to develop a black auxiliary 
committee was rooted in hopes to secure black representation on the Park Board or if his 
motives were simply to fill the void in black representation in City Hall. Regardless of his 
reasons, given the lack of political resources available at the time—specifically, no black 
council members and weak or absent black organizations—Carl Murphy was attempting 
to build resources and black influence. A feature of his role as a political entrepreneur 
was that he created the agenda and could work without the constraints of a larger body; 
however, unlike in other cases in this chapter, his expertise was not matched with other 
resources or additional leadership. The complete absence of a broader roster of leadership 
and the failure to network with other black elites proved consequential. Carl Murphy’s 
efforts can be characterized as innovating an issue rather than reacting to a problem as in 
the Lung Block District case or fitting expertise into an opening in local political 
processes as seen in the zoning battles. 
 A pitfall of innovating issues with little resources is that it is harder to anticipate 
roadblocks. There is virtually no evidence that Carl Murphy or other employees at the 
Afro-American organized in any way to anticipate any roadblocks —such as one that 
became reality when Mayor Jackson would not appoint a black auxiliary to the Park 
Board. Faced with no political influence in City Hall and no organizations willing to 
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become partners on innovating new issues, Murphy had few opportunities for any 
attempts to mobilize around the park system.  
 After one full year of attempts to reform the park system, the Afro-American 
leadership shifted from calling for the Mayor and Park Board to develop playgrounds in 
each black neighborhood to directing their efforts directly on a particular area called 
Perkins Square and pushing for the development of a playground there. This shift 
represented a change in their demands from making changes to the entire system to 
honing in on a single demand. The shift to refocus efforts to the development of a 
playground in the Perkins Square area does not appear to be done at random : This 
decision was most likely a deliberate attempt to build a playground in an area that the 
black middle class enjoyed when hosting public events. More specifically, black 
clubwomen held an annual “flower mart” at Perkins Square as part of their fundraising 
campaign for the Women’s Civic Cooperative League. In short, Perkins Square 
represented a notable area in the city where middle-class blacks had vested interests.  
 The importance of the Afro-American in making a shift in strategy a year later 
should not be understated. By this time, the Afro was able to recruit the help of the newly 
emerged Urban League.  The Urban League brought its own unique set of resources in 
investigation and providing social scientific approaches. We can surmise that Carl 
Murphy was able to bring the Urban League on board because he played a role in the 
Lung Block District campaign and could  expand the strategy with additional networks.  
 Under the new plan to focus efforts on the Perkins Square playground, the Afro-
American editorial staff proposed a solution based on the calculation that 500 children 
lived in close proximity and would be served by the playground. This approach differed 
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from the initial singular efforts of Carl Murphy a year prior—gone were the calls to 
wholeheartedly change the city park system by developing neighborhood parks in every 
black neighborhood. The new strategy moved towards building a more simplistic and 
feasible response to a single issue. The influence of the Urban League’s method is clear 
in a new, calculated approach to build a case to the Park Board. Evidence of more 
partnering beyond the Urban League is also apparent in the second year of the 
playground push. The NAACP papers reveal that women started to organize in their 
homes to aid in the drive to develop a playground in Perkins Square:  
Mrs. Murphy’s Neighborhood Club is thriving splendidly. The Club cannot any 
longer be accommodated in the members’ homes and subsequent meetings are to 
be held in the lecture room of a Methodist Church in that locality…The Club has 
an immediate  objective the securing of playground equipment for the Perkins 
Square Playground.127  
 
 Besides a change in the presence of organizational resources, the second year of 
lobbying also marked a newly appointed Park Board president. The new Afro-American, 
Urban League, and NAACP coalition made efforts to take advantage of this change. As 
mentioned earlier, in the previous year, the Afro-American acted alone and initially 
reached out to the Park Board to lobby directly for change. Revisiting the same strategy, 
the Afro-American leadership and the Urban League secretary met one-on-one with the 
new Park Board president to discuss the inadequacies of city playgrounds and to urge the 
development of a Perkins Square playground.  
 It can be surmised that black leadership appealed to the Park Board president 
rather than Mayor Jackson because the president was newly appointed and black 
leadership was making an effort to take advantage of the opportunity to make a fresh 
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demand to a new face. The Afro-American leadership was also optimistic that its 
lobbying efforts with a changed Park Board would be successful. Exuding confidence not 
displayed in earlier efforts, the Afro-American hailed that “at the meeting of the Park 
Board Friday, G.H. Mackey, Afro Sports Editor, was on hand to make a plea directly to 
the officials and the Perkins Square project was adopted.” However, any burst of 
optimism was quickly shot down weeks later when those pushing for the Perkins Square 
playground were faced with a setback that they had not anticipated.  
 What middle-class activists had not factored in was dissension from working-
class residents in the Perkins Square community. In a pointed cartoon responding to 
community opposition, the Afro-American argued that “We Always Have Them With 
Us” and compares their delegation to the community delegation. Engaging in class 
dialogue, the Afro-American portrayed its delegation as middle-class professionals and 
the community delegation as working-class and pedestrian. The inference of the cartoon 
was that the community delegation confused the president of the Park Board and erased 
any efforts to present a united front of black leadership to the Board. Middle-class black 
activists heading the effort failed to anticipate dissension and protest within the black 
community and also failed to engage black community members in and around Perkins 
Square  through canvassing and mobilization. Because the push for the expansion for 
parks occurred prior to the successes of the neighborhood clubs, it is possible that the 
failure to mobilize at a cross-class neighborhood level was an issue of lack of experience 
in mobilizing across class. 
  In an editorial, Carl Murphy argued that the Perkins Square proposal to the Park 
Board has been “halted temporarily by protests of petitions circulating in two of the 
86 
neighboring churches…It is to be hoped in the interest of the public welfare and for the 
sake of the children they will withdraw their protests and back the playground project.”128 
The protesting and petition campaign that Perkins Square community members 
participated in signals direct activism that was not anticipated by those advocating for a 
Perkins Square park. This also hints at class friction. Second, protesting by community 
members reveals a lack of cohesiveness and communication within Baltimore’s black 
leadership. 
 The failure to anticipate and remedy challenges presented by the neighborhood 
opposition would eventually lead to the failure of the playground effort. The editorial 
staff at the Afro-American made a serious plea for greater neighborhood mobilization 
after facing the setbacks from the neighborhood opposition. The paper argued “It is the 
duty of the neighborhood associations in these sections as well as the parent-teachers 
associations to take the steps to secure the needed play spaces.”129 The Park Board 
ignored the request of the Afro-American, and discussion of a Perkins Square playground 
ceased—in fact, there are no records of mobilization or lobbying for or against the 
playground after the final editorial arguing for heightened neighborhood organizing. 
Although the second year of lobbying for an expanded park system included a larger 
coalition of actors, the playground battle was not well executed, unlike the Lung Block 
District and zoning fights.  None of the actors working on expanding the park system had 
expertise in innovating new policy at the neighborhood level. Bringing new issues and 
demands to the table rather than lobbying for improvements was new to black Baltimore 
at this time. The Urban League had succeeded in prescribing change to a single issue and 
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cleaning up a blighted area, but it brought no new innovations to the fore. The 
neighborhood associations fighting against zoning licenses had accumulated expertise at 
a time of enormous organizational strength in the city and benefited from applying their 
strategy to an opening in local politics. Made plain, the playground battle suffered from 
too little experience and expertise on developing new initiatives and negotiating with 
local officials. 
6. Conclusion 
 This chapter has aimed to demonstrate that resources were cultivated internally in 
ways that sometimes proved advantageous. Three cases have been described: (1) the 
Urban League Lung Block District campaign, (2) the work of neighborhood associations 
to fight liquor and commercial zoning licenses, and (3) efforts early in Baltimore’s black 
organizing tradition to expand the city park system. In each of these cases, I have 
outlined how expertise was utilized and pointed out when the effort involved middle-
class versus cross-class activism.  
 We learned from the Lung Block District campaign that the Urban League 
amassed expertise in social scientific investigations and strategically exploited that skill 
set to build its case to city officials. The Urban League did not advance any protest tactics 
or methods outside of its expertise and was ultimately successful. Similarly, 
neighborhood associations mostly led by women found an opening in the processes of 
local government and used their strength in neighborhood mobilizing to fight against 
liquor and commercial zoning licenses. What we also learned from neighborhood 
associations is that expertise can be shared with other organizational affiliations, and 
black associations in Baltimore often wore multiple organizational hats that enabled them 
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to borrow resources from different places. Lastly, by analyzing the failed attempt by Carl 
Murphy and his coalition to expand the park system in black neighborhoods, we learn 
that expertise is not enough if the timing is wrong and the initiative new. Expertise is 
most useful when an organization has had experience testing it out or is familiar with the 
issue at hand. 
 Scholars of racial politics often look to the mainstream Civil Rights Movement or 
later to highlight the resources imbedded in black institutions that spur political activity. 
These cases uncover evidence of active mobilization around improvement to social 
welfare in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Blacks were engaged politically during this 
period—they made attempts to bargain with City Hall and city officials, organized 
petition drives, and participated in direct action. Although important gains were made, it 
is also true that barriers to political influence slowed massive change. The Urban League 
was victorious in cleaning up the Lung Block, but it did not possess the influence with 
City Hall to revamp housing for poor blacks. And women leading the charge against 
taverns were the most victorious in making broad change but were also limited by not 







 EMPLOYMENT ACTIVISM 
 
 
“So nigh to grandeur is our dust, So near to God is man, When duty whispers low, Thou 




 There are several lessons in scholarship that discuss the effectiveness of federated 
organizations in enhancing the resources of politically weak groups.2 Although much 
stands to be learned from studies that explain how multiple levels of unified agenda-
setting can positively impact information and resource-sharing, less is known about 
different forms of organizational structures that political underdogs employ. In this 
chapter, I examine how organizational structure impacts the strategies advanced in 
campaigns for integration. By taking a closer look at cases where black Baltimoreans 
made attempts to integrate, we notice multiple tactics in exactly how they organized. The 
path to lobby for integration at the local level was organized by federated organizations in 
some instances. However, there are also cases where different organizational structures 
were present
                                                 
1 Mitchell Family Private Archives, City-Wide Young People’s Forum Annual Intercollegiate, Oratorical, 
Vocal & Instrumental Contest, Program 1933–1936.  City-Wide Young People’s Forum Motto. 
2 Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North 
Carolina, 1896–1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Theda Skocpol, Protecting 
Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States (Cambridge, Harvard 




For example, in some cases, efforts were put forward by off-shoot grassroots 
organizations linked to a larger federated organization, and also by purely grassroots 
organizations with no ties to larger racial uplift organizations.  
 These cases reveal that the way a group is organized can have an effect on the 
strategies that they devise. Moreover, the cases in this chapter show how class factors 
into how organizations build mobilization strategies. This chapter takes a closer look at 
four cases:  
1. The push to appoint black court constables for the first time in the city’s 
history; this effort was led by black city council members and marked by 
middle-class activism. 
 
2. The picketing of white-owned grocery stores as part of a “don’t buy where 
you can’t work campaign;” this effort was put forward by a grassroots 
organization and included cross-class activism. 
 
3. Efforts by black teachers to equalize their salaries; this effort was developed 
by a grassroots organization and characterized by middle-class activism. 
 
4. Efforts by the Baltimore Urban League to break the color line in employment 
and housing sectors; this was organized by a federated organization and is best 
characterized as cross-class activism. 
 
 I argue that these cases reveal that there are benefits and trade-offs to certain types 
of organizational structures. These cases also illustrate the heterogeneity of black 
organizing during this period—in both structure and mobilization strategies. Because 
grassroots organizations are generally more autonomous and are not beholden to any 
overarching institution, they can sometimes take on more risk and include a broader 
coalition. We see this play out with the City-Wide Young People’s Forum and their 
efforts to boycott city grocery stores. However, what the City-Wide Young People’s 
Forum also demonstrates is that resource-rich grassroots organizations stand to gain the 




resources and a defined agenda to guide them; however, federated organizations have 
their own constraints because of the multiple levels of oversight, and oversight can limit 
strategy-building. Last, I argue that in the case of organizing for integration via local 
government, the consequences are dire if there is no effort to partner or build coalitions 
with groups outside of government. Local governmental channels can go just so far if the 
group is marred by little political strength, and the court constable appointment case helps 
to show the outcome of weak political influence and absent partnerships.  
 I also argue that regardless of the outcome, a closer examination of how blacks in 
Baltimore organized during this period teaches us about the way different organizational 
repertoires evolved. The accounts in this chapter do not intend to downplay or reshape 
the important work on social movements and organizational change. What I do attempt to 
emphasize is that by examining black organizing in Baltimore, we learn about 
autonomous groups that stood to gain because they were more able to advance riskier 
strategies. As it turns out, the development of autonomous organizations in the early 
1930s would be consequential to black organizing in the city and would have an impact 
on strategy-building in later years.  
2. Existing Literature  
 A growing body of literature examines the role of a group’s organizational 
structure and the strategies it employs. In Skocpol’s seminal work, Protecting Soldiers 
and Mothers, she finds that a federated organizational structure proved advantageous to 
white club women. In her analysis, women with very little political influence were able to 
convert their organizational strength into political resources, and the multilayered 




government. The ability of women’s clubs to have a presence at the small town hall 
meeting all the way up to a national council of women’s clubs allowed tactics and 
strategies to permeate and proved crucial to their ability to garner influence at various 
levels of government.1  
 Skocpol cautions that the impact of federated women’s clubs was not random. 
Instead, she argues that clubwomen pursued their most rigorous work when there was a 
political opportunity for them to put their organizational prowess to work. She states: “In 
turn, this happened at a historical juncture when male-only U.S. political parties were 
weakened, when state legislators were more sensitive to moralistic waves of public 
opinion than to partisan controls, and when U.S. courts were willing to accept labor 
regulations for women but not for men.”2 Skocpol’s work is important in grounding our 
understanding of the limits and promise of federated organizations when timing is 
considered. 
 In her complete investigation inside the movement to pass the ERA amendment, 
Jane Mansbridge uncovers that autonomous organizing is not always advantageous. The 
decentralized structure of ERA organizing opened the door for local groups to have a 
great deal of autonomy. However, the autonomy of local groups clashed with the 
multilayered structure of ERA organizing nationwide and resulted in the failure of local 
groups to adopt unifying strategies with national leadership.3 Kathleen Blee stressed the 
importance of studying the movement formation of previously underrepresented groups 
that launch disturbing movements that seek to advance inequality.  
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 Blee argues that several lessons can be learned from the organizing tradition of 
women of the Klan. She notes that the organizational structure of “Women of the Ku 
Klux Klan” (WKKK) was highly detailed and that women appropriated gender politics 
into how they organized. 
The women’s Klan copied the regalia, militarism, hierarchy, and political stances 
of the male Ku Klux Klan but insisted that they were no mere appendage of the 
KKK, claiming autonomy and a special mission for Klanswomen. They used the 
KKK’s call for supremacy of white, native-born Protestants and interpreted it in a 
gender-specific way...4  
 
Blee’s investigation also uncovered that many of the recruitment strategies of the WKKK 
involved personal and family connections. The analyses in this chapter are partly 
informed by Blee’s finding that members were characterized by “extrafamilial 
involvement.” She finds that members were highly active and involved in more than one 
activity organization, and leaders were both civically and socially engaged and had 
communication skills and established networks.5 Cases in this chapter, and specifically 
the work of the City-Wide Young People’s Forum, were also characterized by what Blee 
would coin extrafamilial involvement.  
 Newer work contributes to our understanding of variations of federated 
organizing and how different groups take on different forms of federated organizing. 
Skocpol and Oser stress that African Americans in particular were members of federated 
fraternal organizations in large proportions and played key roles in mobilizing for racial 
change.6 Liazos and Ganz shed light on the importance of including fraternal 
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organizations in our understanding of civil rights activism. They find that the intricate 
federated networks, secret traditions, and effective communication channels matched 
with existing resources of the members themselves were crucial to legal activism. Their 
work adds a crucial piece to our understanding of not only how black organizations 
crafted strategies for racial change but also the heterogeneity of black organizations that 
played important roles in civil rights activism.7 
 The work of Elisabeth Clemens teaches us that understanding the outcomes of 
different organizational structures may in fact be more complex. She finds that in the face 
of barriers to participating in electoral politics, white women created innovative methods 
to penetrate politics.8 We learn that new organizational structures can form in response to 
exogenous factors and limited access in politics. Sometimes those not previously 
influential in politics can be the architects of new structures and modes of mobilizing. 
And Clemens’ analysis also illustrates that political underdogs can develop new 
organizational structures in patchwork fashion—by taking elements of different 
organizational repertoires to form a new method. In the same vein, Glenda Gilmore 
makes a similar point in showing that black clubwomen in North Carolina created new 
modes of organizing in the face of blocked access during the Progressive Era. In 
Gilmore’s examination, black clubwomen found new ways to organize both in structure 
via black women’s clubs and through strategy by brokering for local and state services 
for blacks under the guise of women’s work.9 
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 In relation to the cases in this chapter, Clemens finds that “…the majority of 
organizational activity by women’s groups involved a much more eclectic process of 
copying and transforming multiple models of organization.”10 Two cases in this chapter 
show a similar pattern. Blacks in Baltimore created new organizational repertoires in 
response to the resources available and in keeping with the political opportunities 
available at the time. When resources such as knowledge and experience are available, 
modes of organization can stretch beyond classic organizational models, and autonomous 
models can develop. What is key is that when groups organize autonomously, they are 
free from oversight and strategies can be expanded.  
3. Local Government: City Council and Integrating Political Appointments 
 In 1920, black city council members Warner McGuinn and William Fitzgerald 
lost the battle to appoint four black court constables—an attempt to garner patronage 
resources and a move that would have integrated the post of court appointees that assisted 
with clerical duties. The court constable battle provides a good illustration of the limits of 
the black council members’ influence in local party politics. In May 1920, McGuinn and 
Fitzgerald each nominated two black men from their districts for court constable—a 
measure that required a procedural vote from the majority of council members for the 
appointments to be upheld.11 Records indicate that both councilmen had strong opinions 
and expectations on the constable vote from the early stages: “Messrs. McGuinn and 
Fitzgerald have announced that the Council must accept the colored candidates or none. 
If any change in the measure is made, it will have to be done on the floor of the Council 
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when the bill is reported next Monday, and the vote will be a matter of record.”12 The 
limited influence that both McGuinn and Fitzgerald held within the local Republican 
Party is clear from the beginning of the constable vote.  
 By 1920, the city council held 18 Democrats and 9 Republicans, with the 
Democrats broken into the Kelly and Mahon factions. Members of the Mahon faction 
were also key members of the Joint Committee of Police and Jails responsible for 
constable appointments, providing them with important influence. Warner McGuinn also 
sat on the Joint Committee of Police and Jails. He was outnumbered and had limited 
influence. Recognizing the powerful influence of the Mahon faction, white Republicans 
in the Council bargained with the Mahon faction and struck a deal to block the vote of the 
black constables in return for additional white constable appointees. And in a clear 
strategic decision of timing, white Republican council members struck the deal with the 
Mahon faction while McGuinn and Fitzgerald were attending the Republican National 
Convention and therefore unable to resist these movements.13  
 What unfolded reveals the constraints of black office-holding in Baltimore. 
Knowing of the absence of McGuinn and Fitzgerald, the City Solicitor and leading white 
Republicans arranged a meeting with Walter Emerson—a prominent black leader who 
also sat as the executive of the 14th ward with McGuinn. The maneuvers of the white 
Republican leadership point to an overt effort to capitalize on the timing of their 
bargaining and to utilize Emerson as a proxy when information- sharing between the 
black city councilmen was weak. During the meeting, they requested that Emerson 
endorse removing all black constables in the vote and when he rejected that offer, they 
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proposed that the list be shortened from four appointees to two. Again, Emerson rejected 
their proposals and vehemently argued: “We have a right to name four men and we are 
insisting on it without any kind of compromise. Failure of the leading Republicans in the 
Council to stand by our nominees is one of the rankest deals colored voters have gotten 
since Broening was elected Mayor.”14  
 Although there are no records available detailing correspondence between 
McGuinn, Fitzgerald, and Emerson, it is clear that they were unified on their demands for 
installing all four black constables. This is most likely explained by the fact that this 
period marked a watershed moment because two black council members were elected in 
1919 for the first time in the city’s history. This case also sheds light on race politics and 
the general racial climate in the city during this period. White councilmen went on record 
during city council sessions to persuade their colleagues against the vote, with one 
explicitly stating, “Don’t vote for any ordinance with the names of nigger constables in 
it.”15 The advancement of four black men to these court positions incited racial animus 
inside the city council. In his final plea to the city council, Warner McGuinn argued 
against the campaign mounted by a coalition of white Republicans and the Democratic 
Mahon faction to wholeheartedly bar black appointees solely on the basis of race. 
Colored letter carriers deliver mail to your doors. Now these constables have no 
power, no authority. They simple serve processes of the courts. Simply because a 
man is colored ought not be a bar to his holding this or any other political 
position. Should you pass this ordinance you are saying, no matter how intelligent 
a man may be, how god-fearing he may be, however much taxes he may pay, the 
fact of his colored blood bars him from holding public office. 16 
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 For the most part, white councilmen were united in their efforts to block any 
increase in black political presence and also recognized that doing so would benefit their 
own political endeavors by increasing the number of white political appointees. The 
brokering of constable appointments between the white Republican leaders and the 
leading Democratic Mahon faction aligns Baltimore local politics along a similar 
spectrum with other Southern cities characterized by lily-white Republicans working in 
opposition to black Republicans. Both Bunche and Walton showed how white 
Republicans in the South, lacking majority influence at the local level, made overt efforts 
to distance themselves and sometimes prevent advances by black Republicans.17 In short, 
when white Republicans in Baltimore were presented with the opportunity to broaden 
their influence within white communities, they brokered with the Mahon faction and 
knowingly killed the chance for any black political appointments.  
 The joining of forces resulted in the entire Mahon faction and all white 
Republicans voting for removing black constable appointees, a final move that left white 
Republicans appointing 22 constables, the Mahon Democrats appointing 34 constables, 
the white Kelly Democrats with no constable appointments, and black Republicans also 
without appointments.18 
 Protest on the part of McGuinn and Fitzgerald was carried out, with McGuinn 
leading the charge. However, McGuinn’s protest did not include mobilizing any 
resources—he arranged no meetings or protests and initiated no petition drives. His push 
for integration was solely driven within the confines of City Hall.  
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 McGuinn built no alliances with outside partners—most likely because at this 
period in Baltimore there were few opportunities to build partnerships. The Urban 
League had not developed local branches and the NAACP was just starting to develop. 
By taking a closer look at the landscape of black and fraternal organizations and 
professions from 1919 to 1920, we gain additional insight into the resources available 
during this time. In contrast to later years, 1919 to 1920 represented a time of 
organizational infancy for black Baltimore. The court constable battle happened at a time 
when organizational growth was just beginning to ramp up across the board for black 
Americans, when WWI had recently come to a close, and when the mass migration of 
black Americans from the South and rural parts of Maryland was just underway. Tables 
3.2 and 3.3 compare the presence of black organizations, fraternal orders, and 





Table 3.1: Presence of Black Organizations, Fraternal Orders, and Professionals, 
1919–192019 
 
ORGANIZATIONS & FRATERNAL ORDERS 
Baltimore Medical Association 
Baltimore Educational Association 
Day Nursery Association for Colored Children 
Maryland Colored Public Health Association 
The Colored High School Alumni Association 
The Dubois Circle 
Woman’s Suffrage Organization 
Woman’s Cooperative Civic League 
Eva Jeaifer Neighborhood Club 
YMCA  
YWCA 
Maryland Association for Colored Blind 
Neighborhood Improvement League 
Maryland Medical Dental and Pharmaceutical 
Association 
NAACP 
Maryland Association for Social Service 
The Defense Council  
Red Cross Branch 
Arch Social No, 1 
Cosmopolitan Choral Society 
Maryland State Colored Teachers Association 
Baltimore Dramatic Club 
Pricilla Art Club 
Grant United Order of Odd Fellows 
H.W.A. Grand Lodge, F.J.A. Masonry 
Order of Moses 
I.B.P.O. of Elks 
Grand United Order of Nazarites 
Knights of Pythians 
Galilean Fishermen 
Order of Good Hopes 
G.U.O of Chaldeans 
Good Samaritans 
BLACK PROFESSIONALS 
Post office workers; 70 
Custom house workers; 27 
Pharmacists and pharmacy assistants; 19 
Physicians; 32 
Dentists; 13 
Real estate and insurance; 28 
Notaries; 10 
Lawyers; 19 
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Table 3.2: Presence of Black Organizations, Fraternal Orders, and Professionals, 
1929–193020 
 
ORGANIZATIONS & FRATERNAL ORDERS 
 
African Methodist Episcopal Clergymen  
Colored Business Men’s Exchange  
Young Women’s Christian Association  
Galilean Fisherman Lodge 
Fishermen of Galilee 
Sharp Street Community House. 
Lincoln Alumni Association 
Federation of Colored Women’s Clubs Care  
Knights of Pythias 
Mason Lodges 
Moses Lodges  
N.A.A.C.P. 
Postal Employers 
Women’s Co-operative Civic League 
Maryland Inter-Racial Commission  
Odd Fellows  
Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity 
Douglass High School Alumni  
YMCA 
Seven Wise Men  
Good Hope Lodge  
Nazarites  
Howard Alumni Association 
Morgan College Alumni Association 
Health Week Committee 
Sigma Pi Phi Fraternity 
Grand United Order of St. Luke  
United Usher Board Association  




Schoolmasters Club  
Hod Carrier Union 
Longshoremen’s Union 
Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity 
Baptist Laymen Association 
Methodist Episcopal Clergymen  
Bar Association 
Baltimore Urban League 
Medical Association  
Pharmaceutical Association  
Dental Association 
Defense League 
Zeta Phi Beta Sorority 
Equal Rights League 
Baptist Clergymen 
Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs 
Baltimore Afro-American  
Omega Phi Psi Fraternity 
Colored Day Nursery 
South Baltimore Y Club 
Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority 
Delta Sigma Theta Sorority 
Phi Delta Kappa Sorority 
Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity 
Arch Social  
Day Nursery and Kindergarten for Colored 
Children 




Pharmacists and pharmacy assistants; 21 
Physicians; 61 
Dentists; 24 
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 We learn that by 1930, Baltimore’s black population is more highly organized 
across various sectors and that more black professionals have moved to the city by this 
time.  Other scholars have emphasized the importance of politically weak groups in 
building partnerships with outside groups. For example, in Clarence Stone’s examination 
of black politics in Atlanta over time, he argues that partnerships between the black elite 
and business leaders were key to making substantive changes.21 Records indicate that in 
1920, McGuinn did not make attempts to build partnerships outside of City Hall. 
Councilman McGuinn took on the battle as one person, perhaps because of little time, 
decreased political engagement, or perhaps because there was little incentive to other 
blacks to join in on the fight. 
 When the issue of constable appointments came to the surface again two years 
later in 1922, Councilman Fitzgerald played a stronger role in organizing a delegation to 
build a coalition of blacks to lobby for the appointments. There are no records indicating 
the shift in strategy. We can surmise that in the span of two years, organizational growth 
and resources within the black community grew and that the black council members had 
an opportunity to think about and reshape their strategy.  
 The coalition that Councilman Fitzgerald organized was not robust. He called on 
four black civic leaders to lobby the mayor for black court constable appointments. In 
short, black council members were ill-equipped to utilize their role as elected officials to 
garner support on municipal issues. Although the effort in 1922 involved the new tactic 
to build a four-man coalition, their efforts failed for the second time and no black court 
constables were appointed.  
                                                 





The Afro-American recounted: 
 Both colored councilmen protested last year without avail. Similar protests made 
 this year when the terms of the constables expired have so far proved equally 
 afrontless. A delegation headed by Mr. Fitzgerald and consisting of Charles 
 Hall, Walter Emerson, John C, W Grayson and Albert John called on the Mayor 
 by appointment last Saturday. The appointment of colored constables for the 14th 
 and 17th wards was discussed but it is understood that the Mayor declared that his 
 ‘hands are tied.’ This means that the colored councilmen must nominate white 
 men for these jobs again.22 
 
 What the case of the court constables reveals is that black elites benefited when 
there were organizational resources available to them and when blacks in the city were 
politically engaged. When organizational resources and talent are available and willing to 
act, leaders are better able to customize their strategy within the parameters of their 
organizational structure. Other cases in this chapter demonstrate that when matched with 
robust organizational resources, mobilization and political strategies tend to develop in 
ways that fit into the structure of the organization. One other note: The court constable 
case offers a window into challenges mounted by black elected officials in a period 
before mass political incorporation of African Americans at the municipal level. But what 
this case shows is their political weakness and constraints as minorities in City Hall. The 
flourishing of alternative modes of mobilization and organizing on behalf of black 
Baltimoreans is partly understood as a response to the failures of formal politics and 
institutions to bring about racial change.  
4. Grassroots Organizing: The City-Wide Young People’s Forum 
 The emergence of the City-Wide Young People’s Forum—commonly called the 
“Forum”—is representative of a change in the scope and strategy of organizing in 
Baltimore. Made plainly, the Forum introduced grassroots autonomous organizations as 
                                                 




influential components to the city’s organizing tradition. The City-Wide Young People’s 
Forum was formed in October 1931 by two sisters—Baltimore natives Juanita and 
Virginia Jackson. Juanita Jackson was the Forum president and her leadership extended 
for years to come. The Forum in structure and shape mirrored the organizing tradition 
that several scholars have described as crucial to the development of political engagement 
and activity of blacks in later years.23 However, in a fashion much different from the 
Urban League, the NAACP, or a fraternal organization, the Forum was structured around 
a speaker followed by an open discussion where those in attendance had the opportunity 
to ask questions and engage and disagree with the speaker.  
 A closer analysis of the Forum shows how an autonomous grassroots organization 
with no formal attachments to other organizations or structures made use of resources and 
engaged in political activity. The Forum was also the most active local black organization 
in Baltimore in the early 1930s—it included the largest membership roll and mobilized 
the largest group of black across class. The Forum shows how organizational structure 
factors into strategies devised and the important role of autonomous grassroots 
organizations in mobilizing black Baltimoreans. 
How the Forum Functioned 
 
 At its core, the Forum was created in the midst of the Depression as a response to 
the weakened outlook for black youth and as an effort to spark civic engagement. 
Knowing the constrained employment opportunities, the Forum situated advocating for 
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equal employment opportunities at the center of its mission.24 Juanita Jackson noted that 
she found the need to create the Forum upon returning to Baltimore after college and 
recognizing the dearth of opportunities for black youth. According to Jackson, she 
envisioned the Forum as a space for black youth, regardless of class: 
 to amplify the spiritual, cultural, and intellectual life of the people, by presenting 
 speakers on varied and timely topics; to enlist the interests and efforts of a larger 
 group of young people; to cultivate the interests and invite the co-operation 
 of a larger group of older people; to make more fruitful and less superficial inter-
 racial contact.25 
 
Activating political engagement and broadening the scope of individuals active in the 
social and political life of Baltimore across racial lines was an important goal of the 
Forum. The Forum introduced a new organizational repertoire to Baltimore in both 
substance and structure. It employed a different configuration of resources, and its 
organizational structure by design encouraged civic and political engagement. The Forum 
differed from other organizations in Baltimore up to this time.  
 Unlike the NAACP or Urban League, those who participated in the Forum were 
exposed to a mass meeting on a weekly basis—and because they functioned 
autonomously, they were able to implement meetings and mass mobilization in ways that 
did not require adhering to a larger federated protocol. The Forum was structured as a 
series of organized speakers featuring elites at the local, state, and national level to 
discuss the pressing issues concerning black life and politics. Meetings were held every 
Friday evening at Bethel A.M.E. Church to accommodate large crowds. Meeting turnout 
was impressive. By its second year, the Forum had a membership of 400 Baltimoreans 
and reported “representing thirty-two churches and nine denominations which presents its 
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program every Friday night to an audience that ranges from one to two thousand 
people.”26  
 The sheer numbers of individuals engaging in Forum meetings makes plain the 
importance of analyzing this organization. By studying how participation was fostered 
and how everyday people had opportunities to get involved we can start to piece together 
the story of how black Baltimoreans became politically engaged during a period of 
sweeping economic changes. Another significant difference of the Forum was that it was 
created by youth not already established in the black elite circles of the city. This does 
not mean that the Jackson sisters did not have access to black elites—they were not 
completely removed from the centers of black influence, because their mother, Lillie 
Jackson, was highly active and connected to black leadership and was the president of the 
NAACP. Their connectedness to black elite circles in Baltimore and their family relation 
to the president of the NAACP were crucial to building resources and knowledge and 
utilizing information networks.  
 The importance of the Forum’s developing autonomously and apart from any 
existing organizations should not be understated. Its autonomy allowed for a different 
configuration of resources and a method of organizing that did not require input or 
permission from a larger body. As such, new mobilization efforts were tested and new 
leadership was developed. What is also key about the development of the Forum is the 
beginning of a family leadership tradition in the Jackson and Mitchell families that would 
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eventually represent the base of political influence and black politics in Baltimore for 
many years to come. Juanita Jackson would later serve as assistant to Walter White in the 
national office of the NAACP in 1935 and continue to work in the city of Baltimore on 
issues of race uplift and equality alongside her husband, mother, sisters, and aunts—and 
each would become highly active in protest and lobbying efforts with local government.27  
 Lillie Jackson would eventually become the president of the Baltimore NAACP 
branch also in 1935 and would be credited with reshaping the branch and ushering in an 
era of tremendous organizational growth and political activity and protest. Because of the 
embedded family connections, it is difficult to analyze the work of the Forum and Juanita 
Jackson in the same way as we would other race uplift organizations of the time. For one, 
the very tight family connections that helped to shape the Forum and its work differ from 
those of other organizations with a federated structure, such as the NAACP, and smaller 
local organizations, such as fraternal and grassroots organizations. The Forum is an 
important case, however, because it adds complexity to our understanding of the different 
modes of influence and networking that blacks and potentially other politically 
disadvantaged groups can use. 
 At its most elementary level, the Forum was a local organization with deep family 
linkages that set the groundwork for later work instrumental to Baltimore’s black politics. 
The Forum had a full bevy of resources and managed to build up a strong and large 
membership base and invite an impressive group of speakers. The Forum was 
Baltimore’s first nonfederated grassroots organization that succeeded at coordinating 
efforts across organizations, building partnerships, facilitating dialogue and debate, and 
finally translating these skills into action. The Forum worked as an incubator of talent 
                                                 




beyond its family networks. Its major would reshape the local NAACP and take on 
bigger battles. For example, the Forum’s legal advisor would later become the Baltimore 
branch’s lawyer, and members of the executive board later served on the local NAACP 
executive board.28 
 The roster of meeting speakers points to the prominence of the Forum as a viable 
organization in Baltimore and demonstrates its ability to utilize its autonomous structure 
to build an expansive agenda. The vast list of speakers demonstrates the networking and 
coordination skills of Juanita Jackson and the Forum’s ability to build a wide-reaching 
agenda that was not situated in a specific area. Its work differed from a federated 
organization such as the NAACP or the Urban League because it did not have a strict 
agenda to follow. Although the NAACP would later evolve, in the early years, the agenda 
was focused on anti-lynching and legal redress, and it later moved to campaigns for 
integration. The Urban League by design was tightly bound by an agenda to develop 
better employment opportunities for blacks.  Important agenda topics ranged from a 
woman’s role in politics to the economic outlook for blacks in the city. 
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Table 3.3: Sample of Forum Speakers and Topics29 
 
Selected Speakers 
Dr. Rayford W. Logan, Journal of Negro History 
Mary McLeod Bethune, Bethune-Cookman College 
Dr. David Weglein, Baltimore City Schools 
Mr. Elmer A. Carter, Opportunity Magazine 
Mrs. Marie Bauernschmidt, Public School Association 
of Baltimore 
Dr. W.E.B. DuBois, Editor, Crisis NAACP 
Judge Bayard Williams, People’s Court, Baltimore 
Dr. Channing Tobias, National YMCA 
Adam Clayton Powell, Sr., Abyssinia Baptist Church 
Mr. Ira De A. Reid, National Urban League 
Oscar DePriest , Congressman, Chicago 
Illinois 
William Pickens, Field Secretary of the 
NAACP 
Mabel Byrd, National Recovery 
Administration 
Walter White, Executive Secretary, 
NAACP 
Dr. Charles H. Houston, Howard 
University Law  
Dr. E. Franklin Frazier, Fisk University 
Miss Mary White Ovington, Treasurer 
NAACP,  
Mr. Edward Lewis, Baltimore Urban 
League  
Roy S. Wilkins, Assistant Secretary 
NAACP 
Congressman Arthur Mitchell, Illinois 
Selected Topics 
The Depression and the Negro 
Lifted to Service 
Political Symposium: “My Party’s Program” 
The Progress of Colored Schools 
Symposium: “Have Women Made a Mess of Politics?” 
The Future of the Darker Races 
A Fraternal Symposium: “What My Fraternity Is Doing for Humanity” 
What’s the Matter with Race Relations? 
What the Negro Should Expect from the New Deal 
A Symposium: “Know Your City” 
Debate: “Should the Negro Leave the South?” 
Shall the Negro Cross the Color Line? 
Present-Day Tendencies in the Development of Women 
Negro Leaders at the Cross-Roads 
The Significance of Recent Developments in Racial Consciousness 
Are we Facing Interracial War? 
What the State Administration Means to the Colored Group 
Effects of Discrimination in Educational Opportunities in Maryland and a Plan of Attack 
Unemployment Insurance 
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The Forum meetings were highly attended, lending to the contention that grassroots 
organizing matched with resources and strong leadership effectively mobilized people. 
The Afro-American reported that nearly 1,000 people attended Forum meetings on a 
regular basis.30 This attendance is impressive. For one, the sheer number of people that 
attended the meetings gives reason to believe that the Forum was not an entirely elite 
organization that served to facilitate discussion only among the black elite; instead, the 
Forum and its activities included blacks from all walks of life. Also, the Forum operated 
at the height of the Depression and managed to have tremendous turnout with very little 
incentives beyond an impressive set of speakers and spirited debate.  
 Scholars have noted how the accumulation of political skills can help groups with 
weaker political influence.31 These skills can be learned on the job, at church, and in civic 
groups, to name a few places. The organizational structure of the Forum helps to inform 
our understanding of the types of political skills the Forum helped to hone.32 By 1934, the 
organizational structure of the Forum was extensive. With close to 30 members 
comprising the executive leadership, the organization’s structure offered participants 
multiple opportunities to learn a variety of skills such as letter and memo writing, 
communication skills, and voting. By taking a closer look at the organizational structure, 
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it is clear that the Forum borrowed institutional remnants from other sectors. The Forum 
was autonomous and not linked to a larger organization, so its design was innovative in 
that components from other institutions were mimicked in the building of its 
organizational structure.  
 For example, the Forum borrowed from: (1) the black church in creating a chorus 
and sick committee, (2) governmental institutions in creating a ways and means 
committee, and (3) the NAACP in placing a legal advisor on the executive board. This 
mélange of different institutional elements is most likely influenced by the overlapping 
experiences of the Forum’s leadership in the church and organizations such as the 
NAACP. There was a leadership post for each moving part of the organization. Remnants 
of the black church are evidenced in the position of the chairman and vice chairman of 
ushers and the chorus. Pieces from the NAACP show up in the Forum’s legal advisor 
position, social committee, and membership committee (also evident in local NAACP 
branches).33 What is clear about the organizational structure of the Forum was that it was 
robust and illustrative of the knowledge base and education of its leadership. Reaching 
beyond a grassroots organization, the Forum allowed lots of people to get involved and 
polish their organizing and participatory skills. 
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Table 3.4: Leadership Structure of the City-Wide Young People’s Forum 34 
 
President 
Vice President (n= 7) 




Legal Advisor  
Business Manager 
Chairman of Ushers 
Vice Chairman of Ushers 
Chairman of Ways and Means Committee 
Chairman of Program Committee 
Chairman Constitution & Research Committee 
Chairman Student Aid and Scholarship 
Committee 
Chairman of Sick Committee 
Chairman of Auditing Committee 
Chairman of Social Committee 
Chairman Auditing Committee 
Chairman Publicity Committee 
Chairman Membership Committee 
Director of City Wide Young People’s Chorus  
 
 It is also important to note how the Forum shared resources with the NAACP. As 
stated previously, Juanita Jackson Mitchell was the daughter of Lillie Jackson, president 
of the NAACP. The nature of their familial relationship enabled a seamless sharing of 
resources. Although the Forum functioned autonomously from the NAACP, it is clear 
that both organizations worked together closely, and archival records demonstrate that the 
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NAACP used the Forum for mobilizing new members and expanding its scope of 
political action.  Lillie Jackson explained: 
 The City-Wide Young People’s Forum gives me an opportunity to make my 
 appeal for memberships as well as to announce our recital. It is through the 
 Forum every Friday night, one week in each section of the city, that we keep 
 alive the interest in our branch. Juanita’s presence the first Friday in each month 
 at Bethel A.M.E. Church keeps the large crowds from all over the city coming. 
 Thus, any announcement given on that night reaches the whole city. It is she who 
 plans and helps the officers keep live programs every Friday night. We are 
 depending on this young, enthusiastic group to help our local branch to get the 
 public sentiment in favor of High Schools in Baltimore County and colored 
 policemen in Baltimore. They are starting out with petitions for colored 
 policemen tomorrow night at the Forum which meets at my church (Sharp St. 
 M.E. Church). Behind the petitions of probably 6,000 names, the local branch will 
 send our committee to see the Governor, then we’ll get other fraternal, social, and 
 religious organizations to go. Mr. Carl Murphy, with whom I’ve talked, is giving 
 us his whole hearted support and he will also go as a newspaper editor fighting for 
 Negro policemen…We had about eight hundred people in all that snow. So you 
 can see what the Forum will mean for our local NAACP. It will be a mouth-piece 
 for us.35 
 
The Forum and Political Action 
 
 The political activity of the Forum centered on equal access to employment. This 
is understandable, because the organization  was at its peak during the Depression years. 
The Forum organized around the employment of black librarians, black teachers, and 
store clerks and the equal distribution of social welfare services. Starting in 1932, the 
Forum lobbied officials from the public library system to open the qualification process 
for black librarians. This battle would last for several years and eventually culminate 
decades later through the courts. Further, the Forum teamed up with the Urban League in 
1933 to increase the number of black social workers appointed by the Baltimore 
Emergency Relief Commission. Records indicate that the Forum worked directly with the 
                                                 






Urban League in conducting research on black social workers and the Baltimore 
Emergency Relief Commission, and also helped interracial groups to advance their work 
on this issue.  
 Judging from the expertise and makeup of the Urban League during this period, 
we can surmise that the Urban League probably took the lead on the research and 
bringing in interracial contacts. The Forum, on the other hand, provided legal expertise 
and organized a petition drive. According the Forum records:  
 Under the leadership of the legal advisor, Attorney W.A.C. Hughes, Jr., petitions 
 with thousands of signatures were presented to the proper authorities in each 
 case....As a result of this effort, in conjunction with the efforts of the Urban 
 League, during September and October of 1933, five more Social Workers were 
 appointed by the Baltimore Emergency Relief Commission, which number has 
 been increased to sixteen during 1934.36 
 
An analysis of the Forum’s political activity shows that the organization helped to 
spearhead collaborative efforts by offering resources and that it possessed the skills to 
lobby local officials and organize petition drives, raise funds and distribute resources, and 
campaign for candidates running for office. The Forum played a pivotal role in partnering 
and offering legal expertise during Baltimore’s “Buy Where You Can Work” campaign. 
The campaign was originally orchestrated by a single individual with no prior connection 
to Baltimore—Kiowa Costonie, a traveling motivational speaker who had experience 
leading a similar campaign in Pittsburgh. It is important to note that “Buy Where You 
Can Work” campaigns were spreading across the country at this time and not limited to 
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Baltimore.37 This case is important to analyze because it shows how the Forum found a 
niche and crafted a mobilizing strategy. 
 The Forum possessed both the organizational autonomy and the skills to assist in 
the boycott efforts surrounding the campaign. The basic facts of the “Buy Where You 
Can Work” campaign are clear and well documented. In November 1933, Kiowa 
Costonie launched a boycott and picket of the A&P grocery stores to persuade the 
grocery’s leadership to hire local blacks. This boycott was organized after verbal 
communication with management at the A&P stores stalled and was unsuccessful.  
  Forum records indicate that the Forum was involved with Costonie’s movement 
and boycott and that they worked in partnership.38 Although the full efforts of the 
Forum’s cooperation is not entirely outlined, we can hypothesize that the Forum assisted 
in communicating the details of the boycott and soliciting picket participants at its weekly 
meetings. The result of the A&P boycott was successful: After three days of boycotting 
and picketing, A&P leadership conceded and offered 38 young black men clerk 
positions.39 The timing of the A&P boycott speaks to the ability of a group with the status 
of a political underdog to increase its chances for success when it can latch onto a 
politically opportune moment. Operating without constraints or permission, the Forum 
was able to tackle this campaign for integration. Although the Depression and the 
economic landscape did not guarantee the success of the A&P boycott, the Forum was 
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able to muster the necessary resources to launch the boycott via its established networks 
of speakers and the black elites to which they were attached. 
 Political opportunity, however, does not guarantee success. Just weeks after the 
success of the A&P boycott, again, the Forum and Mr. Costonie joined forces to expand 
their boycotting and picketing efforts to local merchants in black neighborhoods that did 
not employ blacks. In this venture, the strategy was not directed at one single store chain; 
instead they aimed to convince multiple white merchants on the 1700 block of 
Pennsylvania Avenue to employ young black women.40 The same strategy was applied to 
the second round of lobbying for jobs for young blacks. After unsuccessfully discussing 
the push for black employment with white store owners, the Forum organized a boycott 
and picket of the stores in identical fashion. The economic climate and the timing of the 
A&P and the Pennsylvania Avenue campaigns were the same. However, the outcomes 
were drastically different.  
 After a week of boycotting and picketing (as opposed to three days in the A&P 
campaign), the Pennsylvania Avenue store owners filed a court injunction to halt 
picketing.41 The reasons behind the different behavior of the Pennsylvania Avenue store 
owners is not entirely clear. Perhaps these store owners had observed the experiences of 
the A&P campaign and had more time to coordinate and put forward an organized effort 
against the black picketers. Another possibility is that the white store owners were able to 
coordinate and effectively pull together their resources to fight the picketers and that the 
A&P leadership could not afford to fight the picketers on its own. In this sense, 
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broadening their efforts to target a group of stores rather than one chain hindered the 
picketers. More simply stated, the Forum expanded its effort to fighting a multiple set of 
actors without broadening its resources, and this disparity allowed the white store owners 
to put forward a stronger defense.  
 The second attempt by the Forum provides a good example of how emerging 
groups with few political resources navigate failures and reconfigure their resources. In 
this case, a deeper analysis into the Forum’s response to the picketing injunction 
demonstrates complex layers of organizing and the beginnings of intersecting networks 
for Baltimore’s local black leadership. I argue that the autonomous grassroots structure of 
the Forum encouraged innovative mobilization schemes and strategy-building. It is also 
important to note that the Forum devised new strategies at a time when the NAACP was 
not flourishing—although other organizations were important, the NAACP in particular 
was notable for mobilizing at the local and state level to improve race relations.  
 First off, in response to the injunction placed on the black picketers, the Forum 
took charge and furnished the legal counsel to respond to the case. The Forum dispatched 
the organization’s legal advisor, W.A.C. Hughes, and recruited former city councilman 
Warner T. McGuinn.42 The success in securing McGuinn speaks to the Forum’s existing 
networks with seasoned black leaders and its ability to garner the participation of talent 
outside its core membership of young black Baltimoreans. What complicates our analysis 
of the Forum’s political activity is the existence of the complex networks of Juanita 
Jackson, the Forum’s president. Although Ms. Jackson was the president of the Forum, 
evidence also points to the fact that she was at the helm of leadership for the local 
                                                 




NAACP Booster Club and coordinated efforts surrounding the picket injunction on 
behalf of the NAACP as well.  
 An article from the Baltimore Afro-American tells that Walter White, secretary for 
the national office of the NAACP, was a keynote speaker at a local NAACP meeting 
organized by Juanita Jackson under the auspices of the Booster Club. At the meeting, 
Walter White spoke on the picketing injunction and urged those in attendance to continue 
the fight. According to the review by the Afro-American, Walter White offered his 
opinion on the next steps for mounting a strategy: 
 He pointed out that although the persons and organizations active in the fight had 
 been restrained by court order, a number of other groups and individuals could 
 take up the battle. Every church, lodge, club, and especially the local branch of 
 the NAACP was asked to begin a program of struggle that would bring the 
 merchants into line.…“The NAACP is ready to take the injunction question to the 
 Supreme Court if necessary,” he said, and advised the people to have money 
 ready to use for the bail of persons arrested for taking part in the boycott.43 
 
The fact that Juanita Jackson served as NAACP Booster Club president and orchestrated 
the mass meeting with Walter White as speaker raises questions.  
 The obvious question is why Ms. Jackson wore multiple hats to push forward the 
same issues and demands. A related question is whether her intersecting organizational 
affiliations were coincidental or orchestrated efforts to take on multiple leadership roles 
to bolster influence and strengthen strategies. What is clear is that Juanita Jackson 
organized Mr. White’s speaking engagement separate and apart from her work as the 
Forum president. In fact, a presentation of the facts reveals a curious chain of events. The 
Forum actually hosted Walter White as the keynote speaker at one of its Friday sessions 
                                                 




on December 1, 1933, to discuss the topic “Shall the Negro Cross the Color Line?”44 The 
Afro-American reports that a few weeks later, Juanita Jackson again organized a meeting 
for the NAACP to have Walter White speak on the national office’s legal work and the 
beginning action steps for the University of Maryland Law School admissions case.45 The 
article describes that in discussing the topic of legal cases, Mr. White naturally 
commented on the current situation surrounding the picket injunction.  
 This chain of events signals a few potential hypotheses. One possibility is that 
Juanita Jackson’s heightened civic engagement allowed her to strategically utilize her 
affiliations and leadership posts. For example, since the NAACP was mostly focused on 
strategies surrounding legal redress at the time, through her dual posts as Booster Club 
and Forum president, she was able to take advantage of the current priorities of the 
NAACP to integrate her expertise and heavy involvement in the picket case. Had she not 
had the influence or experience with the picket case as Forum president, we can imagine 
that the details of the picket case may not have gotten direct access to Walter White or 
endorsement and committed help from the national office either.  
  In holding dual leadership positions, Juanita Jackson streamlined her influence 
and bypassed the need to coordinate efforts across multiple organizations. Furthermore, 
the dual influence and networks that Juanita Jackson demonstrated at this time would be 
replicated in following years and would mark the key strategy of later race politics efforts 
as additional movements were mounted by autonomous grassroots organizations. In this 
respect, the political behavior of Juanita Jackson during this period is important and 
consequential to making a significant imprint on how local organizations built the 
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capacity to organize and mobilize black Baltimoreans. In brief, in the absence of a 
flourishing NAACP and within the constraints of the agenda-setting of the Urban League, 
the mass mobilization of blacks in Baltimore was orchestrated by an autonomous 
grassroots organization that harnessed resources from multiple areas and crafted 
innovative strategies.  
 Adding to the complexity of Juanita Jackson’s networks and leadership positions, 
a deeper analysis into the picket injunction case reveals a more nuanced system of 
mobilizing. Although the Forum furnished legal counsel and raised funds for the picket 
case, another group also became very much involved—the Citizens Committee, under the 
leadership of Lillie Jackson, mother to Juanita. The timing of events suggests that the 
Citizens Committee became involved after the Forum lost the picket case—the judge 
ruled the injunction on the picketers to be permanent, and the Forum followed up by 
making plans for an appeal.46 The Afro-American reports that the Citizens Committee 
organized a mass meeting to raise funds for the appeal and led the efforts by raising the 
largest sum among other black organizations also urged to contribute.47 Although it is 
unclear why the Citizens Committee was formed and took on the challenge to raise funds, 
it is important to note that a series of additional autonomous organizations were formed 
in response to Forum activities. 
 It is also important to explain that the growth in political activity in black 
Baltimore did not develop without tension and differing opinions. In fact, not all parties 
agreed over the methods and strategies employed. Tensions mounted between Kiowa 
Costonie, the Forum, and the Citizens Committee. What is also clear is that these tensions 
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were echoed within the larger black community and discussed on the editorial pages of 
the Afro-American. After losing the initial picket case, the Forum and the Citizens 
Committee expanded their legal strategy and solicited help from the national office of the 
NAACP to assist with the appeal. The move to bring the NAACP legal counsel into the 
picket case shifted the scope of the issue from a purely local effort to one involving 
people outside of Baltimore. The NAACP brought in Charles Houston, then Dean of 
Howard University Law School, to take the lead on the picket appeal.  
 In a sign of mounting tensions surrounding the NAACP legal team, an editorial by 
Clarence Mitchell (who sat on the executive leadership of the Forum) noted that several 
Baltimoreans responded to the NAACP’s arrival with the attitude that no more money or 
action was needed. His editorial also explained that the NAACP lawyers were not 
strongly welcomed by some: “Two good attorneys, who so far have gotten more kicks 
than compliments or dollars, are employed on the case and need the moral support of 
every person in Baltimore’s population.”48 But the strongest tensions appear to have been 
with Mr. Costonie and over strategies. With the ushering in of the NAACP legal team, it 
was clear that the strategy had shifted from a focus on direct action and protest to one of 
well-honed legal maneuverings. This emphasizes the constraints that the NAACP as a 
federated organization brought on board in regards to strategy. The mobilization shifted 
away from mass activism via boycott efforts and mass meetings to one of accumulating 
the resources and legal expertise to succeed in the courts. 
 It is clear that the shift in strategy was laced with differences in class and 
available resources—Mr. Costonie was a political entrepreneur in his own right with no 
solidified Baltimore pedigree, and those leading the charge in established organizations 
                                                 




such as the Forum and the Citizens Committee were college-educated and Baltimore 
natives. Clarence Mitchell’s editorial also reveals that these tensions were played out in a 
debate between Mr. Costonie and the organizational base over using the $2,000 raised for 
the appeal to open up black-owned businesses fully run and staffed by black 
Baltimoreans rather than using the funds for a legal fight.  
 Mr. Mitchell argued against using the monies to open up black-owned businesses. 
He posited that more resources beyond money were needed to build and run a store, and 
that black Baltimoreans did not possess those additional resources at the time—Clarence 
Mitchell offered that black clerks could gain experience first, and with hard work, build 
the capital and experience to open their own stores.49 The tensions embedded within the 
Forum’s efforts as an autonomous grassroots organization that worked in partnership 
with the NAACP legal team speak to the fact that conflict was present in all 
organizational structures. Because of the lack of an institutionalized structure, the Forum 
was exposed to internal strife and conflict. The disagreements with Mr. Costonie are not 
surprising.50  
 All over the country, black communities were sifting through strategies to fight 
racial battles, and discussions often surrounded the push to advance direct action and 
black self-reliance versus methods to make systemic changes to institutions. In 
Baltimore, the decision was made to make systemic change to institutions, but there was 
also an understanding of the value of the protest, boycott, and picket, and it would be 
misleading to describe the Forum as an organization without class diversity. In an 
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analysis of the tensions and variety in opinions over the picket case, it would be remiss 
not to also include the editorial commentary of Ralph Matthews of the Afro-American.  
 Matthews was known for offering opinions contrary to those of Baltimore’s black 
elites. In speaking on the picket case appeal and the arrival of the NAACP legal team, 
Matthews urged black Baltimoreans not to put full stock into the right to picket, and to 
use the picket battle as an opportunity to bring together the city’s black organizations and 
resources to improve race pride. In essence, he was urging black Baltimoreans to use this 
time to ignite race consciousness and to work together on a larger platform beyond the 
picket fight. 
 We should not, however, permit ourselves to lose our sense of proportion. Getting 
 jobs for our youth is the important issue, not the right to wear signs on our backs 
 and parade….The picket decision prohibits demonstrations in front of stores, but 
 it does not and cannot prohibit a silent, passive campaign of education in our 
 lodges, churches, schools and community gatherings. There the vital blows must 
 be struck.…That offensive should be carried on within the race, creating race 
 pride and racial unity. The picket is only a weapon of warfare. If the enemy has 
 captured our sword, we should not plead with him to give it back. Let us drag out 
 our cannon.51 
 
It is difficult to untangle how big a role class and resource differences came to play in 
advancing a heightened legal effort with the national NAACP, but it is clear that during 
the Depression era, Baltimore’s leadership became much more robust and the Forum took 
the reins on organizing and mobilizing in full scale.  
 The Forum’s work extended far beyond its legal efforts evidenced in the picketing 
case. In fact, the picketing case was just one of the many political activities of the 
organization. In addition to weekly discussions led by nationally renowned speakers on 
race, the Forum worked the hardest on opening up employment for black youth. In March 
1934, the Forum opened an office specifically devoted to providing employment services 
                                                 




to the city’s out-of-work black youth.52 And speaking to the political skills and resources 
that the Forum had acquired, the space for the employment center was donated by one its 
sponsors. This provides clues to the fact that the Forum was fairly prominent and skilled 
in working effectively with its partners.  
 When strengthening influence with local institutions, the Forum did not act alone. 
Instead it  utilized its existing partnerships and networks with black organizations to 
bring forward a unified contingent of black interests. By having no ties to institutional 
protocol, the Forum was able to expose everyday blacks to the many variants of local 
politics, and the combined leadership skills of Juanita Jackson and her networks and 
knowledge base enabled the Forum to develop as an intricate grassroots organization with 
influence.  
5. The Fight to Equalize Baltimore City Teacher Salaries 
 Issues surrounding education, including integration, school improvements, salary 
equalization, and the appointment of a black member to the school board, persisted for 
several decades, with the first discussions around these issues starting to churn at the turn 
of the century. The most robust instances of black political participation surrounding 
schools were not local in scope and were marked by legal methods at the core. Therefore, 
it is difficult to isolate the trajectory of campaigns for school equality. However, a closer 
analysis of Baltimore school politics between 1924 and 1927 does reveal the blending of 
civic participation and legal redress to take on school issues. In later years, where school 
issues took on more prominence, we notice that the climate of political opportunities 
differed and efforts were punctuated by an influential local and national NAACP. 
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Because an entire project could be devoted to changes over time in local school policy 
and activism, I have chosen instead to hone in on specific cases that involved civic 
groups and local government in methods that stretched beyond legal means and centered 
on local issues. The Defense League’s fight to equalize black teachers’ salaries in 
Baltimore City from 1924 to 1927 represented the first effort by a black civic group to 
mount a legal rather than legislative campaign at the local level.53  
 The fight to equalize black teacher salaries in Baltimore represented a move to 
change local school policy. Black leaders would join forces over several decades to fight 
against school segregation and for the improvement of school facilities for black children. 
However, what the Defense League case reveals is how local groups in the 1920s 
mounted efforts for local policy change. The Defense League’s efforts unfold two 
lessons: (1) how middle-class black activists responded to a political environment 
immediately following an abrupt change in political representation and (2) how conflict 
and disunity factored into the absence of coordinated efforts or partnering between black 
civic organizations and black institutions. What the city salary equalization case teaches 
us is that even in the midst of mounting a successful effort, there is evidence of a failure 
to configure resources in ways that capitalized on the resources available at the time. 
 Civic groups committed to racial uplift were not unified on issues relating to 
school policy. In fact, between 1923 and 1927, several groups stood in opposition and 
were in conflict over school issues. Three groups operated with similar and often 
overlapping demands and were in opposition and not in partnership. The Federation of 
Parent-Teacher Clubs was the largest group, representing 10,000 members and a notable 
leadership of prominent black elites and white liberal elites. Laura Wheatley, former 
                                                 




committee head of the 1920 NAACP membership campaign, served as president, and 
other members of the executive leadership included Sarah Fernandis, president of the 
Women’s Cooperative Civic League, Maurice Ross, executive secretary of the Urban 
League, Dr. Broadus Mitchell, the white president of the Urban League, Rev. Charles 
Briggs, and two other white members.54 The Schoolmasters Club—a smaller civic group 
of black male teachers—also advocated for the equalization of teacher salaries. Lastly, 
the Defense League also became involved and was comprised of prominent black 
attorneys, clergy, and also former council members William Fitzgerald and Warner 
McGuinn. At first glance, it appears that both the Defense League and the Federation of 
Parent-Teacher Clubs had the most robust resources. The Defense League had legal 
expertise and support from two former council members already familiar with the politics 
of the school board and the inner workings of City Hall. The Federation, on the other 
hand, could recruit from a large base of parents and teachers, and its leadership brought 
together several influential race uplift organizations and black institutions, and involved 
interracial participation. The question then is: Did the group with the most robust 
resources lead the charge? And, were the most powerful groups able to join forces and 
buttress their communication, experience, and membership resources in ways that proved 
advantageous?   
 In 1924, the state legislature passed a law “prohibiting any discrimination on 
account of sex in the payment of city and State employees.” The Baltimore City Council 
followed up by ruling that this law extended to its teachers and appropriated $50,000 to 
the school budget to raise salaries. However, the attorney general further ruled that the 
gender discrimination law did not apply to black teachers, signaling an effort to make a 
                                                 




clear distinction between gender and race equality.55 The Federation of Parent-Teacher 
Clubs would eventually not take the lead on pressing for salary equalization and would 
instead be trumped by the legal strategy of the Defense League. However, in the end 
neither group would be responsible for successfully negotiating with City Hall because 
the Schoolmaster’s Club would eventually get the promise from Mayor Jackson to 
equalize the salaries of black teachers. There is reason to believe that this was a peculiar 
outcome. The group with the least amount of resources caught the ear of City Hall, and 
the group with an abundance of resources appears to have electively removed itself from 
becoming involved in the fight for equal salaries. All this begs the question: Why did the 
Federation not deliver on carrying out a fight on teacher salaries when it appears that it 
had expertise across an organizational continuum and robust membership? The 
Federation stayed away from legal matters and instead stuck to issues where it could 
work directly with City Hall, such as city services and representation. Moreover, why do 
we see no evidence of partnering between organizations?  
 First off, any coordinated effort between the Defense League and the Federation 
of Parent-Teacher Clubs did not happen because both groups were in conflict with each 
other. The source of the conflict is not clear, but what is evident is that the conflict sits at 
the center of the salary equalization fight. Nearly a year after the state legislature ruled 
against gender discrimination for city employees, the Defense League held a mass 
meeting outlining its objectives for the year. Records indicate that the Defense League 
had been in existence for just one year and was inactive during its first year—but in the 
meeting, Defense League leadership decided to tackle the issue of salary equalization.  
                                                 




 What is important to note beyond the agenda-setting at the Defense League’s 
meeting is that leadership from the Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs attended. 
According to reports from the Afro-American, “Despite the fact that the President Dr. 
Harry McCard asked for comment from the audience, Dr. B. M. Rhetta, Dr. Edward J. 
Wheatley, and Mrs. Laura J. Wheatley, president of the Federation of Parent-Teacher 
Clubs, were ruled out of order when they attempted to speak. Objections by W. Ashbie 
Hawkins were sustained, and when speakers protested the chair’s ruling, the meeting was 
quickly adjourned.”56 Unfortunately, there is no available evidence suggesting the reason 
for the conflict between the Defense League and the Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs. 
We can surmise that whatever conflict arose was brewing for some time and that Harry 
McCard of the Defense League shut down comments from the Federation because of 
anticipation of an opposing viewpoint or instigation of more conflict. The scuffle 
between the Defense League and the Federation would not be terribly important had it 
been an isolated event. However, conflict persisted and was consequential to any 
possibility to partner or collaborate on behalf of equal salaries. 
 Merely days after the Defense League held its mass meeting, leadership from the 
Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs conducted an arranged private meeting with the 
school board. This speaks to its knowledge of maneuvering within city government and 
the scope of its access—elements of its expertise that could be helpful if matched with a 
collaborative effort. Again, conflict arose when leadership from both the Defense League 
and the Schoolmasters Club showed up unannounced and demanded that they be present 
                                                 




at the meeting.57 As expected, the school board reiterated that the meeting with the 
Federation was a closed meeting and that all other parties had to arrange their own 
private meeting. In the meeting, the Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs outlined its 
recommendations to the school board. These recommendations included: the appointment 
of a director of black schools, repairs and improvements to needy schools, and speediness 
in filling vacancies in black schools.58  
 What was not included in the Federation’s recommendations was the equalization 
of salaries. The Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs went on record endorsing the 
equalization of salaries but opted not to lobby when meeting with the school board. It is 
clear is that the Federation stayed away from meddling in local policy change and instead 
opted to focus on school improvement and increased hiring. This strategy would not 
require mobilization of its massive membership rolls and would instead involve 
bargaining and lobbying between the Federation’s leadership, the school board, and City 
Hall. This strategy was most likely put forward because of the influence of the Urban 
League leadership (the president and secretary of the local Urban League sat on the 
executive board of the Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs). The decision by the 
Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs to avoid a fight to equalize teacher salaries suggests 
its reticence to share its resources and join the charge with other groups and hints at the 
influence and ultimate constraints of the Urban League methods at this time.  
 In the early 1920s, the Urban League was not interested in challenging local 
policy, and as other chapters demonstrated, it honed in on building expertise around 
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fighting for neighborhood issues and sticking to “block by block” battles that relied on 
copious research and social scientific investigations. The Urban League was gaining 
traction with local government during this time, and it is likely that members of the 
Urban League advocated to mount a series of lobbying efforts with the school board and 
City Hall and not to pursue a mobilization effort that shifted from their proven strategy. 
Salary equalization did not fall under neighborhood improvement, and therefore the 
balance of the Federation of Parent-Teacher Club leadership steered clear of 
collaborating with other groups in order to maintain its existing method of pressure 
politics. 
 What is also clear is that the Federation for Parent-Teacher Clubs was not in 
communication with either the Defense League or Schoolmasters Club. While the 
Federation was making efforts to lobby with the school board for a director of black 
schools and school improvement, the Defense League was busy ramping up its efforts to 
push the city to equalize teacher salaries. The Defense League put forward a different 
strategy in comparison to the Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs. The Federation of 
Parent-Teacher Clubs went directly to the school board to push for changes authorized by 
the school board, and the Defense League reached out to the Board of Estimates, which 
oversaw the fiscal arm of local government. It is probable that the Defense League went 
about a different strategy in reaching out to the Board of Estimates because two of the 
Defense League members were former city council members and had knowledge of the 
different threads of local government tied to the implementation of salary equalization.59 
What is clear from the path to equalize city teacher salaries up to this point is that groups 
committed to racial uplift simply failed to join together. Personal conflicts and strict 
                                                 




attachments to organizational methods hampered partnerships and collaboration. And the 
Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs, arguably the group with the largest membership 
base, behaved in the most rigid fashion. 
 In comparison to the Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs, the Defense League 
demonstrated that it was able to remain flexible in the midst of challenges. When faced 
with no response from the Board of Estimates and school board, the Defense League used 
its legal resources and filed an injunction to halt the release of funds in the budget 
earmarked for the increase of salaries for white teachers. This move would later paralyze 
any movement of the Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs and halt its efforts. The 
Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs’ lobby on other school issues was trumped by the 
legal expertise of the Defense League—and the legal strategy marked the first instance of 
legal activism by blacks in Baltimore up to this time.60 According to reports from the 
Afro-American, “Appeals to the School Board, the Mayor, and the Board of Estimates to 
remedy this defect [have] fallen on deaf ears, [and an] injunction was secured upon which 
a hearing will be staged July 6th.”61 The Defense League had the personnel resources to 
carry out a legal fight. Former council member Warner McGuinn served as the primary 
spokesperson and legal counsel alongside prominent lawyer and member Ashbie 
Hawkins. Moreover, members of the Defense League comprised an influential group of 
black community members including former council member William Fitzgerald, the 
pastor of Bethel AME Church, notable physicians, and attorneys.62  
                                                 
60 “A New Weapon,” Afro-American, August 1, 1925. 
61 “Defense League’s Injunction,” Afro-American, June 27, 1925. 




 A case can be made for the Defense League’s anticipating that filing an injunction 
would upset white teachers who were awaiting a salary increase.63 Members of the 
Defense League had the knowledge and expertise to understand the ramifications of the 
injunction. The city’s response to the injunction was predictable—spokespersons for the 
city argued that they would fight against the injunction being made permanent so they 
could go ahead with equalizing the salaries of white female teachers.64 The Defense 
League submitted the injunction on June 11, 1925. Within a month, the Board of 
Estimates and the School Board were effective in delaying a response on the injunction 
and failed to make any changes to their plans to equalize the salaries of white teachers 
only. By July 11, 1925, the Board of Estimates prolonged any movement on the 
injunction by ruling that:  
 It is understood that the School Board will submit to the Board of Estimates a list 
 showing the effect of the salary equalization plan adopted…and that no increases 
 in compensation shall be paid until the list to be so submitted shall be approved 
 by the Board of Estimates. The action of the Board of Estimates is not to be 
 considered as fixing or approving the policy to be followed in the adoption of 
 future budgets. The motion was adopted unanimously.65  
 
In making this ruling, the Board of Estimates essentially extended the injunction debate 
by providing the School Board with more time to craft its strategy to fight the injunction 
and also to test the mettle of the Defense League’s stamina to continue the fight. It is 
important to note the multiple layers of influence between City Hall, the Board of 
Estimates, and the School Board during the injunction fight. The desire of the Defense 
League was to ultimately win the fight over teacher salaries in the legal realm, forcing the 
School Board to change its policy on salary equalization by race and gender and the 
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Board of Estimates to make fiscal changes with dispersing funds. What is interesting is 
that although the Defense League initially lobbied with City Hall to no avail, during the 
injunction fight, both the mayor and city council president went on record endorsing the 
inclusion of black teachers for salary equalization.66  
 It is not entirely clear why City Hall openly endorsed race and gender salary 
equalization in contrast to the School Board and Board of Estimates, although a potential 
electoral reason was to gain favor in the black community in anticipation of the upcoming 
1927 election. This is especially unclear given the fact that during the injunction battle, 
City Hall revealed that it did not make provisions in the 1926 budget for race and gender 
salary equalization.67 Regardless of the favorable endorsement from City Hall, the 
Defense League continued to face inaction from the Board of Estimates and School 
Board on the injunction. Again, the Defense League was flexible amidst the challenges 
and adjusted its strategy. In an effort to intensify its legal strategy, the Defense League 
filed a writ of mandamus in January 1926.  
 In what the Afro-American editorial staff had earlier encouraged as a “new 
weapon” to fight racial injustice, the writ of mandamus took the injunction one step 
forward by arguing that the practice of paying high salaries to white male teachers and 
low salaries to black female teachers violated state law and constituted race and gender 
discrimination.68 The Defense League anticipated a heightened legal fight by submitting 
the writ of mandamus—according to law, by submitting the mandamus, the issue would 
be required to be settled in court. However, the Defense League’s efforts fell short when 
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the judge in charge of the case overruled on the matter and ordered the City Solicitor to 
complete an answer within 30 days rather than file with the court.69  
 This would result in a tremendous setback for the Defense League because its 
renewed efforts up to this point were dependent on arguing its case in court. The setback, 
however, is not surprising given the fact that this represented the first effort by black 
elites in the city to mount a legal battle and that this attempt predates the availability of a 
well-organized NAACP legal team. The City Solicitor would later follow up with a 
response to the Defense League’s writ of mandamus and extinguish any momentum in its 
cause. In its response, the city made clear its system of segregated schools and argued for 
no changes to the salaries of black teachers on the grounds that black male and female 
teachers were treated equally. 
 
  [The] Frederick Douglass Senior-Junior High School (devoted exclusively to the 
 colored race and taught by the colored race) was omitted for the reason that no 
 discrimination exists in the pay of colored male and colored female teachers in 
 that school. These defendants say that fixing of salaries is entirely a matter for 
 these defendants, and that there is no law of this state which requires that salaries 
 for colored teachers shall be the same for white teachers.70 
 
Equally important is the absence of any evidence of mobilization or partnering. The 
Defense League’s members had expertise and experience with the law and city 
government, but there is no indication of discussions with other parties such as the 
NAACP or the Schoolmasters’ Club to bolster its efforts by activating other groups to 
join the cause. Much like the Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs, the Defense League 
acted alone, even though other voices had already chimed in. And since evidence points 
to the fact that black civic groups were already well versed with organizing delegations to 
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lobby City Hall, it is important to note the absence of any direct lobbying with local 
officials during the final phases.  
  It appears that up to this point, strategies and efforts did not overlap, and when 
groups opted to shift directions, they did not seek to broaden their toolbox of resources by 
reaching out to others who were fighting a similar battle. Instead, the Federation of 
Parent-Teacher Clubs and the Defense League responded to setbacks by abandoning the 
fight rather than asking for help in places sympathetic to the issue at hand. Conflict and 
disagreement limited this possibility. Had the Defense League collaborated with the 
Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs or Schoolmasters Club, it would have amassed a 
membership base including teachers, and had the Defense League continued to lobby 
directly to City Hall in partnership with members from other groups, we can imagine that 
the mode of mobilization would have stretched beyond the legal realm and the 
opportunity for mass activism would have presented itself.71  
 The lack of partnership building between the Defense League, the Federation of 
Parent-Teacher Clubs, and the Schoolmasters Clubs represents one large missed 
opportunity for black teachers, parents, and black leaders to mount a fight. But there are 
also very good reasons to understand the lack of partnership-building and the absence of 
a larger group fighting for salary equalization. Perhaps the lack of activism by black 
teachers was wise and calculated based on their intentions to keep their jobs and not 
incite any conflict to that end. However, this explanation does not make complete sense 
because in the end, the Schoolmasters Club—a group composed of black male teachers—
would persist in its efforts to push for salary equalization and succeed. 
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 The work to equalize black teacher’s salaries in Baltimore ended on a peculiar 
note. Records on the lobbying efforts of the Schoolmasters Club are very slim. However, 
in the end, Mayor Jackson ultimately worked with the Schoolmasters Club to announce 
equalization of black teacher salaries for the 1927 budget. Although it is not strange that 
the mayor made this announcement in anticipation of the local elections, what is 
interesting is that he chose to reach out to the Schoolmasters Club. Since records on the 
Schoolmasters Club are limited, we can glean very little on how the Schoolmasters 
garnered the ear of the mayor. We can hypothesize that the mayor decided to work 
through a relatively neutral group in hopes of not causing any political cleavages within 
the black community. The Schoolmasters Club did not include prominent black lawyers 
and former council members or top leadership from the Urban League.  
 This case introduces how black Baltimoreans failed to effectively partner across 
groups with similar agendas. It shows is that they sometimes worked within issue silos, 
and as a result, mass activism did not become an option and the demands remained 
narrowly focused.  As stated earlier in this chapter, this case of the early fight for salary 
equalization was followed by additional campaigns put forth by the NAACP legal team 
to challenge salary differences across the state. What the lack of partnering also suggests 
is that its failure may have also hindered the growth of the agenda. Although it remains 
an important feat that black teachers in the city were granted equal salaries, it should be 
noted that in the end, the issue at hand remained narrowly construed. I argue that the lack 
of collaboration between the Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs, Defense League, and 
Schoolmasters Club helped to shape the limited agenda. We can hypothesize that had 




have come to the table with an elongated set of demands simply by nature of their 
multiple interests. This in turn would have transformed the salary equalization fight into a 
multi-issue agenda that touched on various grievances related to unsatisfactory schools 
for black children. 
Was weak organization to blame for a failure of partnership building? 
 
 Arguably, the failure of the Federation of Parent-Teacher Clubs, Defense League, 
and Schoolmasters Club to join forces and resources encourages a consideration of the 
status of organizational readiness in Baltimore at the time. Some may argue that 
partnerships were mired by few opportunities to effectively organize. In reality, black 
Baltimore did face a weak organizational outlook during the years of the salary 
equalization battle compared to later periods. Baltimore was not unique to other cities 
that were also ramping up. Larger federated organizations like the NAACP and Urban 
League were just beginning to proliferate in cities in the North and border states.  
 Records indicate that the Baltimore branch of the NAACP was undergoing its 
own fits and starts over the course of the salary equalization fight. For example, there 
were logistical difficulties between the national office and the local branch. Records 
indicate that in the early 1920s, the local branch had difficulty getting buy-in from people 
in the community because the national office was slow to properly process memberships 
and deliver the Crisis to members.72 By 1922, the local branch was making attempts to 
build the membership base and focused most of its mass-level activity on building 
momentum to help the national office with its charge to advocate for anti-lynching 
legislation. 
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 The Baltimore Branch of the NAACP has a present membership of 265 members 
 and a standing executive committee of 15 members. The Branch conducted a 
 number of investigations through its legal redress committee in an effort to secure 
 justice for those accused of crimes or the victims of crimes… An Anti-lynching 
 Mass Meeting was held June 6 at Bethel Church. Representative Dyer addressed a 
 gathering of nearly 2000 people. 230 memberships were secured. A second Anti-
 lynching mass meeting is planned for the near future with Senator France as 
 speaker.73 
 
During the exact timing of the salary equalization fight, the local NAACP suffered from 
uneven leadership. The lack of steady leadership with the local NAACP was not isolated; 
what the trajectory of the salary equalization fight shows is a general weakness in 
leadership across the board and no strong efforts to overcome the collective action 
problem.  
 I argue that weaknesses in organizational readiness do not account for the failure 
of partnerships. When presented with the opportunity to collaborate on teacher salaries 
and school improvement, the three organizations involved stuck to themselves and were 
unable to overcome internal conflicts. No leader emerged to harness the membership, 
knowledge, and experience of the three organizations lobbying on behalf of black 
teachers. A comparative view of other cities shows that even without an established 
NAACP or larger organizational apparatus, partnering sometimes did flourish. For 
example, in 1905, blacks in Nashville were able to launch a boycott of the segregated 
streetcars. Black business leaders and clergy teamed up in bringing forth economic 
resources and enabling communication networks through the church to mobilize 
everyday blacks to join the boycott. When blacks in Memphis attempted to mimic the 
Nashville boycott, black clergy refused to participate, and any possibility for partnering 
                                                 
73 Papers of the National Association of Colored People. June 21, 1922. Report of the Baltimore Branch of 




floundered.74 It is important that we do not consider weak organizational readiness to be a 
death wish to any efforts to build coalitions and work together. Doing so would silence 
the examples of political entrepreneurs emerging as strong leaders and instances when 
groups overcome collective action. 
6. Federated Organization: Urban League Efforts to Integrate Employment Sectors 
 
 The Baltimore Urban League was formed in 1924 with the mission “To make 
studies of existing conditions among Negroes, and to promote, encourage, assist, and 
engage in any kind of work to improve these conditions.”75 The focus in the early years 
of the Baltimore Urban League was social scientific inquiry into the economic and social 
welfare of blacks in the city.  
 The Urban League specialized in lobbying for economic opportunity. Often these 
efforts involved integrating employment sectors previously denied to black workers. As a 
federated organization, the Urban League operated in a methodical fashion. As 
previously mentioned, in the early years, the Urban League conducted a series of 
investigations of black life in Baltimore.76 The early years are also marked by pushes for 
improved training and facilities for blacks (see Chapter 2 for a deeper discussion). For 
example, in 1928, the Urban League weighed into the debate over segregated department 
stores in Baltimore. 
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 Plans to take some organized action in the situation created by united action of 
 many stores in the downtown section barring colored trade were made at a 
 meeting held at the Baltimore Urban League Tuesday evening.…Several plans of 
 meeting the situation discussed at the meeting included making a complete survey 
 of white and colored stores which would cater to the group. It was especially 
 pointed out that now would be an excellent time to begin the building up of race 
 enterprises. A committee to take the matter up with the Women’s Civic League 
 and other clubs was appointed.…77 
 
 Maurice Moss, Executive Secretary of the Urban League, opened a discussion on 
 the local department store situation, where a number of leading houses have 
 banned colored trade….He urged a campaign of education to build up colored 
 trade, train efficient personnel and produce finance to operate them.78 
 
 Judge J. N. Ullman, president of the League, declared that in the matter of 
 selecting whomsoever they wished as customers and shutting their doors to those 
 persons they did not wish, the stores were within their legal rights, according to 
 his knowledge of the law….Judge Ullman pointed out that by attacking the 
 fundamental problems of constructive economic welfare, the league hoped to 
 make conditions wherein such problems as these would solve themselves.79 
 
It is clear from the department store battle that the Urban League preferred to take a 
measured approach to the issue. It did not advocate for boycotting of stores or other 
riskier tactics. Instead, it suggested conducting a survey of stores and building up the 
capacity to train black workers for store positions so that black employment in stores 
could be sustained. Boycott efforts were seen as jeopardizing long-term change. Later 
years would mark a shift to lobbying with employers and local officials to break down 
barriers to black employment. 
 Urban League strategies and tactics did not change much over time, and they 
employed a fairly formulaic method when lobbying for the expansion of economic 
opportunities. A few cases of the League’s work in the 1930s and 1940s demonstrate this. 
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 Six Negro case workers have been appointed by the Baltimore Emergency Relief 
 Commission and two colored interviewers have been placed in the new 
 Transience Bureau operated by the Government. These results were the results of 
 recommendations made by the League to relief authorities on the advantages of 
 using colored personnel in the treatment of Negro relief problems. 80 
 
Between 1933 and 1934, the Urban League lobbied the Baltimore Emergency Relief 
Commission to advocate for black employment on the new sectors opened under New 
Deal policy. The tactics used did not involve mass mobilization, as there is no evidence 
of mass meetings or engaging its membership in any way; however, its efforts to open 
employment sectors were aimed at opening the doors for middle-class and working-class 
blacks. The Urban League behaved much differently than the City-Wide Young People’s 
Forum on employment matters. The same practice of negotiating with officials to break 
the color barrier in employment extended into the 1940s. Cases from the Urban League 
Annual Reports from 1940 and 1941 reveal that negotiating with officials remained the 
primary strategy for opening employment barriers.  
 When Negro carpenters applied for work in the early stages of the work at Ft. 
 Meade, officials in charge of construction and of the carpenters’ union told them 
 “no plans had been made to use colored mechanics.” At this point the League 
 entered the picture and negotiated with the Consolidated Engineering Company, 
 with officials of the Local No. 101 and with the office of Dr. Robert C. Weaver, 
 Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense....A total of 147 Negro 
 carpenters have been employed and they have chalked up an enviable 
 record….This achievement was based on two years of organization work carried 
 on by the League, through the Baltimore Building Trades Association. Local No. 
 544, International Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, affiliated with the 
 American Federation of Labor....81 
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 A Negro electrician was employed on a construction job at Edgewood Arsenal as 
 a result of work done by our Industrial Department. It was the first time in the 
 history of Baltimore, that a Negro was admitted into the Electrical Workers 
 Union, A.F. of L. The League’s Executive secured this opening and helped to iron 
 out the problems of union affiliation involved.82 
 
A final case of the League’s efforts demonstrates its work outside of economic issues. 
Although the bulk of its work centered on getting blacks into jobs previously unavailable, 
work was also focused on social welfare. For example, in 1943, the Urban League was a 
key partner in working with the federal and local housing authority to build public 
housing for blacks.  
 Staff members have worked closely with the Federal Public Housing Authority, 
 the National Housing Agency, Baltimore Housing Authority, and the Citizens 
 Planning and Housing Association in matters of site selection, obtaining pertinent 
 data and interpreting housing needs. Both in the matter of temporary housing for 
 the immigrant Negro war workers and permanent housing the League has given 
 guidance and direction....The League has also supplied private builders with 
 scientific data on Negro family life, income, etc., which was used in plans for 
 additional housing developments now being constructed for Negro workers in 
 several areas of the city and surrounding territory.83 
 
The Urban League went about this in similar fashion to other campaigns to improve 
social welfare. Much like its efforts to clean up the Lung Block described in Chapter 2, 
the Urban League conducted an investigation and used data to help inform its work with 
officials. 
 By taking a closer look at efforts launched by federated organizations we can 
observe that the Urban League followed a certain protocol. For the most part, it steered 
away from expanding its tactics and strategy into mass activism and preferred to network 
and build partnerships with outside elites. This method is well documented in the 
                                                 
82 “Baltimore Urban League Annual Report 1941,” Urban League Papers, Series 13 I: N Box 5. 




behavior of the Urban League in other cities. For example, Richard Thomas’ study of 
Detroit from 1915 to 1945 notes that the Detroit Urban League adopted skills in 
networking and “and cooperated with other institutions, organizations, agencies, and 
individuals in carrying out its mission of serving the needs of the black urban 
community.84 Because of its federated structure, the Urban League behaved similarly 
across the country. This method allowed it to unify its efforts. However, it is also clear 
that its organizational structure did not allow for expansion into riskier tactics and 
strategies—this work was left to autonomous grassroots organizations and sometimes 
offshoot organizations. 
7. Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined how different structures of organizing matter in the 
tactics and strategies that a group utilizes. There is mounting scholarship that discusses 
the benefit of organizational strength in building the capacity and influence of 
underrepresented groups. This chapter provided additional complexity to how we 
understand the impact of organizational strength by looking at the nature of organizing. I 
honed in specifically on cases of organizing around issues of employment. Four different 
organizational structures were compared—city council representation, autonomous 
grassroots organizing, offshoot organizing from a larger federated organization, and work 
pushed forward by a notable federated organization.  
 This investigation found that when faced with different constraints and 
flexibilities within organizational structures, groups devised different types of tactics and 
strategies. In some cases the structure of organizing was not successful. For example, 
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because of weak influence in City Hall, black council members were unable to move 
their agendas. Other cases demonstrated successful organizing structures. For example, 
the City-Wide Young People’s Forum was not formally attached to any larger 
organization and therefore did not have to navigate through any institutional protocol to 
devise mobilization strategies. As a result, we find that its strategies were riskier and 
evolved in response to changes in events. Without the constraint of having to abide by the 
rules and protocol of a larger organization, the Forum was able to innovate and made 
important gains. The findings of this chapter do not advocate for one organizing structure 
over another. Instead, by demonstrating how methods of organizing differed within 
organizational structures, we are better able to piece together a fuller portrait of how 










“There’s a new Negro emerging today. Two years ago it would not have happened in 
Baltimore, but today we’ve had enough—we’ve gotten up the nerve to March on 
Annapolis and we don’t give a damn what happens. We believe it is better to die fighting 




 In this chapter I ask: How can the configuration of internal organizational 
resources have a bearing on how black activists find the proper fit to push for demands? 
These resources include: communication skills, expertise, experience, and membership. 
Although disadvantaged groups often have fewer resources to count on in comparison to 
other groups, it still stands that what they do with the limited amount they have matters. 
In short, how resources are used can be consequential to the outcome. In this chapter I 
investigate how black Baltimoreans used the resources available to them when organizing 
against discrimination. This chapter shows that when faced with various circumstances, 
black activists responded and configured their resources in different ways. The two cases 
discussed in this chapter also illuminate the underpinnings of class-based activism. 
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The case of golf course desegregation during the Depression years sheds light on the 
continuing discussion of how the ideologies and goals of middle-class blacks were at 
times in sharp contrast to the everyday realities and struggles of working-class and poor 
blacks.1 The other case discussed in this chapter shows how a grassroots organization 
developed a multifaceted mobilization strategy that relied on cross-class activism to fight 
against police brutality. The cases in this chapter occurred during different time periods 
and at different periods of organizational strength. Therefore, the cases do not 
demonstrate causation. However, these cases show that in times of riper opportunities and 
increased organizational strength, resources can be better designed. Although the 
configuration of resources was not singularly responsible for the outcomes of these cases, 
a closer analysis of how local groups made use of their resources—and specifically how 
they packaged them—helps to explain how disadvantaged groups make use of coalitions 
and partnerships within their own community and build a storehouse of resources without 
relying on external actors. I find that black Baltimoreans were more successful when they 
found ways to customize their resources in ways that allowed them to partner and build 
upon a unique and complex web of existing layered networks that allowed them to exert 
pressure politics in more effective ways. 
2. Existing Literature 
 Several studies of social movements have made note of the importance of how 
resources are configured within the disadvantaged group. They note that how a group 
positions its resources can influence the outcome. In Aldon Morris’ effective analysis of 
the modern-day Civil Rights Movement and the protest organizations in Montgomery, 
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Alabama, he stresses the importance of how a disadvantaged group makes use of its 
resources and how those configurations can have lasting impacts on the strategies 
employed. In Morris’ estimation, some configurations work better not only in light of the 
problem at hand but also in relation to how the masses will react and participate. For 
example, Morris explains that the formal organizational structure of the NAACP was not 
the best-positioned resource for the formation of the Montgomery bus boycott, and 
instead leaders had to craft new resources and institutions within existing resources and 
institutions. New resource configurations were formed, and grassroots organizations 
“were able to organize the black masses because they themselves were mass-based 
organizations that had grown directly out of a mass-based institution, the black church.”2  
 In Morris’ investigation, local NAACP leaders were cognizant of the limits of 
advancing the NAACP to tackle the bus boycott and decided to reconfigure their 
resources and form a new organization grown organically from the NAACP to take on 
the bus boycott. In their estimation, the “red tape” and the limits of the organizational 
structure of the NAACP would negatively impact their chances for success.3 Morris also 
notes that the bureaucratic structure and the formal nature of the NAACP was not the 
most complementary resource for the tasks of the bus boycott. Instead, local-level groups 
at the grassroots were best-positioned to build the movement and to gain the trust and 
participation of the masses.”4  
 McAdam also analyzed the modern-day Civil Rights Movement to make an 
argument on the configuration of a disadvantaged groups resources. McAdam argued that 
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without the accumulation of a stockpile of resources, weak groups are not able to 
effectively capitalize on sociopolitical shifts to make change and bring about their 
demands. McAdam also argued that disadvantaged groups have the potential to marshal 
their own indigenous resources in effective ways but that involvement from external 
groups can have dire outcomes and lead to co-optation.5 Other scholars have posited 
theories in contrast to McAdam and argued that external involvement is a crucial 
component of success for disadvantaged groups (McCarthy and Zald).6 Seen in this light, 
the assumption is that disadvantaged groups are resource-poor and that more robust 
external influences help disadvantaged groups to better utilize their resources. Evans 
offered a key element to the debate on how resources matter and argued that although 
political underdogs may have fewer resources, they have demonstrated the ability to 
cultivate some resources internally and found creative ways to locate institutional holes to 
further strengthen other resources.7  
 Evans therefore offers an “in between” perspective: She doesn’t argue that 
external actors ruin efforts by disadvantaged groups nor does she extol that bottom-up 
movements must be solely orchestrated with indigenous resources. This project does not 
intend to add to the debate over whether the cultivation of indigenous resources is 
necessary to fending off co-optation. Instead, at the micro level, this paper provides an in-
depth look into how disadvantaged groups used their indigenous resources and the 
consequences of their behavior. In short, I look to how groups improvised and crafted 
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what they had available to them amidst exogenous circumstances such as the economic 
climate, political shifts, or the size of the black community, for example. What I find and 
argue in this chapter is that disadvantaged groups sometimes incubate their indigenous 
resources in innovative ways and the result is a complex web of internal and overlapping 
networks that can have important outcomes.  
3. The Monumental Golf Club and Golf Course Desegregation 
 In the summer of 1934, the Monumental Golf Club led the charge in negotiating 
with the mayor and Park Board to grant exclusive rights to black golfers to play at the 
municipal Carroll Park golf course. The drive to secure rights for black golfers represents 
a peculiar issue given the economic realities of the period. The timing of the golf 
integration battle may initially appear unusual. Admittedly, the golf case is not fully 
inclusive of the concerns of black Baltimoreans in the Depression era. What this case 
does reveal is the heterogeneity of black organizing at this time. Although golf 
desegregation should not be classified as the norm in terms of black organizing, it is 
important that we do not ignore the presence of black middle-class activism and the 
lessons learned from how they organized. Existing work has cautioned the inclusiveness 
of uplift ideology and middle-class agenda-setting.  
 Although blacks believed they were opposing racism by emphasizing class 
 differences, uplift ideology had as much to do with race as class...Uplift, among 
 its other connotations, also represented the struggle for a positive black identity in 
 a deeply racist society, turning the pejorative designation of race into a source of 
 dignity and self-affirmation through an ideology of class differentiation, self-help, 
 and interdependence.8 
 
Kevin Gaines raises doubts on uplift ideology exercised by elite African Americans. He 
argues that a cultural politics largely based on class differences resulted in reinforcing 
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racist ideologies and broke down unifying efforts in black communities. Although the 
golf desegregation case has theoretical linkages to Gaines’ argument on the actual utility 
of racial uplift ideology to advance substantial change, we are able to observe the inner 
workings of middle-class activism when examined strictly as a case of anti-
discrimination activism. I also found that even though golf course desegregation has class 
characteristics, the timing was partly strategic. With the city losing potential funds 
because of decreased usage during the economic downturn, middle-class activists argued 
that segregation was bad economically. They argued that opening the course to blacks 
would bring in new and consistent dollars. For example, the Afro-American claimed that 
golf course desegregation was “a good lesson in economic segregation,” because 
increased access to public golf courses would immediately improve the city economy.9  
 It should also be noted that although golfing represented a middle-class sport, 
considerations of costliness were taken into consideration when the Monumental Golf 
Club mounted its efforts. In its early stages, there were discussions surrounding the 
potential drawbacks of the cost associated with buying golf equipment and ways to 
circumvent expenses. A meeting recap published in the Afro-American recounted:  
  
 The matter of golf equipment costs was also discussed, and statements of several 
 of the club members who have made purchases recently disclosed that the 
 essential clubs, a bag, tees and six balls could be purchased for considerably less 
 than $10. The fear was expressed that misunderstanding of the expenses involved 
 had interfered with the plans of numerous prospective players who did not own 
 equipment.10 
 
The golf course battle was not crafted entirely as a middle-class issue, although it is clear 
that realities of class are inherent. It is clear that the purchase of golf equipment and the 
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fees to play were prohibitive for a large segment of Baltimore’s black population. Given 
that, the analysis of the push for a black golf course should be understood as an effort that 
targeted racial exclusion but did not mobilize the masses per se. The golf course case is 
worthy to include in this project for a few reasons. Foremost, case selection has been 
guided by instances where Baltimoreans have taken on local issues that require working 
with local institutions or parties. The golf course case represents the work of a local 
group working with the Park Board and City Hall. Secondly, cases were chosen that 
involved local people who devised innovative ways to spark civic engagement.  
The Work of the Monumental Golf Club 
 
 The Monumental Golf Club developed as an offshoot organization of the 
Baltimore Urban League—a federated organization grounded in improving the 
employment opportunities for blacks. In ways that mirrored the work of the City-Wide 
Young People’s Forum, the golf course battle demonstrates the ways that black 
Baltimoreans created new organizational structures. And also like the Forum, members of 
the Monumental Golf Club utilized their resources and the availability of layered 
networks. For example, Edward Lewis was the president of the Urban League and also 
served as the president of the Monumental Golf Club, which for the most part served 
middle-class interests. His layered networks speak to Juanita Jackson’s involvement with 
the NAACP and her work with the City-Wide Young People’s Forum. These cases 
ultimately demonstrate the complexity of affiliations and the ways that individuals 
mimicked their leadership into other organizational structures.  
 The Monumental Golf Club was formed in 1934 for the specific purpose of 




black golfers did not have access to municipal golf courses. Moreover, at the time, black 
golf clubs were active in other parts of the country as well, so there was nothing 
particularly unique about the existence of a black golf club in Baltimore. Both Chicago 
and Washington, DC, boasted black golf clubs that organized regional tournaments.11 
There is evidence that black golfers from Washington, DC, interfaced with Baltimore’s 
black golfers. More importantly, golfers from both cities discussed racial exclusion in 
their respective cities.12 Urban League president Edward Lewis was at the helm of 
leadership, along with two doctors and one attorney.13  
 The club found early success in its push to get exclusive access. Initially, the Park 
Board ruled in favor of the Monumental Golf Club and granted Carroll Park golf course 
as the first exclusively black golf course in the city. The success was shortlived after 
whites that lived in and around Carroll Park protested the ruling. Reacting to constituents, 
Mayor Jackson suspended his call to offer unlimited access to black golfers in response to 
the white protesters, and ordered further investigation into the matter. At its early stages, 
there is virtually no evidence that the Monumental Golf Club participated in any 
partnering or cooperation with other organizations after the ruling was suspended. This is 
surprising, given the growing organizational strength in the city at the time. Instead, in 
acting as an offshoot organization of the Urban League, the Monumental Golf Club did 
little to stray away from the formality of the Urban League and chose not to advance 
riskier strategies such as picketing. In comparison to the workings of the Forum, that 
operated strictly autonomously, the strategies of the Monumental Golf Club were more in 
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line with the habits of the Urban League. The main difference was that the Urban League 
took on issues of employment access and social welfare, and this effort had everything to 
do with leisure and integration (and advocating for access to places of leisure was not in 
the purview of the Urban League). 
  Instead of broadening its influence amidst adversity, the Club met with Mayor 
Jackson directly and offered a proposal that would let black golfers play on the golf 
course exclusively on Saturdays and allow the Park Board to sort through the protests and 
demands of the white citizens during the week. This move signals both a commitment to 
mounting tight-knit strategies and also confidence in persuading city government 
directly. We can surmise that Edward Lewis gravitated to this strategy because his work 
with the Urban League involved direct contact with city officials and he was behaving 
much like he would with the Urban League, merely representing a different group with a 
different agenda. In short, the leadership was the same and the initial strategies remained 
the same. The narrow strategy to rely solely on city officials was not without opposition.  
 Carl Murphy, editor of the Afro-American, was clear in his disappointment with 
the golf club’s strategy. Murphy offered a more aggressive strategy that borrowed from 
the experiences of the grocery store picketers. Murphy argued that the black golfers 
should play golf at the course and make the necessary arrangements to inform the police 
in advance. Demonstrating knowledge of NAACP strategies, Carl Murphy argued that 
the police would arrest any protesters, and since there was no official Jim Crow law 





 Instead of setting up for themselves a Jim Crow course, local golfers should 
 present themselves at any of the municipal courses, making sure in advance that a 
 police officer will be present to make an arrest. In view of the fact that Rule No. 1 
 of the park board is that the facilities of all parks should be open to all citizens, a 
 test case in the courts should settle once and for all the rights of colored citizens in 
 that respect. That, after all, is the principal issue involved.14  
 
Carl Murphy spoke out against an all-black course and favored taking efforts to integrate 
the city’s courses—a move that would involve preparations for a legal battle to challenge 
the validity of segregated city park space. His arguments are indicative of his continued 
correspondence with the national office of the NAACP during this time. Carl Murphy 
would later sit on the national office’s board of directors and stay in constant 
communication regarding the leadership of the local NAACP branch while the golf 
course battle was simmering.  
 Heeding Carl Murphy’s suggestions, the Monumental Golf Club decided to 
pursue a test case only if the ruling of the park board was reversed upon the scheduled 
neighborhood meeting between the Park Board and the white residents of Carroll Park. 
Equipped with members from the black Baltimore elite, the Monumental Golf Club 
announced that club attorney, Dallas Nicholas, had prepared a writ of mandamus in 
anticipation of any ruling that would forbid black golfers from using Carroll Park.15 
The Golf Course Hearing and Aftermath 
 
 Neighborhood organizing from the opposition stymied the advances of black 
leaders. White residents of Carroll Park launched an organized attack against the original 
park board ruling and had more political influence than the black delegation. According 
to reports, three city councilmen, a Methodist minister, and 13 community members were 
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represented at the park board meeting to hear the grievances of the white residents.16 The 
park board decided to reverse its original ruling and decided that effective immediately, 
the black golfers would be given exclusive rights to the course on Mondays, Wednesday, 
and Fridays of each week and on the first and third Sundays of each month.17 After the 
reversal of the Park Board’s ruling, Carl Murphy again spoke out on future actions: 
 We hope that those who sponsor the movement to wipe Jim Crow and restriction 
 out of public places will use the same determination and fight of which the 
 radicals are capable and tell the park board that they will not only play on the 
 Carroll Park course whenever they please but will also fight to have all courses 
 open to them.18  
 
The Monumental Golf Club did not bend to Carl Murphy’s calls and did not advance its 
efforts through the courts. Instead, the golf club’s leadership went back to discussions 
with City Hall with the goal of improving golf courses. Their discussions with City Hall 
surrounding improvements to the course again involved singular efforts that mirrored 
their leadership experiences with the Urban League.  
 In contrasting the work of the City-Wide Young People’s Forum and the 
Monumental Golf Club, what sticks out is that the golf club was led by the president of 
an established organization, whereas Juanita Jackson was an emerging leader with no 
solidified leadership responsibilities to another organization. Perhaps Edward Lewis did 
not advance a strategy that involved any partnerships or cooperation with other groups 
because he relied on the networks and resources available as president of the Urban 
League. Regardless of the motives behind different strategies, the experiences of the 
Monumental Golf Club highlight how the organizational structure of an offshoot 
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organization with deep formal connections to a federated organization often mimic rather 
than expand strategies. An important question is what evidence is available to make the 
connection between the Monumental Golf Club and the Urban League? 
 Archival records from the Urban League show that upon securing golfing 
privileges, the Urban League announced that it had in fact been responsible for the 
success. 
 Golfing Privileges for Negroes Secured by League. The League’s secretary has 
 been working quietly since January 1934 to secure the right for Negro golfers to 
 play on municipal course. On August 15th the Board of Park Commissioners 
 agreed to turn over the Carroll Park Golf Course for the exclusive use of Negro 
 golfers. To George L. Nichols, General Superintendent of Public Parks and 
 Squares and to the Board of Park Commissioners the Baltimore Urban League 
 extends its plaudits for this new venture. It has been necessary for Negro golfers 
 to go either to Washington or Philadelphia to play the game.19 
 
The fact that the Urban League claimed victory with no mention of the Monumental Golf 
Club raises complexities. Because correspondence records are not available, there is no 
precise way to ascertain the politics behind this. However, we can hypothesize a few 
possibilities. For one, it is possible that Secretary Lewis “quietly” formed the 
Monumental Golf Club and purposely informed the Urban League of his efforts after 
achieving success. This announcement is the only record of the golf course 
desegregation, leading to the possibility that this was not an organized campaign set forth 
by the Urban League. It is also possible that the practice of forming offshoot 
organizations with targeted objectives may have been commonplace among leadership. 
By doing so, leaders could strategically bypass institutional protocol, oversight, and 
communication with a larger body. Institutional protocol could be perceived as taking too 
long or limiting tactics.  
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  The Monumental Golf Club continued its work after solidifying golf course 
access. Records also indicate that issues concerning the golf course remained under the 
label and auspices of the Monumental Golf Club even though archives show that the 
Urban League claimed success. In 1937, three years after negotiating for black access to 
Carroll Park, the Monumental Golf Club successfully worked with the mayor to secure a 
total $22,000 in budget appropriations for improvements and a clubhouse for Carroll Park 
golf course.20  
 
4. The Citizens Committee for Justice: How a Mass Coalition Orchestrated a 
Historic Movement  
 
 What this next case shows is how resources can be cultivated in unique ways 
without external support. This dissertation does not argue that external support is a direct 
ticket to co-optation or a movement’s demise. Several studies have demonstrated that 
external support can be viewed in ways that transcend dichotomies and lift up interactive 
models. The case described in this chapter demonstrates how complex partnering can be 
designed around overlapping networks. It shows that mass cross-class coalitions can be 
built. And this case also reveals that grassroots organizations can cultivate mass 
coalitions. When it comes to the configuration of resources, this case shows how hyper-
organization eased partnership-building. Because members had multiple affiliations, their 
allegiances helped to pave the way for seamless coalition-building. In effect, hyper-
organization actually helped to overcome collective action.  
 This chapter also poses a question that may appear peculiar initially: How do 
personal connections have a bearing on an organization’s ability to partner? This chapter 
would be incomplete without a deeper analysis of the organizational leadership of Juanita 
                                                 




Jackson Mitchell, Virginia Jackson Kiah, Florence Snowden, and Lillie Jackson—these 
four women, mother, aunt, and daughters were key actors in this case. This case works to 
show how having family ties factors into an organization’s ability to harness resources 
and minimize collective action.  
Background 
 
 On January 31, 1942, Private Thomas Broadus was shot to death in the back by an 
off-duty Baltimore policeman. Reports from the shooting describe that Private Broadus 
was shot after attempting to hail a cab—he got in a physical altercation with the 
policeman that later resulted in his untimely death. What we learn from a closer analysis 
of the Private Broadus murder and its aftermath is it is not only another case of 
heightened racial tensions marked by violence between black soldiers and whites during 
wartime. In addition, his murder and its aftermath worked as a catalyst for heightened 
participation and civic engagement by the masses, and also played a tremendous factor in 
bringing together a multifaceted coalition of black leaders and organizations in 
Baltimore. Black Baltimoreans became politically engaged when local groups found 
ways to make use of layered resources and interlocking networks to bolster mobilization 
schemes and activate participation. Resources were layered in that memberships, 
knowledge bases, information networks, and leaderships were configured in ways that 
enabled multiple organizations with often layered membership bases and the same 
leaders to come together, but all under the guise of separate organizations working 
together. Networks also were interlocking. Rather than staying within issue and/or 
organizational silos, what we notice in this case is that actors engaged and talked to each 




 Local black activists in Baltimore took on the Private Broadus murder in ways 
that varied from earlier attempts to improve local racial conditions. What ensued was a 
use of resources and mobilization tactics that aimed to target a much more 
comprehensive platform than in previous examples. Black activists in the city protested 
the murder and used the incident to springboard a widespread and comprehensive attack 
on local and state race relations, political appointments, and the general social and 
economic welfare of black Baltimoreans citywide.  
  Nearly two months after the death of Private Broadus, a reported 2,000 black 
Baltimoreans marched on the steps of the State House in Annapolis, Maryland, in protest. 
In the short run, the murder of Private Broadus was a tragic event that prompted black 
leaders in Baltimore to organize a mass march to protest racial injustice. However, the 
larger picture of the Broadus murder adds to our understanding of African American 
political participation and activism. I argue that the murder of Private Broadus did not 
merely launch a singular act of political mobilization but that the events following the 
murder set in motion a larger strategy of political action for black leaders in Baltimore 
that were long-lasting. The aftermath of the Broadus murder also reveals the political 
activity of an autonomous organization that developed out of the NAACP, and how its 
status as an independent organization helped to break down barriers and usher in 
opportunities for partnering and collaboration.  
 
The Death of Private Thomas Broadus 
 Police brutality against young black men and women in Baltimore was nothing 




Baltimore City employed no uniformed black policemen (although one uniformed black 
policewoman had been appointed), and several African Americans had died at the hands 
of members of the police force.21 A 1930 editorial in the Afro-American titled 
“Murderous Cops” reported that eight people had been killed by police officers in the last 
six years. What the Afro-American took issue with was that the majority of the murders 
occurred at the hands of policemen in the Northwestern District—the area comprising the 
bulk of the African American population. The Afro-American reasoned that “If police can 
be gentlemen in southeast Baltimore, they can be gentlemen in the northwestern part of 
the city” and that “The trouble is police brutality in Baltimore has gone as far as some 
people are to stand.”22  
 The 1938–39 annual report of the Baltimore NAACP discussed the murder of four 
young black men shot and killed by policemen and called for the local branch to work 
more intensely on issues of police brutality via the courts.23 Records from the private 
family archives of the Mitchell family reveal that Lillie Jackson and the Baltimore 
NAACP were deeply concerned about police brutality and were active in testing out new 
strategies after failed attempts.  
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 In a letter written by Juanita Jackson Mitchell, we see evidence of attempts to 
reach out to the State House and concern over the viability of the NAACP in mounting a 
picket against Baltimore police stations. 
 Things are pretty tense. Mamma wrote to the Gov. for an appointment today—
 Monday—for a city-wide delegation and so far he hasn’t answered the letter. 
 Things are at a standstill. So we don’t know what. The NAACP lost the case of 
 the grocer— Freeland in So. Baltimore who was so badly beaten. The grand jury 
 refused to indict the man. So! We’re getting ready to have a big protest mass 
 meeting. We’d like to picket the police stations but are afraid they’ll beat us up. 
 So we are in the midst of preparation.24 
 
This correspondence offers a glimpse into how information was shared between Juanita 
Jackson Mitchell and other members of her family (namely between her husband and 
mother). Moreover, we notice that the Baltimore NAACP endorsed protest tactics in 
1941, but concern over their lack of influence and racial violence encouraged a more tacit 
strategy to lobby the governor. Evidence presented later in this chapter will show that 
after the Private Broadus murder in 1942, the NAACP would work collaboratively with 
the newly formed Citizens Committee for Justice and build a hybrid strategy that entailed 
mass protest and lobbying at the State House. 
 The facts of the Private Broadus murder have been well documented. According 
to official reports, Broadus spent the evening socializing with a few black soldiers from 
his base and two young black women along Pennsylvania Avenue—a social and 
commercial hub for black Baltimoreans—on the evening of the killing. Private Broadus 
was making attempts to hail a cab when the officer interjected and instructed the 
cabdriver to drive away because the cab was not licensed.25 Private Broadus became 
                                                 
24 Letter to Clarence Mitchell from Juanita Jackson Mitchell, June 2, 1941.  Private Mitchell Family 
Archives.  This letter is also evidence of the correspondence embedded in familial networks. 
25 No official reports or newspaper articles discuss the fact that the cab was unlicensed—there is probably a 




upset and reportedly told the officer that he “wanted a colored cab and had a right to 
spend his money with whomever he chose.”26 Broadus was promptly arrested and upon 
resisting arrest got into a physical altercation with the officer. As Broadus and the officer 
struggled, Broadus managed to break free and ran away—as he ran, the officer shot him 
in the back, killing him.27  
 Although tragic, the story of Private Broadus’ murder was not entirely unique 
during the war years. Robin Kelley argues that several black WWII soldiers rejected 
white officials such as policemen and bus drivers not simply because they were angry but 
also because they were making systematic efforts to protest white power structures. In 
Kelley’s estimation, these acts of deviance contributed to the larger narrative of black 
protest in the Jim Crow and Civil Rights eras.28 Kelley’s analysis fits into a larger body 
of scholarship that argues that WWII was a catalyst moment for opening new political 
opportunities for blacks, and that worldwide focus on American race relations provided 
important political leverage for black activism. Scholars who emphasize the importance 
of WWII on American race politics also argue that the origins of the mainstream Civil 
Rights Movement should be attributed to the political and economic changes precipitated 
by WWII.29 
 Police brutality was an important issue in the black press in addition to the local 
NAACP. In fact, in cities across the country, the NAACP was bolstering its legal teams 
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to fight on several fronts, with police brutality being one of the major charges. It is key to 
note that although organizational strength was relatively high, the mode of participation 
was rooted in legal means when the NAACP got involved. The national and local 
NAACP were not inexperienced with responding to incidents of police brutality, and the 
national office had precedents to draw from. However, what this case reveals moves 
outside of the NAACP and mobilization through the courts. Within a week of the murder, 
the Baltimore NAACP, under the leadership of President Lillie Jackson, set out to 
galvanize a larger organizational alliance to put forth a legal challenge.  
 The local NAACP was the first organization to respond. To mobilize for legal 
redress surrounding the murder, Lillie Jackson dropped in on the executive board 
meetings of prominent black organizations throughout the city and encouraged them to 
take action against the Private Broadus death. Jackson not only spoke out against the 
murders but also tasked other black organizations with sending telegrams to local and 
state government officials to protest their outrage and to push for a serious investigation 
into the Private Broadus murder and police brutality against African Americans in the 
city as a whole.30 This mobilization tactic was used in addition to a legal strategy more 
characteristic of the NAACP at the time. 
 Speaking specifically to Baltimore, the local branch had its own experiences in 
prior years with devising strategies to react to police brutality cases. In 1938, the local 
NAACP attempted to launch a legal attack to confront deaths of blacks by city 
policemen. Their attempts in years prior were characterized by failed efforts through the 
courts. Between 1938 and 1939, the local branch attorney W.A.C. Hughes worked to put 
pressure on the state attorney’s office to bring the cases of police killings in front of a 
                                                 




grand jury. The local NAACP was initially successful with lobbying the state to 
recommend that the case and the officers involved go before the grand jury. However, the 
case fell flat when the local judge refused to hold the trial.31 Lacking political influence, 
the local branch’s legal efforts were diminished by its marginalized status.  
 The local branch moved to advance the same strategy with the Broadus murder. 
The use of the same response and tactics speaks to what was probably the influence of the 
national office of the NAACP in molding and providing resources and funds to help local 
branches carry out cases involving police brutality. Again, mirroring previous attempts, 
the legal counsel for the local branch managed to get the case to the grand jury. And 
again, the first step in the legal battle was successful, with the grand jury determining that 
it found “a presentment of unlawful homicide against Bender and the State’s Attorney 
prepared the usual indictment.”32 In almost identical fashion to the NCAAP’s attempts a 
few years earlier, the case faltered and was dismissed when the grand jury abruptly 
changed its mind and ruled that there was not enough evidence for an indictment.33  
 What we discover in a closer analysis of the Broadus case is that an offshoot 
organization, the Citizens Committee for Justice (CCJ), developed from the NAACP and 
utilized different strategies and tactics that were not focused on the courts. By moving 
away from a legal strategy, the CCJ was able to develop its capacity for partnering and 
collaboration. When groups stick to a legal strategy, they essentially constrain their 
ability to mount strategies that require a deeper set of resources that are mostly found 
when groups collaborate. Legal strategies are often not about mass activism. By sticking 
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to them, groups remove the need to reach across their networks and join forces with other 
like-minded parties.  
 Additionally, the local NAACP branch was constrained in the tactics and 
strategies that it could advance because of a strict protocol imposed by the national 
office, and the Citizens Committee for Justice could work autonomously but also in 
partnership with the NAACP. After the NAACP’s failed legal fight against the officer 
involved in the Broadus death, the political activity around the issue shifted from a legal 
battle. The new focus moved from one of embedded racism in the police department to a 
highly organized campaign forged primarily by an offshoot organization of the NAACP 
to push for not only an end to policy brutality but also to pursue other issues. The shift in 
strategy after the failed legal attempt reminds us that building partnerships can expand 
agendas and issue platforms.  
The Emergence of the Citizens Committee for Justice  
 Emerging from the Private Broadus murder was the creation of the Citizens 
Committee for Justice (CCJ), an autonomous offshoot organization of the NAACP. The 
CCJ was an umbrella organization of black leaders representing all sectors that utilized 
several tactics beyond the courts. In many ways, the CCJ was also a massive coalition of 
black-led groups. The CCJ was formed by Juanita Jackson Mitchell, former president of 
the City-Wide Young People’s Forum and daughter of NAACP president Lillie Jackson. 
The CCJ organized the mass march at the State Capitol, lobbied state and local officials, 
executed petition drives, and hosted a series of rallying meetings— all resulting in one of 




 At the heart of the CCJ was the belief that all black organizations across the city 
must work as partners to weave a thick layer of black organizational strength to build 
influence with local and state officials to shift local policy. Meetings were held at the 
offices of the Baltimore Afro-American, with editor and chief Carl Murphy serving as the 
chairman. Carl Murphy was a longtime friend of the Jackson and Mitchell families and 
also sat on the board of directors of the national office of the NAACP—he therefore had 
interlocking networks with the organizational leadership and had layered resources 
because he was active in several black organizations at varying levels. Juanita Jackson 
Mitchell served as the director and clergyman Reverend E.W. White was the secretary. 
Both Mitchell and White brought their own set of layered networks that could be utilized: 
Grassroots organization, NAACP leadership, and clergy relationships capture a brief 
snapshot of the knowledge and experience that they brought to the table.  
 What is peculiar about the emergence of the CCJ is that although Murphy and 
Mitchell had deep ties to the NAACP, there is no record of consistent correspondence 
with the national office regarding the Broadus murder or the Annapolis March. This 
could mean that either the national office was not fully informed of their activities or that 
it decided against becoming involved in the work of the CCJ. The most robust evidence 
of involvement with the national office included reference in the Baltimore Afro-
American of a member of the legal team speaking at a mass meeting encouraging 
participating. According to reports from the Afro-American, Dean Ransome of the 




must be willing to march on Annapolis first. If we’re going to fight for this country, let’s 
make it a country worth fighting for.”34 
 The CCJ fully demonstrates how political underdogs find ways to build extensive 
partnerships. What the CCJ displays is how resources were strategically configured to 
aggregate nearly every corner of black organizing in the city. Ralph Bunche argued, 
“There is plenty of evidence that the Negro is a very political animal. And that his 
political urges will find expression in other channels whenever he is deprived of 
participation in the usual political processes.”35 I draw on this discovery to better 
illustrate how disadvantaged groups found new channels to package their resources. 
Nearly 200 organizations joined together over the course of two months to contribute 
their membership base, leadership, funds, space, and experience to execute the march on 
the State House.  
 The organizations that became part of the Citizens Committee were a vastly 
representative group ranging from labor organizations such as the Glass Blowers’ 
Association and the Women’s Auxiliary of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters to 
the National Civic Symphony Society. Churches, fraternal, educational, mainstream 
racial uplift, and grassroots organizations were all represented in the CCJ. As such, it 
would be inaccurate to characterize the work of the CCJ and the Annapolis March as an 
occurrence of black elite activism. Black Baltimoreans representing different economic 
classes helped to organize and sign petitions, speak to local officials, orchestrate mass 
meetings, and attend meetings and rallies, and took time off work to protest at the State 
House during a weekday.  
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 The vastness of the CCJ’s work was bolstered by its leadership’s ability to bring 
in a diverse group of partners. Because the leadership of the CCJ was connected to major 
levers in the black community and also had personal connections, conflict did not 
override as in the salary equalization case. Moreover, committee heads had access to 
mobilizing people from labor unions, churches, and education, community, civic, and 
fraternal organizations.  And those that were targeted to participate were targeted in 
multiple ways and on more than one front because they became involved via their hyper-
organization. For example, one could learn about participating in the CCJ efforts via a 
church, sorority, and neighborhood group that was involved. And further, by harnessing 
leadership from nearly every black organization in the city, the CCJ leadership helped to 
overcome the collective action problem by creating one seamless organization with an 




Table 4.1: Organization Depth of the Citizens Committee for Justice 
 
LABOR ORGANIZATION CHURCH FRATERNAL &CIVIC 
GROUPS 
Plumbers Association 
Colored Master Beauticians 
International Bed Carriers Union 
International Longshoremen’s 
Association 
Glass Bottle Blowers Association 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters 
Women’s Auxiliary of the 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 
Porters 
Colored Motion Picture 
Operators Union 
Association of Negro Technicians 
Steel Workers Organization of 
Colored Workers 
United Transport Services 
Employees of America 
Workers Council 
#14 American Legion 
Unity Christian Church 
Zion Methodist Church 
St. James Episcopal 
Whatcoat Methodist Church 
New Metropolitan Baptist Church 
First Baptist Church 
Metropolitan Methodist Church 
Olivet Christian Church 
Baptists Ministerial Alliance 
Bishop of the Methodist Church 
North Baltimore District 
Superintendent of the Methodist 
Church 
United Baptists Missionary 
Convention of MD 
South Baltimore District 
Superintendent of the Methodist 
Church 
Baptists Ministers Conference of 
Baltimore Interdenominational 
Ministerial Alliance Morningstar 
Baptist Church 
Enon Baptist Church 
Union Baptist Church 
Olivet Christian Church 
Baptist Ministerial Alliance 
Sharp Street Baptist Church 
Sharp Street Community 
House 
Youth Council NAACP 
PTA Douglass High School 
Omega Psi Phi 
Temple of Elks 
Northwest Residential 
Protective Association 




Phi Beta Sigma 
Falcon Rod and Gun Club 
Brilliant Start Temple 
Nazarites 
East Baltimore Citizens 
League 
Women Auxiliary Legion 
Post 
Eastern Star 




National Alliance of Post 
Office Employees Masonic 
Grand Lodge of Maryland, 
Business and Professional 
Girls 
Monumental Lodge of Elks 
Pride of Baltimore Elks  
Douglass Practical Nurses 
Club 
Women’s Auxiliary St. 
James Church 
Jolly Lads Pleasure Club 
Baltimore Citizens League 
Underwriters Association 
Alpha Kappa Alpha 
Women’s Society  
Big Sisters 
Clean Block Campaign 
Harper Temple Elks, 
Beauticians Association 
East Baltimore Residential 
Protective Association 







Colored Democrats Club 
Young MD Colored Democrats 
Citywide Republican Club 
Women’s Society Metropolitan 
Baptists Church 





PTA Dunbar High School 
National Association of College 
Women 
National Association of College 
Women Morgan State College 






The CCJ devised a comprehensive set of demands to challenge local policy. These 
demands included:  
1. For Mayor Howard Jackson to appoint a black member of school board to fill one 
of three vacancies on the board; 
2. A thorough investigation into police brutality; 
3. For the city to hire uniformed rather than plain-clothed black policemen; 
4. For Mayor Jackson to appoint a black magistrate to the Northwest Police District; 
5. For the city to hire an additional black policewoman; 
6. The appointment of a black magistrate; 
7. For the Governor to appoint a black member of the Crownsville State Hospital 
Board; 
8. For the Governor to appoint a black member of the Henryton Sanatorium Board.1 
The CCJ displayed expertise in building partnerships and a solid organizational structure 
in ways that strongly mirrored the structure of both the NAACP and the City-Wide 
Young People’s Forum. The CCJ replicated models that worked in the past. This offers 
evidence for how autonomous offshoot organizations functioned—many were led by 
seasoned leaders in the community who utilized the lessons learned from their previous 
experiences and implemented a set of best practices in how to package different 
resources. For example, the CCJ designed an elaborate committee system. To mobilize 
partnering organizations and strategize around the best tactics to enforce these demands, 
the Citizens Committee set up the following committees—Civic, Fraternal, Speakers, 
Cars and Transport, Placard and Pamphlets, Social Welfare, Mass Meeting, Labor, and 
Petitions.  
 Each of these committees opened an opportunity for black Baltimoreans from 
various socioeconomic ladders and varying organizational memberships to fully 
participate in protest politics. In addition to the expertise and leadership resources of the 
                                                 




CCJ coalition, how else were resources used and packaged in important ways? One of the 
key features of the Annapolis March was the actual physical movement of everyday 
blacks to the march. For this to succeed, transportation had to be organized and paid for, 
people had to be mobilized and convinced to attend the march during a weekday, and 
logistical details had to be determined. The CCJ worked to overcome these problems by 
organizing mass meetings at churches to get the word out. To raise funds to finance the 
march, the CCJ used these meetings to garner funds. For example, the Afro-American 
reported that “Mrs. Juanita Jackson Mitchell, director of the committee, made an appeal 
for an offering to finance the trip, to pay for buses, trains and cars to transport marchers 
free of charge. Over $200 was collected at the meeting, and prior contributions totaled 
$300.”2  
 Black organizations and churches that comprised the CCJ enabled mass 
participation. The various tentacles of the CCJ provided both the supply of members and 
the work they needed to carry out their agenda. The mass coalition also helped to fund 
the efforts. The work of Nancy Burns, Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Scholzman, and 
Theda Skocpol all points to some contention that the civic engagement and political 
education of citizens are very important pieces to understanding how mobilization works 
and how people become engaged and participate in politics.3 They all display how 
ordinary people can become involved in politics and play important roles when there is a 
strong enough organizational apparatus to pass along important skills. Even if activists 
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did not know it at the time, the organizational planning and detailed structure of the CCJ 
afforded a tremendous opportunity to local blacks from all walks of life to learn 
intimately about the various components of political activism and also planted fertile 
seeds for an organizing tradition.  
March Strategy and Mobilization 
 The strategy of the CCJ was essentially a two-pronged approach—to push for 
large changes at the local level and to begin making strides at the state level. The CCJ’s 
lobbying efforts stated at the local level, where it arranged to meet with the mayor of 
Baltimore to see if some of their demands could be met in short order. Approximately 
three weeks prior to the Annapolis March, the CCJ met with the mayor and designated 
Carl Murphy to be the spokesperson at the meeting. Members of the Citizens Committee 
went into the meeting with the stance that they represented nearly 1,000 black leaders in 
the city of Baltimore from all spheres of influence and were an important voting bloc that 
could not be ignored. Therefore, it was a strategic move to build a large coalition to 
demonstrate to city leadership that the CCJ comprised a substantive bloc of voters and 
influence.  
 At the meeting, the CCJ made two specific demands: First, it sought the 
appointment of a black magistrate to the Northwest Police District and second, leadership 
urged the mayor to fill one of three vacancies on the school board with a black member. 
These demands were not new: In fact, black leaders in the city had lobbied for decades 
for the appointment of a black school board member.4 The decision to present this issue 
again should come with little surprise—at this point black leaders were banded together 
                                                 
4 See Hayward Farrar,  See What the Afro Says: The Afro-American, 1892–1950  (PhD dissertation, 





and were hopeful that they had more leverage in their coalition. However, none of their 
demands was influential in City Hall. Again, efforts to bring about substantive change 
were unsuccessful and indicative of their weak influence in terms of actually achieving 
results on issues that would change the scope of representation and formal political 
incorporation. 
 The bulk of the Annapolis March strategy occurred at the committee level. Each 
CCJ committee head lobbied with local officials leading up to the march to press for their 
demands. For example, Edward Lewis, secretary of the local Urban League, headed the 
crime committee and lobbied the police commissioner for a thorough investigation into 
police brutality and to push for increased hiring of black policemen. Lewis lobbied 
repeatedly but to no avail with the police commissioners. After meeting on multiple 
occasions to press for the concerns of the black community, Lewis’ direct efforts to get 
the police commissioner to agree to concrete changes before the march failed to deliver. 
Other members of the CCJ leadership used the weeks leading up to the Annapolis March 
to press for their assigned concerns. And in showing that their efforts were geared toward 
taking advantage of the potential political opportunity that the Broadus death could bring, 
much of the lobbying was targeting beyond the death with the goal of spotlighting several 
issues that disproportionately affected Baltimore’s black community. The ability to 
stretch the agenda beyond police brutality was enabled by the partnerships that defined 
the group—and by bringing together diverse resources with different areas of expertise, 




 A closer look at the committee leadership of the CCJ brings to light the layered 
resources.  
• Linwood Koger, a prominent civic and political leader, represented labor 
interest and asked for the appointment of an African American magistrate; 
 
• Donald Boyce presented petitions asking for the removal of Police 
Commissioner Stanton; Urban League executive secretary Edward Lewis 
led the charge on the municipal level to reform the police department; 
 
• Harry Cole, youth committee head and member of the NAACP Youth 
League, was utilized as the youth voice to represent black soldiers fighting 
for democracy; 
 
• Local NAACP branch attorney W.A.C. Hughes, Jr., asked for an 
investigation into all police killings in the city; 
 
• Dr. Ralph Young asked for African American membership on the 
Maryland Tuberculosis Commission; 
 
• Dr. George Crawly, president of the United Baptist Convention of 
Maryland, urged that the Crownsville State Hospital for the Insane hire 
African Americans and offer representation on the board; 
 
• Vergie Waters, president of the Colored State Beauticians Board, lobbied 
for African American representation on the State Beautician Board;5 
 
• Lillie Jackson, president of the local branch of the NAACP, worked to 
encourage the hiring of an additional African American policewoman; 
 
• Carl Murphy, editor of the Baltimore Afro-American and board member of 
the national office of the NAACP, was lead spokesperson; 
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• Juanita Jackson Mitchell, daughter of Lillie Jackson, founder of the City-
Wide Young People’s Forum, and former staff member for the national 
office of the NAACP, was the founder and president of the CCJ. 
 
 
 The CCJ’s strategy was also displayed in the planning of the mass rally the 
Thursday evening prior to the march. Amidst a packed crowd of 1,600 at the Sharp Street 
Church, Adam Clayton Powell—the newly elected councilman from New York—
addressed black Baltimoreans to encourage large turnout for the day ahead. In reality, the 
turnout was notable, especially given that it was held on a weekday with a reported 2,000 
in attendance. One of the most interesting observations from the Annapolis March was 
the inclusiveness of the organizing. The march occurred on a weekday, and many did not 
go to work the day of the march. Instead, they waited in line with hundreds to board 
chartered buses at the Sharp Street Memorial Church—a system that was orchestrated by 
the CCJ and its committee structure to spur massive participation and a feature that points 
to the march not being an elite gathering. Those in attendance represented members from 
black labor organizations to local churches to leaders of exclusive social clubs. On the 
day of the march, members of the CCJ met for two hours with three state officials, 
Governor Herbert O’Connor, State Comptroller Millard Tawes, and Secretary of State 
Thomas Jones, and presented their grievances in depth and offered their demands.  
The March on Annapolis: The Development and Aftermath 
 On Friday, April 24, 1942, nearly 2,000 black Baltimoreans traveled 35 miles to 
protest and lobby for improvements to the political, economic, and social welfare of 
black Baltimore. Juanita Jackson Mitchell, director of the Citizens Committee for Justice 
and head organizer, firmly expressed to Governor O’Conor that the march was the 




were thoroughly frustrated with the “smart-aleck” police brutality that white police 
officers imposed on black men and women.6 Juanita Mitchell went on to emphasize to the 
Governor that the 2,000 African American citizens in attendance were all citizens of 
Baltimore and represented a collective 150 political, social, civic, fraternal, church, and 
labor groups.7 Again, evidence points to an overt strategy to bring together a coalition of 
organizations in order to apply additional pressure to policymakers. Mitchell was 
deliberate in emphasizing the mass coalition of organizations that joined together. This 
technique shows how political underdogs bargained with political elites of influence. In 
her opening remarks to Governor O’Conor, Mitchell also stressed that in addition to the 
vast collection of organizations represented on that day, the NAACP also represented 
6,000 paid members and was committed to their fight.8 Although the CCJ was not 
transparent about its activities with the NAACP, when the time came for it to 
demonstrate its strength, Juanita Mitchell made the point to position the NAACP as an 
enormous resource backed mainly by black Baltimoreans. 
 Mitchell’s demands were firm and sharply directed—speaking on behalf of the 
entire coalition of black organizations and institutions in Baltimore, she argued that “We 
don’t need any go between [politicians]” and that the demands outlined should be 
addressed with no delay or lag time “but next week, so we can report to our people.”9 In 
her insistence that action be swift in order for CCJ representatives to “report to [the] 
people,” we can surmise that by design Juanita Mitchell expected the CCJ to serve as an 
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aggregate resource whereby leaders would share information and dispatch talent to assist 
with next steps.  
 The goal of the meeting was to send a strong message to all appointed and elected 
officials in Baltimore and Maryland that black Baltimoreans demanded better 
representation, more jobs, and better city- and state-run facilities. Additionally, the 
Annapolis March was intended to send a strong message that black Baltimoreans were 
organized en masse and in partnership. The demands of Mitchell and the rest of the black 
leadership contingent were that they would continue to agitate until city and state 
officials made changes to institutions and political processes that were rooted in racial 
injustice. 
 At the conclusion of the meeting, Governor O’Conor did not agree to any 
immediate changes. Instead, he noted that he did not expect such large and vast 
representation and was impressed with the thoroughness of each presentation.10 It should 
be noted that this was the first organized and direct effort to lobby at the state level for 
black leaders in Baltimore. As a result of the march, O’Conor agreed to appoint a 
committee to study the issues raised at the hearing, forming the Governor’s Commission 
to Study Problems Affecting Colored People. Across many cities, governors and mayors 
set up similar commissions. This committee was formed as a direct result of the march on 
the State House and shows that although the CCJ was initially unsuccessful in forcing 
change, its efforts helped to initiate a presence and set up the groundwork for the opening 
of influence at the state and local level.  
                                                 




The Governor’s Commission to Study Problems Affecting Colored People 
 The Citizens Committee for Justice was prominent in the early stages of the 
Governor’s Commission. Governor O’Connor chose 18 leaders, 5 of whom were African 
American, to sit on the Commission. Of those, three black members on the Commission 
had served as committee heads under the CCJ. Local NAACP president Lillie Jackson 
served on the Commission along with Urban League head Edward Lewis. Linwood 
Koger, the CCJ’s intermediary on labor issues, also was awarded a post on the 
Commission, in addition to the wife of former black councilman William Fitzgerald. 
Table 4.2 : Members of the Governor’s Commission on Problems Affecting the 
Negro Population11 
 
Name Profession Race 
Glen D. Brown Educator  White 
Bishop M. H. Davis Clergyman  Black 
James Drury Labor Executive  White 
Mrs. William Fitzgerald Civic Leader  Black 
Joseph Healy Industrialist White 
Albert D. Hutzler Merchant White 
Lillie Jackson Civic Leader  Black 
David S. Jenkins Educator  White 
Linwood Koger Attorney  Black 
Dr. E. Paul Knotts Physician  White 
Edward S. Lewis Executive Secretary, Urban League  Black 
J. C. Mattingly Retired Judge  White 
Frank Ober Attorney  White 
Charles A. Piper Banker  White 
Dr. R. H. Riley State Director of Health  White 
John N. Scarff Architect White 
Daniel Siemon Personnel Director White 
Judge M. A. Soper United States Judge White 
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The bulk of members on the Commission were from the white elite—judges, business 
leaders, a school superintendent, and a member of the state hospital board made up the 
white representation. The Citizens Committee took clear steps to stay in front of the 
Governor’s Commission and was present at the Commission’s first meeting. The 
appointment of some CCJ leaders to the Governor’s Commission allowed the CCJ to 
remain deeply involved. In an effort to continue the push for their demands, Carl 
Murphy, chairman of the CCJ, reiterated the demands outlined at the Annapolis March 
and provided each Commission member with documents outlining the CCJ demands. 
Although black leaders in Baltimore were hoping that their constant efforts would yield 
major change, many were cautiously optimistic that any substantive change would 
evolve. As Carl Murphy expressed to Mayor Howard Jackson a few days prior to the 
Annapolis campaign, “Let us say at the outset that this is not a matter of sudden decision, 
but on the other hand, it is a step that has been taken repeatedly year after year and 
administration after administration for more than a quarter of a century.”12  
 At the May meeting of the local branch of the NAACP, Commission member and 
Urban League Secretary Edward Lewis spoke in front of 350 people. Speaking on behalf 
on the Commission, Lewis made all efforts to assure everyone that the Commission 
would not be a symbolic group aimed to quiet demands but that he and other black 
members on the Commission would work for their demands. Lewis also encouraged 
attendees to directly present their demands to the Commission. The initial hopes and 
expectations of the Commission were high. Black leaders in Baltimore grew increasingly 
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disappointed and began speaking out on the Commission’s progress within a few months 
of its existence. By September 1942, about four months after the creation of the 
Commission, Marse Calloway, local African American Republican Party leader and 
member of the CCJ, spoke out publicly about his dissatisfaction with Governor O’Conor 
and the Commission.13 The dissatisfaction of CCJ members speaks to a larger point—
although this case presents the trajectory of black Baltimore’s first successful campaign 
to build a mass coalition for local policy change, what is also revealed is that political 
activity during this period did not yield wholesale success.  
The Work of the Commission 
 By design, the work of the Governor’s Commission was more symbolic than 
action-based. The Commission was set up with six subcommittees and charged with the 
task of conducting research on a specified topic area and writing a comprehensive report 
that would be used as a springboard for potential policy change. The six committees 
included Housing, Health, Employment, Education, Police and Liquor Problems, and 
County Problems. Early dissatisfaction expressed by members of the black community 
was that only three committees had completed their research and culminated their 
findings and policy recommendations by the January deadline. However, some progress 
was made. The most notable success by January included:  
1. The appointment of the city’s second African American policewoman; 
2. The recommendation by the subcommittee on Police Problems that the governor 
bring to trial the officer who shot Private Broadus; 
3. The subcommittee on employment recommended that black institutions be staffed 
exclusively by black employees and supervised by black-led boards; 
                                                 




4. The subcommittee on housing concluded that housing in the black community 
was dangerous and disproportionately inferior to housing available to whites;14 
5. The appointment of a black member to the Crownsville State Hospital.15 
To the spokespersons for the black community, these recommendations were not enough. 
As expressed on the editorial pages of the Afro-American, “Of late, Governor O’Conor 
has been consistent in disdaining suggestions for the welfare of colored people made by 
his commissions.”16 According to the Afro-American, the Commission failed woefully in 
making any immediate changes that would substantively improve the welfare of black 
Baltimoreans. Although they were pleased with the black appointment to the Crownsville 
Hospital Board and the appointment of an additional black policewoman, they were 
dismayed when Mayor Jackson filled the school board’s vacant spot with a white 
member. According to black leaders, white leaders failed to deliver on matters pertaining 
to feasible and immediate political appointments. Later years would deliver uniformed 
black policemen, a black school board member, and housing reform geared to poor 
blacks.17 However, in a forceful editorial published almost year after the creation of the 
Commission, Carl Murphy expressed his outrage. Murphy argued that the final report did 
not broadly take on the major issues that black leaders had demanded, and he was 
particularly disappointed with the Governor and Mayor because many of the 
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recommended improvements only required their leadership and approval and they failed 
to make good on their promises.18 
Why the Citizens Committee for Justice and Not the NAACP? 
 One of the biggest surprises of the 1942 Annapolis March is that it was not 
organized and carried out by the NAACP. I argue that the CCJ spearheaded and carried 
out the march and pushed for demands at the local level because on some issues, the 
goals and agendas of the NAACP were incongruent with the desires of local black 
leaders. Additionally, the CCJ is a case of how autonomous organizations have more 
leeway to configure resources in unique ways. Prior to the larger successes at the federal 
level, the NAACP spent a lot of time ramping up branches across the country and 
increasing their national influence. As a result, salient issues for the national office of the 
NAACP revolved around the amelioration of issues that had legal ramifications with the 
potential to reverberate in other places. The local policy goals of Baltimore’s black 
leadership did not attract the national leadership of the NAACP (as opposed to local legal 
battles), and conversely, black leadership in Baltimore did not wish to be encumbered by 
the external oversight of the NAACP. The Annapolis March and its aftermath is in stark 
contrast to the NAACP’s involvement in fighting for the equalization of teachers’ 
salaries. Although the case did not involve Baltimore city proper and rather focused on its 
surrounding counties, this legal battle heavily involved the national office legal counsel 
and primarily Thurgood Marshall. What the Maryland-wide teacher salary case helps to 
demonstrate is that the NAACP national office was most interested and involved in 
instances regarding legal redress were precedents could be made to help further battles.  
                                                 




 The demands that the CCJ outlined did not connect to legal issues.19 There were 
also technical reasons that better explain why the CCJ, an autonomous organization, 
would emerge as the group leading this charge. Local NAACP leaders had to abide by 
strict rules on budgeting and financing, publicity, and correspondence with the national 
office. Allowing the NAACP to steer the ship may have slowed down mobilization 
efforts and would have surely called to question the specific demands imposed and 
strategies used.  
 Why the CCJ emerged as an offshoot of the NAACP and why its tactics and 
strategies differentiated from the NAACP’s previous attempts is important to understand. 
For one, the local NAACP did not further pursue the Broadus case after it failed in the 
grand jury because it was constrained by the agenda-setting and protocol put forth by the 
national office. The national office had a structured and organized system, and rolled out 
agendas that were sometimes incongruent to the wishes and wants of the local branch. 
Correspondence from the national office shows that a good deal of correspondence 
between the local and national office revolved around national campaigns to send letters 
to officials at the federal level to support or protest legislation. In Baltimore specifically, 
the local branch leadership and citizens that joined had local demands and simply wanted 
their membership dollars to go toward improving their conditions. We see evidence of 
this echoed by Lillie Jackson’s correspondence with the national office.  
 We have had a number of people ask about what the branch proposes to do about 
 racial discrimination in the Baltimore department stores. What is the status of this 
 situation?”20 
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 I cannot understand how the National Office expects a President of a Local 
 Branch to keep alive the interest of its community by always raising money to 
 help others, and not to help themselves. We have many Local Problems, and when 
 a Community designates its giving to a Specific Cause, in keeping with the aims 
 of the Association, I cannot see how a local branch can raise money for one cause 
 and appropriate it for another cause.21 
 
Lillie Jackson’s correspondence illustrates a clear frustration with the national office. 
Judging from her criticisms of the national office’s lack of support over local work, we 
can hypothesize that the formation of the CCJ by her daughter is not merely coincidence. 
Familial networks were key to the development of the CCJ and its goal to bring together 
a coalition of organizations. Without the larger apparatus of the national office, we can 
surmise that both Lillie Jackson and Juanita Mitchell, both whom were intricately 
connected to the NAACP, recognized that the CCJ needed to have a deep organizational 
base and a large network.  
 The formation of the CCJ also signaled a strategic move to break from the rules of 
the NAACP and to have full control over financial resources. As discussed earlier in this 
chapter, the large base of the CCJ was used to fundraise in the absence of a larger 
organization like the NAACP that could finance the work. The push for independence on 
financial matters reflects a confidence in funding the work and also the necessity of 
building partnerships to lobby on local issues and pull off the Annapolis March. A closer 
look at the financial relationship between the local and national NAACP is helpful and 
hints at the incentive to utilizing an autonomous indigenous organization such as the CCJ 
with deep resources and expertise. 
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Table 4.3: Illustration of NAACP Division of Fees22 
 
 Amount Paid by 
Member 
Retain for Local 
Branch 
Remit to National 
Office 
Regular Membership $1.00 $.50 $.50 
Crisis Membership $2.50 $.50 $2.00 
Blue Certificate $5.00 $1.25 $3.75 
Gold Certificate $10.00 $3.75 $6.25 
Junior and College 
Chapter Membership 
$.50 $.25 $.25 
Contributors $25.00 or more $10.00 Remainder to 
National Office 
 
Table 4.3 breaks down the financial relationship between the local branches and the 
national office. What it ultimately demonstrates is that local branches stood to lose 
money that could potentially be used for local issues, because on average, half or more of 
membership dues were required to be remitted to the national office. And as expressed by 
Lillie Jackson in an earlier example, local branch leaders were often stymied and 
frustrated by the fact that they would mobilize and recruit memberships on the grounds of 
how the NAACP could improve the status of black Baltimore and be forced to send off a 
large bulk of the funds for purposes not connected to the city. The financial drain of local 
branches and their financial relationship with the national office give reason to believe 
that autonomous organizations like the CCJ were developed strategically for the purpose 
of recruiting and mobilizing around local issues with the freedom to utilize funds and 
resources safe from meddling from outside groups. In the larger sense, this also illustrates 
how political underdogs analyze their resources and make adjustments to make sure that 
they get the most out of what they have. 
                                                 




 Further indications of the strategic decision to work via an offshoot autonomous 
organization includes the little correspondence with the national office on their work and 
planning for the march. A complete scan of office correspondence during the months that 
the CCJ was active revealed one piece of correspondence between the local and national 
office. Carl Murphy reached out to Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary at the time, 
informing the national office of the work underway. Murphy specifically asked that “We 
shall need in addition Thurgood or Andy or somebody who can keep our pickets out of 
jail. Will you be kind enough to call me at the office…so that we can discuss what is best 
to be done.”23 This singular correspondence is the extent of evidence of communication 
on the issue with the national office. There is no reply from the national office, and as 
stated earlier, one newspaper reports a member of the national legal team attending a 
mass meeting.  
 On the one-year anniversary of the March on Annapolis, black leaders in 
Baltimore had come to the disappointing conclusion that they “asked for a hog, [and] got 
a pig knuckle.” Speaking pointedly to Mayor Jackson, Carl Murphy argued that the 
Mayor “failed” the black community and would not support his reelection in the coming 
month.24 Although black leaders in Baltimore were disappointed by the lack of action 
from City Hall and the State House, by 1943, the CCJ was phased out and its leaders 
moved the agenda to the local NAACP. Now under the rubric of the NAACP, leadership 
from the CCJ helped to create a police school to train blacks on passing the police 
examination. The NAACP also worked as an intermediary between the police force and 
the locals to advocate for the hiring of black policemen. The move from the CCJ to the 
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local NAACP reveals the fluidity of the partnership and the strategic movement of 
resources. The CCJ did the work of public activism and advocacy, and the local NAACP 
took on the identity of developing a program that could garner attention and potentially 
receive support from the national office with the hopes of being replicated in other 
places. 
5. Conclusion 
 This chapter has examined the packaging of resources by black organizations in 
Baltimore. It has presented two cases: (1) the attempt to desegregate Carroll Park golf 
course and (2) the Citizens Committee for Justice and its campaign to fight 
discrimination and police brutality. This investigation showed that when political 
underdogs respond to their circumstances and find innovative ways to package their 
resources, there can be impacts on the outcome.  
 The findings from the Monumental Golf Club case show that sometimes federated 
structures were more nuanced. The golf course desegregation case brought to the surface 
how middle-class activists launched campaigns closely connected with their individual 
interests. We found that leadership from the Urban League learned new ways to package 
its expertise and resources and copied institutional experiences to better position itself for 
success. This chapter also analyzed the work of the Citizens Committee for Justice (CCJ) 
and how a mass coalition was formed to advocate for system-wide change. The CCJ 
benefited from building its coalition out of a set of interlocking networks and layered 
resources and later dispatching this arrangement in its efforts to unleash pressure politics. 
A deeper analysis of the CCJ revealed an interesting phenomenon—leaders in the 




group of partners enabled the CCJ to pull together individuals who filled  multiple roles. 
These diverse roles were fashioned into aggregate resources that were helpful in 
organizing the Annapolis March movement and lobbying for local policy change.  
 Lastly, the case of the CCJ also brings a new element to our analysis of 
participation and organizational networks. Key actors of the CCJ were either family 
members or close friends. Because the networks were so close-knit, information could be 
passed on even more seamlessly, and overcoming the collective action problem took on a 
new dimension. In all, the cases analyzed in this chapter show that resources can be 
reshaped and repositioned in ways that affect the process of gaining influence and 









“Now to tell the Baltimore people that the money they raise to fight segregation in our 
city will have to be turned over to the National Office would kill the Baltimore Branch 
immediately. In fact, we could not turn the money raised for the Meade’s Case over to the 
National Office, for it’s the people’s money, and they raised it for that purpose.1”— Lillie 
Jackson, May 27, 1937 
 
  
1. Overview of Findings  
 The central goal of this project was to investigate the successes and limits of black 
activism in Baltimore before significant structural and institutional changes, and to 
demonstrate how black activists went about navigating the best fit to put forward their 
goals. Most political participation scholarship dates the beginnings of black political 
activity after the passage of the Voting Rights Act and the heyday of the Civil Rights 
Movement. This project posited that we stand to learn a great deal about black political 
participation by refocusing our attention on the local conditions immediately prior to 
federal intervention. This project has illuminated cases of success and failure at the local 
level. At its most basic level, this paper has provided evidence that black political 
participation was not dormant in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Additionally, the cases of 
success in this project also reveal that black activists were limited by a lack of political 
influence and representation, and as a result could make important incremental changes 
but not wholesale changes to the racial landscape of Baltimore politics. 
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 This project also shows that black activists at the local level tailored their 
expertise, packaged their resources, and built strategies in a concerted effort to find 
congruence between their limited influence and the limited openings of local political 
institutions. My investigation suggests that black Baltimoreans, and blacks in other cities 
during this time, accumulated a potent set of resources via a web of interlocking 
relationships and networks, and organizational resources that were layered in 
advantageous ways. In each case of successful mass mobilization and participation we 
find evidence of actors that were intricately connected and that organizational 
partnerships resulted in resource sharing. For example, friend, cousin, and sibling 
relationships were used in building partnerships and sharing expertise. Likewise, 
individuals were hyperorganized and affiliated with several organizations at the same 
time. This enabled them to build a toolbox of resources from different places to use 
toward similar goals.   
 This project has also uncovered that different structures of organizing matter. 
There are clear differences between how a federated organization behaves in comparison 
to how a grassroots or offshoot federated organization responds to the issue at hand. 
Organizational configurations factor into the constraints and opportunities for different 
modes of mobilizing. Different organizational configurations have their merits as well. 
For example, federated organizations have the potential to offer disadvantaged groups a 
new set of resources and credibility to external actors. On the other hand, federated 
organizations generally have strict institutional protocols and processes that can block 




resourced and have the benefit of borrowing and partnering with organizations bringing 
different skill sets, they have both the autonomy and the protection to test out riskier 
strategies. 
 The discovery that disadvantaged groups find ways to tailor their expertise to their 
political environment provides further insight into the political strategies of African 
Americans in a period considered a dormant episode in black politics. Archival records 
analyzed in this project reveal that black leaders in Baltimore were very concerned about 
the problems in their neighborhood and communities. Although they recognized the 
importance of national campaigns to end racial violence and efforts at the legislative level 
to implement substantive racial policy changes, they were also deeply committed to the 
politics in their backyard. This project finds that in some instances black Baltimoreans 
found opportunities in local government that matched their set of expertise and exploited 
these opportunities. In the larger sense, this teaches us that although groups on the 
margins may lack influence, they can sometimes tailor their expertise to limited openings 
in local government. 
 Finally, this project instigates new questions and areas of inquiry. At the outset of 
this project, I fully expected to learn a great deal about the trajectory of black organizing 
at the local level. What came as a surprise was the emergence of family and familial 
networks. A common thread of success in the cases analyzed in this project were family 
networks, and particularly gendered family networks. Female-headed familial and friend 
networks were central to partnership-building and resource acquisition. This showed up 
in the leadership of Lillie Jackson, Juanita Jackson Mitchell, Virginia Jackson Kiah, and 




gendered politics is that their work was not firmly situated in the woman’s sphere. They 
built networks with black male elites and found their niche in mobilizing black 
Baltimoreans through various organizations. Their agendas were not constrained by 
gender mores either. They tackled unemployment, police brutality, education, and social 
welfare issues. This dissertation project offers an alternative snapshot into gender and 
black organizing during the interwar period. In this project we find that Lillie Jackson 
revamped and led the second-largest NAACP branch in the country and that her 
leadership persisted over time.  
 Linking with the tenor of gender and race politics in Baltimore during this period, 
this project also reveals that more study is needed on the inner workings of familial and 
friend networks in local organizing. What impacts do familial relations have on 
information networks—is it a benefit or can it lead to failure? How do actors utilize 
family as a resource? Where do familial networks fit into our understanding of the 
development of gender politics and the woman’s sphere? Where do we place alternative 
forms of networking such as family ties into the larger rubric of alternative methods of 
organizing among the oppressed? Where does family fit into our understanding of black 
politics; are there unique features to black political and familial life? This analysis 
contributes to our understanding of the trajectory of black political participation. Through 
the cases of failure and success in this dissertation project, we learn that black political 
activity was not dormant before the height of the Civil Rights era, but instead that blacks 
at the local level sometimes found ways to maneuver and shape the resources on hand to 




2. The Nuances of Federated Organizing at the Local Level 
 Up until this point, this project has made an effort to uncover cases of multiple 
organizations in black Baltimore that worked to improve local racial conditions. This 
dissertation did not take on the charge of dissecting the political trajectory of the 
Baltimore NAACP. Although this too warrants an important undertaking, one of the 
goals of this project is to argue that we stand to learn a great deal from grassroots and 
offshoot organizations in addition to larger organizations like the NAACP. Nevertheless, 
this project would be incomplete without a discussion of the Baltimore NAACP. The 
importance of the NAACP as one of the seminal racial uplift organizations is indisputable 
and well documented. The NAACP and its federated structure proliferated to small cities 
and towns across the U.S. and in both rural and urban spaces, pushing forward a unified 
method to fight segregation and discrimination. 1 Through the NAACP, numerous test 
cases were promoted that ultimately set the tone for some of the country’s largest 
advances in race policy.  
 At the local level, the NAACP was generally the most well-known race-based 
organization and responsible for igniting political activism and participation nationwide. 
Research for this project reflects the importance of the NAACP. As discussed in previous 
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chapters, the NAACP was partly responsible for jump-starting offshoot organizations and 
had the largest membership role in the city and in the country during the interwar years. 
 By 1944, the Baltimore NAACP was the second-largest branch in the country.2 
Local branch reports to the NAACP national office record that the branch had a total 
11,387 members and in 1943 held 23 branch membership meetings, 12 executive 
committee meetings, and five mass meetings.3 Branch membership activity did not slow 
down in 1944, with Virginia Kiah, membership secretary, and incidentally sister to 
Juanita Jackson, organizing a membership drive with 1,000 workers and 30 churches on 
board as partners for the campaign.4 Further, membership reports at the height of the 
1944 campaign placed membership at 21,719 in November 1944.5 
 The success of the Baltimore NAACP should not be understated. However, a 
closer investigation reveals that the local branch thrived amidst continued tension with 
the national office over its right to organize independent local campaigns. I argue that the 
Baltimore NAACP contributes an additional piece to our understanding of local 
organizing and shows that local NAACP branches sometimes employed special tactics to 
fight for their right to advocate for local issues. The Baltimore NAACP was deeply 
concerned about issues in its own backyard, and the national office of the NAACP was 
not always amenable. The relationships between local branches and the national office 
were not always harmonious, and there were consequences to organizing within the 
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confines of a federated organization. What follows is a detailed example of trajectory this 
tension. 
 The Baltimore NAACP was revived in 1935 under the leadership of Lillie 
Jackson. Prior to 1935, the Baltimore NAACP was plagued by several fits and starts.  By 
1936, the local branch was beginning to thrive. Evidence of the Baltimore NAACP’s 
advocating for autonomy over local issues is clear early on. In September 1936, Lillie 
Jackson asked Walter White for permission to utilize funds raised during the branch’s 
baby contest for the Baltimore County high school case carried out by Thurgood 
Marshall.6 Walter White denied her request explaining that: 
 Your request regarding the baby contest and the proceeds from it places the 
 national office in a most difficult position…. Here is the other side of the picture: 
 First, only the national board of directors has the authority to grant deviations 
 from the division of fees and funds raised by special effort as laid down in the 
 branch constitution. Secondly, if the national office makes an exception on 
 division of fees and funds raised by special effort to one branch, we could not 
 consistently refuse similar requests from other branches. Third, the national office 
 is pressed by so many demands from all over the country, many of them from 
 areas where local conditions make it difficult for local people to fight against 
 injustice, that the national office is in dire need of funds, especially for legal 
 defense.7 
 
Lillie Jackson complied with Walter White’s wishes.8 However, this exchange should not 
be overlooked for several reasons.  
 For one, the reasoning behind the Baltimore branch’s request to utilize funds from 
the baby contest signals an attempt to preserve its own treasury funds. Many branches 
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across the country conducted baby contests to raise funds, and a portion of the funds 
would go to the national office. By using baby contest funds exclusively for the 
Baltimore County desegregation case, the local branch would be able to keep more funds 
in its treasury for local efforts. With the refusal by Walter White to use baby contest 
funds for the desegregation case, the Baltimore branch was responsible for separately 
raising funds for the desegregation case in addition to its regular activities. As a result, a 
good portion of the funds raised at the local level would be used for the Baltimore County 
case and would go towards the national office, leaving the branch with few opportunities 
to raise funds to devote to local efforts.  
 It should also be noted that the Baltimore branch did not advocate to take on the 
Baltimore County school desegregation case. Baltimore County was a rural area situated 
outside the city and had no direct bearing on the issues the local branch was fighting for 
in the city. Instead, the Baltimore County school desegregation case was initiated by 
Thurgood Marshall and the national office as a larger effort to focus on legal redress and 
integration of public institutions. There is evidence that the local branch was not in full 
support of having to devote funds to the Baltimore County school desegregation case. A 
few months after requesting that the baby contest funds be used strictly for the school 





 The Executive Committee decided at its meeting this week not to accept the 
 $1,000.00 apportionment for the year 1937. The Branch feels that after sending 
 $300.00 for Xmas Seals in January, and $240.00 for buttons in February, plus 
 memberships, that they have already paid their apportionment for 1937, and hope 
 you will credit them as such. In view of the fact they are paying the cost of the 
 Baltimore County Case, which has to date cost over $1,000.00 and depleted our 
 treasury, it will be impossible to give any more money to the National Office.9 
 
Lillie Jackson’s continued persistence in negotiating with the national office for greater 
financial independence is clear. The correspondence above highlights the fragility of 
funds at the local level. Lillie Jackson not only outlined that financial responsibilities to 
the national office depleted the treasury for the local branch but she also hinted at the fact 
that the Baltimore County case was a hindrance to Baltimore branch. Additional evidence 
from 1937 provides more reason to believe that the desire to advance local agendas 
sometimes clashed with financial constraints imposed by the national office.  
 Although the Baltimore branch did not appear enthused to finance the Baltimore 
County case, it was anxious to take on a local case of residential segregation in Baltimore 
City. Again, Lillie Jackson pleaded with Walter White over the allocation of funds to 
tackle local work. In May 1937, Lillie Jackson asked Walter White for permission to 
utilize all funds raised at their annual mass meeting to fight for a local residential 
segregation case. Lillie Jackson emphasized that this case was “a local condition that 
needs immediate action.”10 Walter White’s response to Lillie Jackson demonstrates 
tension between the national office and the Baltimore branch. Walter White sent a 
response to Lillie Jackson that indicated his dissatisfaction with the Baltimore branch in 
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attempting to maneuver outside of the national office protocol, and for wanting to take on 
a cause that was not initiated by or in line with the national office agenda at the time. 
 I do not have authority to grant this request, such authority being vested solely in 
 the Board of Directors…May I say, however, personally and on behalf of the 
 executives of the National Office, that this request will be difficult for the 
 National Office to grant. The National Office has had to spend during recent years 
 so much money in Baltimore, in addition to the services of its staff and the 
 obligations upon us, particularly during this present fight for the anti-lynching 
 bills.…As you, of course, are well aware, we have to render aid in a great many 
 places in the deep south where it is not as physically safe for Negroes to be active 
 in the name of the NAACP as in a somewhat more enlightened city like 
 Baltimore.11 
 
The incongruence between the goals of a local branch and the national office is 
demonstrated in Walter White’s response. From the perspective of the national office, 
Lillie Jackson’s request was unfathomable given its investment in ramping up the 
Baltimore branch in concert with their larger national agenda. From the perspective of 
Lillie Jackson and the local branch, much of what the national office rallied around did 
not relate to the lives of black Baltimoreans, and its oversight hindered their freedom to 
carry out local work. I argue that the experiences of the Baltimore branch are indicative 
of a larger phenomenon during this time. Given the focus of the national office on 
agendas such as anti-lynching and legal redress, we can surmise that in places that were 
not situated in the deep South, local branches probably struggled with the national 
NAACP to solidify local activism. 
 Archival records indicate that by 1941, the local branch had abandoned attempts 
to negotiate with the national office over financial independence for supporting local 
work. Evidence from the 1940s points to the local branch’s devising new strategies to 
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finance local work in ways that stepped outside the bounds of institutional protocol. In 
1941, Ella Baker worked as a campaign director for the national NAACP office and 
assisted with the Baltimore branch campaign. During her time at the Baltimore branch 
she noticed that, “It appears that some of the larger contributions, especially from the 
colored contributors, may be withheld from the general campaign quota and earmarked as 
donations to the local branch.”12 And as Chapter 4 argued, the financial constraints 
imposed by the national office may have sparked the development of other grassroots 
organizations connected to the Baltimore NAACP, such as the Citizens Committee for 
Justice.  
 The Ella Baker correspondence provides evidence that the Baltimore NAACP was 
indeed developing alternative strategies to strengthen its work at the local level. As Table 
4.3 demonstrates, the national office took home sometimes more than 50 percent of funds 
raised by local branches. This surely put a strain on the budgets of local branches, 
especially since local advancements and achievements served as the primary incentive to 
encourage new memberships and maintain member involvement. Archival evidence of 
the importance of maintaining local efforts to provide an incentive is made plain by Lillie 
Jackson. 
 I cannot understand how the National Office expects a President of a Local 
 Branch to keep alive the interest of its community by always raising money to 
 help others, and not to help themselves. We have many Local Problems, and when 
 a Community designates its giving to a Specific Cause, in keeping with the aims 
 of the Association I cannot see how a local branch can raise money for one cause 
 and appropriate it for another cause, and keep up the interests.13 
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Scholars have noted the importance of incentives in stimulating political participation.14 
In the case of the Baltimore NAACP, it found ways to circumvent the constraints of the 
national office to build incentives for membership. Although the national office was 
helpful in providing support and resources, and the NAACP brand was valuable when 
building partnerships or lobbying for their demands, there were indeed consequences to 
being part of a larger federated organization. In short, the lack of financial independence 
to mount local campaigns posed constraints on the ability of local NAACP branches to 
recruit new members and provide incentives for participation.  
 The Baltimore branch continued its strategy to set aside local funds separate and 
apart from the national office well into the 1940s. The discovery by Ella Baker would 
later wash over because of more heightened conflict between Ella Baker and the 
Baltimore branch over campaign methods. Nevertheless, by 1944 we also notice that 
conflict between the national office and Baltimore branch over allocations of funds. 
During the 1944 membership campaign, Donald Jones, national office campaign director, 
noticed that leadership from the Baltimore branch collected memberships strictly for 
local purposes during its annual membership campaign. 
 While working as Campaign Director with the Baltimore Branch NAACP 
 September 15-October 27, I observed, on the part of Mrs. Lillie Jackson, Mrs. 
 Virginia Kiah, Mrs. Mitchell and others participating as solicitors in the 
 campaign, the practice of soliciting “donations” for the local branch to almost the 
 exclusion of large memberships.…The grand total of the above is $704.00. Of 
 this, $641.00 was retained summarily by the Baltimore Branch, $63.00 classified 
 as memberships. Of the $63.00 the National Office gets $55.500—which means 
 that of $704.00, the National Office does not get $434.25, to which it is entitled 
 under the Constitution.15 
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Again, Walter White chimed in that this practice was not permitted by the branch without 
permission from the national office. According to White, only emergencies warranted the 
practice of local branches raising funds for local initiatives with no proceeds going to the 
national office. In Walter White’s correspondence, we also notice a more blatant chiding 
of local branches in general and his insistence that they work within institutional 
protocol. In discussing the necessity of local branches’ obtaining permission for 
autonomous local work, Walter White exclaimed, “Were it not adopted and followed, 
there is no telling for what purposes some branches might raise and spend money which 
in turn might conceivably do irreparable harm to the Association.”16  
 Walter White’s concern about how local branch autonomy would harm the larger 
mission of the NAACP is clear. This speaks to the general finding of this project that 
alternative forms of organizing were created in response to the constraints of federated 
organizations such as the NAACP. And although Walter White and the national office 
were concerned about the inner workings of local branches, evidence points to the fact 
that admonishment did not always stop local leaders from acting on their own agendas.  
 For example, correspondence from Donald Jones, campaign director from the 
national office, demonstrates Lillie Jackson’s reluctance to cease the Baltimore branch’s 
practice of securing membership funds for local purposes. Donald Jones recounted that 
when he informed Lillie Jackson of the proper protocol to obtain permission from the 
national office in order to raise local funds, “She in turn informed me that her branch 
needed money for its operation, and it was their practice and that it was going to be 
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continued.”17 In the end, the national office had limited leverage in imposing rules. As 
stated earlier, the Baltimore branch was the second-largest in the nation by 1944, and 
drastically interrupting the relationship between the Baltimore branch and the national 
office could have painful effects on both sides. What is clear beyond the conflicts 
between local branches and the national office is that their relationship was not always 
amicable. Further, this investigation of the Baltimore NAACP and the city’s larger black 
organizing tradition brings forward new directions of inquiry into how local blacks 
became politically active during a period often described as the nadir of black politics. 
Judging from the Baltimore case, we learn that innovative methods of organizing were 
developed. Further, new organizational repertoires were created in response to 
constrained institutional structures in order to maintain incentives for mass participation. 
3. Epilogue 
 This dissertation discussed several cases of black political participation at the 
local level in Baltimore from the 1920s through the 1940s. Clearly, this project in scope 
does not provide an entire analysis of how black Baltimoreans maneuvered in and out of 
state and local political institutions for political advancement. However, this project does 
provide reason to believe that black activists learned from earlier success and failures and 
amassed a set of resources and experiences that were bequeathed and utilized in later 
years. The case of the Citizens Committee for Justice is an example of a lesson learned. 
Juanita Jackson Mitchell “practiced” her skill set in mobilizing the masses during her 
tenure as Forum president and refined those skills with more resources in the fight against 
police brutality. A brief look into the agendas put forward by black activists after the 
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Annapolis March is important and shows vestiges of an organizing tradition that was 
developed in the early years. 
 According to NAACP records from 1947, similar issues from earlier years were 
put on the agenda. Membership campaign literature from 1947 outlines the work of the 
NAACP during that year:18 
• “Fighting now for the right to use city-owned Mount Pleasant Golf Course.” 
• “Have fought continuously for adequate recreational facilities for colored 
children in schools, playgrounds.” 
• “Cooperated with other agencies in fight for adequate sites for additional 
housing projects. Continued fight for improvement of privately built homes in 
Cherry Hill.” 
• “Had ‘colored’ signs removed from public lavatories at Municipal Airport.” 
• “Responsible for placement of 12 colored librarians and opened the Enoch 
Pratt Library Training Course for Colored.” 
• “Fighting for employment for colored operators in Baltimore Transit System 
and C&P Telephone Company” 
• “Conduct each year a Police Training School to prepare candidate for the 
police examination.” 
• “Seeking prosecution of Raymond H. Wilson, rookie policeman, responsible 
for unwarranted killing of Navy veteran Benjamin Mason, Jr., father of three 
small children, who was shot in the back on August 29, 1947.” 
 
What is notable from this list is the continuance of issues that came up in earlier years 
and discussed in this dissertation. For example, the fight for revamping the city’s parks 
and playgrounds system in black neighborhoods continued and seems to have ramped up, 
work toward public golf course use remained a key issue, and the NAACP persisted in 
integration efforts. Key to the list of issues in 1947 is the continued focus on police 
brutality. It is important to observe that by the late 1940s, the Baltimore NAACP had 
expanded its tactics and strategies into legal work, showing that it had evolved from 
relying mostly on mass-level work. This is partly because of the general trend in the 
                                                 




NAACP nationwide, but is also indicative of the expertise of the NAACP leadership and 
the lessons it learned in the 1930s and ’40s. 
 By the late 1940s and moving into the 1950s, the executive leadership of 
Baltimore NAACP had amassed substantive legal expertise. Lillie Jackson, president of 
the local branch, would serve at her post until 1969, and shortly thereafter created a new 
civil rights organization called Freedom House. She would also later go on to receive an 
advanced degree at Morgan State College in 1956, bolstering the resources available to 
black activists in the city.19  
 Juanita Jackson Mitchell, a key actor in this dissertation, became the first black 
woman in Maryland to receive a law degree and was admitted to the bar in 1950. Upon 
earning her law degree, she would devote most of her efforts to legal redress and worked 
primarily through the NAACP. Specifically, she led legal actions to open schools and 
public accommodations to blacks in Maryland and worked side by side with Thurgood 
Marshall on the integration of parks in Baltimore and Annapolis, a move that echoes the 
earlier work of Carl Murphy and Mitchell’s method of building partnerships with other 
groups.20 The ties between Juanita Jackson Mitchell, her husband, Clarence Mitchell, 
Thurgood Marshall, and the rest of the national NAACP legal team is evidenced by the 
fact that the Baltimore NAACP was the headquarters for the NAACP legal team during 
the Brown v. Board case.  
 Finally, Clarence Mitchell became the national labor secretary for the NAACP in 
1945 and one of the most prominent figures of the mainstream Civil Rights Movement. 
Prior to that, he was the executive secretary for the St. Paul Minnesota Urban League and 
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the assistant director of the Negro Manpower Service in the War Manpower 
Commission—again showing that black activists in Baltimore made repeated efforts to 
build multiple networks. Although he only shows up periodically in this dissertation 
project, his impact on local and national racial politics is undoubted. Clarence Mitchell 
spent the majority of his career as a lobbyist for the NAACP and was known to many in 
Washington as the 101st Senator. Specifically, he was noted as “…a burly veteran of 
countless legislative skirmishes and undertakings, [who] played a particularly prominent 
role in passage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.”21  
This brief epilogue shows that key actors in the early years of Baltimore’s black politics 
later went on to become some of the most active members of the mainstream Civil Rights 
Movement.  
 Last, it is important to briefly sketch out a research agenda for future work. This 
dissertation makes a strong attempt to contribute to the growing American Political 
Development literature on the Long Civil Rights Movement and the development of 
black activism amid severe institutional constraints. However, additional questions 
continue to mount and new research agendas are crucial to progressing this important 
work. Key questions to explore in further work include delving deeper into efforts by 
working-class black activists. The data on middle-class activism is more abundant and 
has driven the bulk of scholarship. What is unclear in the literature is how and when 
working-class and middle-class activists worked together. Did black activists of different 
class levels interact at the organizational level and to what extent? Further, much of the 
work on middle-class uplift ideology portrays a black middle class that was dichotomous 
to working-class blacks—were these cleavages rigid and did working-class blacks have a 
                                                 




say in agenda-setting? To answer these questions, we will need to take a closer look at 
the records of labor organizations, read black newspapers with a discriminating eye 
toward letters to the editor and special columnists, and scrub the census data to learn 
more about residential patterns. Undertaking a more thorough analysis of these records 
will demonstrate a fuller picture of how middle- and working-class blacks lived together 
and what was on their minds.  
 Finally, beyond the next steps in finding more robust answers to how black 
political activity emerged, this dissertation takes a step to reveal the early work of some 
of the country’s most ardent civil rights activists. The cases and analyses in this 
dissertation bring forward the early traces of the civil rights era and reveal a piece of a 
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